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FACTS and DECISIONS BELOW: In 1966, blacks in Claiborne 
County, Miss, organized a boycott of white merchants. The blacks 
were dissatis f ied with, among other things, segregation in a 
number of public institutions, the lack of black clerks in white-
owned stores, and the failure of private businesses to comply 
with the 1964 Civil Rights Act. 
In 1969, the white merchants brought suit in county chancery 
court seeking injuncti✓relief and $3.5 million in damages for 
business losses. The petrs raised the First Amendment as a 
defense, but the state ct denied their motion to dismiss. In the 
end, the ct found that the boycott violated the Miss anti-boycott 
statute and held the 130 defendants (including petrs} jointly and 
1 
severally liable for $1.25 million. The ct also enjoined the 
boycott and banned picketing, persuasion, advice, threats, and 
intimidation aimed at discouraging patronage of resps' stores. 
The Miss S Ct affirmed in relevant part, but on different 
grounds. It found that the Miss anti-boycott and trade 
restraint statutes were not applicable. But it ruled that the 
lower ct's decision could be supported by th/common law of civil 
conspiracy and held that petrs were jointly and severally liable 
for resps' business losses. 
The Miss S Ct based its ruling on a finding that the boycott 
was infected with fear and violence. It endorsed the lower ct's 
finding that many blacks were intimidated and that they were 
forced against their will to withhold patronage from white 
stores. The Miss S Ct noted that the boycott included the use of 
"Deacons" who patrolled the shopping district to discourage black 
- -
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patronage of white stores. The Miss S Ct enumerated several 
instances of violence or intimidation: one petr warned a black 
not to shop in a white store; three petrs were charged with 
shooting into the home of a recalcitrant black; someone shot into 
_______, ---"? 
the home of another uncooperative black, and she was called an 
"Uncle Torn" at NAACP meetings; someone threw a brick through a 
nonconforrnant's window; someone shot into the home of yet another ---. 
black; a Deacon destroyed a flower garden of a black woman who 
refused to boycott; a group of unnamed black youths 
elderly black man; a Deacon grabbed a black man's package and 
denounced him when he left a white store; several blacks were 
threatened for shopping in white stores; and another black's ----------tires were slashed by unknown vandals. The ct also cited a -statement by Charles Evers, the NAACP Field Secretary, who warned 
a crowd that if they shopped in white stores, "we're gonna break 
your neck." 
Relying upon Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. Meadowrnoor Dairies, 
312 U.S. 287 (1941), the ct decided that states can ban political 
boycotts which are in effect violent conspiracies. In 
~~ 
particular, it ruled that the First Amendment does not include a 
right to commit a crime. The ct concluded that this boycott was 
a conspiracy to use illegal force and threats, in violation of 
Miss Code Ann §97-23-83, which makes it a crime to threaten a 
person with bodily harm to prevent him from doing business with 
another. Finally, the Miss S Ct ruled that the NAACP and the 91 




On various state law grounds, the ct reversed some aspects 
of the damage award and remanded for recalculation of damages. 
The ct evidently permitted the injunction to stand, but its 
ruling is not clear. The ct only commented that, although the 
granting of the injunction was assigned as error, it had not been 
argued and that the petrs had stated that "the injunctive aspects 
of the case are now moot." Petn App Sa. 
CONTENTIONS: Petitioners. Petrs first insist that the 
Court has jurisdiction to hear the case now. Although the Miss S -Ct remanded for calculation of damages, the Miss S Ct has decided 
the controlling federal questions. Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. 
Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 480 (1975). 
Petrs contend that the Court should take the case because it 
decides an important question of the application of the First 
Amendment to political boycotts. The Court has never explained 
how the First Amendment applies to political boycotts. In the 
course of this litigation, the CA5 found that the chancery ct 
gave insufficient weight to petrs' First Amendment rights. Henry 
v. First Nat'l Bank, 595 F.2d 291 (1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 
1074 (1980) {upholding DC injunction against enforcement of 
chancery ct decree pending review by Miss S Ct and this Court). 
The Miss S Ct painted with a broad brush and gave absolutely no 
protection to petrs' First Amendment rights. It held them liable 
for business losses caused by lawful as well as lawful 
persuasion, and enjoined all protest activities, whether or not 
illegal. 
t 
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The Miss s Ct erred when it relied on Meadowmoor. That case 
permitted an injunction against all labor picketing, but in the 
unusual circumstances of a labor war. Meadowmoor should be 
limited to industrial strife. In any case, the facts of this 
case do not justify invocation of Meadowmoor. There was no 
finding that an injunction against only illegal conduct would be 
insufficient. Moreover, the Miss S Ct found that threats alone 
would justify an injunction, a ruling that goes far beyond 
Meadowmoor. Finally, and importantly, the evidence showed that 
the boycott suceeded, not because of fear, but because of black 
determination to change the discriminatory practices in Claiborne 
County. The Court should grant cert to insure that Meadowmoor is 
not misapplied and to resolve the direct conflict between the CA5 
in Henry and the Miss S Ct. 
In addition, the Miss S Ct violated petrs' associational 
rights by holding them jointly and severally liable for all 
resps' business losses from the boycott. The 91 individual petrs 
were each held liable even though there is evidence only that 
nine petrs were involved in violent acts. With respect to 
virtually all the petrs, the evidence showed simply that they 
belonged to the NAACP, peacefully demonstrated, and supported the 
boycott. There was no finding that any of the petrs had a 
specific intent to further the boycott through illegal means. In 
effect, the Miss S Ct held that anyone who joins in a protest 
activity will be liable for the unlawful act of another with whom 
his only connection is common political affiliation. The Miss S 
Ct decision violates the rule of cases holding that in the First 
- -
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Amendment context a person may be penalized only for his own 
actions. ~, Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972). 
Respondents. This Court lacks jurisdiction. First, the 
✓ 
challenge to the Miss S Ct finding of damages liability is time-
,___ 
barred. The petn was filed within 90 days (with extension) of --
the denial of rehearing by the Miss S Ct. But in their rehearing 
petn, petrs challenged only the injunction. They did not mention 
the damages issue. Thus, they were required to file their cert 
petn contesting the damages question within 90 days of the 
original Miss S Ct decision. 
Second, the 1njunction issue is moot, and the petrs waived 
it in the courts below. In oral argument, petrs' attorney stated 
the injunction question was moot because the boycott had long 
since ended. 
On the merits, there is no need for the Court to intervene 
in order to protect political boycotts. This boycott was tainted 
by a conspiracy to commit violence. The record amply 
v 
demonstrates that the boycott was permeated by violent 
activities. There is no conflict with Henry, because the CA5 
merely ruled on the validity of a DC preliminary injunction. It 
had no record facts before it. 
Petrs incorrectly claim that this case does not fall within 
the rule of Meadowmoor. The record shows that the level of 
violence called for a broad Meadowmoor ruling. Meadowmoor has 
never been limited to labor disturbances. There is no question 
in this case of applying Meadowmoor to political boycotts, 
because this boycott was directed at businessmen, not 
- -
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politicians. Petrs ask the Court to review the voluminous record 
and make factual determinations. This Court does not decide 
fact-bound cases. 
The record clear ly demonstrates a central design, as ·the 
Miss S Ct found. Resps sum up: "[A conspiracy] is a partnership 
where one acts for all and where even innocent protected acts are 
a step in a criminal plot, neither innocence nor the Constitution 
prevents punishment." Resp 21. 
DISCUSSION: Cert should be granted. The Miss S Ct's 
decision imposes a great burden on petrs' associational rights. 
Each petr is held jointly and severally liable for resps' 
--------------·-.....__ ----------
business losses, which could total several hundred thousand 
dollars. Yet, with respect to almost all petrs, there was no 
proof that they personally either committed acts of violence or 
participated in a scheme to use violence. In fact, no one knows 
who committed most of the acts of violence cited by the Miss s 
Ct. The rule of the Miss S Ct decision holds petrs liable for 
peacefully participating in a political boycott, based upon the 
violent acts of some of the boycott's adherents. 
Not only did the Miss S Ct hold innocent boycott 
participants liable for violent acts, it also held them liable 
for innocent acts. Undoubtedly, a good part of the resps' 
business losses was due to voluntary boycotting by blacks 
dissatisfied with racial discrimination. Under the Miss S Ct 
decision, the petrs are liable for the losses due to voluntary 
boycotting as we ll as losses due to violent coercion. 
- -
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In the past, the Court has been reluctant to employ the 
Meadowmoor rationale. See Carroll v. President & Comm'rs of 
Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 18 0-81 (1968); Youngdahl v. 
Rainfair, Inc., 355 U.S. 131, 139 (1957); Cafeteria Employees 
Local 302 v. Angelos, 320 U.S. 293, 296 (1943). Moreover, 
Meadowmoor itself permitted an injunction; it did not authorize 
the imposition of damages on picketers who did not engage in 
violent or unlawful conduct. The Court should pass upon the Miss 
S Ct's expansive use of Meadowmoor, because of its potential 
effect on all political boycotts and its concrete effect on this 
boycott and others in Miss. 
As the resps point out, there is no direct conflict with the 
CA5, because Henry dealt with a preliminary injunction. But the 
Miss S Ct's evaluation of the First Amendment interests at stake 
certainly differs from the evaluation of the CA5, and the Miss S 
Ct also departed from the CA5's restrictive interpretation of 
Meadowmoor. See 595 F.2d at 303-04; see also Machesky v. 
Bizzell, 414 F.2d 283 (CA5 1969). 
The jurisdictional problems are minimal. Resps' attempt to 
block review of the damages issue seems meritless. If resps had 
their way, every petr who sought rehearing before filing a cert 
petn would be forced to file two petns, an early one raising the 
issues not addressed in his rehearing petn and a later one 
raising the issues involved in his rehearing request. Since 
petrs filed their petn within 90 days after the denial of 
rehearing (with extension), the damages issue is properly 
presented for review. As petrs argue, they fit the Cox 
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Broadcasting exception; the federal questions have been 
conclusively decided even though the Miss S Ct remanded for a 
damages determination. 
The injunction issue is probably not moot. 
concede that the boycott has ended. Petn 8 n.8. 
Petrs appear to 
But the 
injunction governing petrs' conduct is still in force, since the 
Miss S Ct d id not overturn that part of the chancery ct's 
decision. Thus, because petrs continue to be subject to the 
restraints of the injunction even if they are at present not 
boycotting, the injunction issue does not seem moot. In 
addition, the injunction on its face reaches beyond a boycott, by 
barring persuasion and advice as well as group activity. It is 
also important to note that the injunction bars perfectly 
innocent expression as well as violent acts and intimidation. 
Furthermore, petrs insist that they did not waive the 
injunction issue. They claim that they argued that chancery 
court jurisdiction was inappropriate on remand since the boycott 
which had been enjoined was no longer in existence. 
But even if the injunction issue is moot or has been waived, 
the damages issue alone merits review. And, the outcome of the 
Court's resolution of the First Amendment issues involved in the 
damages question will in effect determine the validity of the 
injunction. 
In sum, the Miss S Ct decision imposes substantial burdens 
on the First Amendment r ights of association and speech, and 
raises an important question concerning the scope of Meadowmoor. 
Cert should be granted. 
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There is a response. 
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To: Mr. Justice Powell 
From: David Levi 
BENCH MEMORANDUM 
March 2, 1982 
No. 81-202: NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., et al. 
Questions Presented 
Whether all boycott participants are liable for the 
violent acts of certain of their fellows? 
Whether all damages attributable to the boycott may 
be assessed regardless of whether the damages stem from 







- - 2. 
I. Liability of Individual Participants 
The participants in this boycott were assessed 
damages on the basis of the Mississippi common law of 
conspiracy. Under this law, liability rests upon an agreement 
e,-< -
to accomplish an illegal objective, or an agreement to 
accomplish a legal objective by the use of illegal means. 
On this record, the Court should reverse the finding 
of liability of each of the individual defendants. In cases 
similar to this, involving the liability of individual members 
of an association for the violent acts of other members, the 
.rt. "' Court has required a showing of specific intent to resort to 
violence or agreement to illegal activity. See Scales v. 
United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961); Noto v. United States, 
367 U.S. 290 (1961); United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 
(1967). The requirement of specific intent is designed to 
protect the first amendment right to associate and to speech. 
The Court should remand on this guestion. It would appear 
that very few, if any, of the defendants will be found liable 
under such a ~ dar~~ 
II. Damages 
By holding that individual members may not be held 
- liable without a showing of specific intent, the Court does 
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protect the NAACP from derivative liability--if it can be 
shown, for example, that Evers had specific intent, then the 
NAACP might be liable for his activities. Yet the 
organization should not be accountable for damages due to 
protected activity under the first amendment. Undoubtedly the 
bulk of damages here was due to individual, uncoerced choice 
to join a boycott. Outside of the labor or antitrust areas, a 
political boycott is protected by the first amendment. There 
must, therefore, be an apportionment of damages; plaintiffs 
are entitled only to those damages that they can show stemmed 
from unprotected, violent acts. 
Perhaps if the boycott was of wholly violent 
character it would be unfair to require a shopkeeper to show 
that his damages stemmed from violent activity and coercion, 
rather than from peaceful picketing. But this was not a 
boycott of such a violent intensity. Moreover, it is likely 
that the bulk of damages stemmed from picketing outside of 
stores. If this picketing was accompanied by violence or 
coercion the shopkeeper can get an injunction. It does not 
appear that the shopkeepers in this case took such mitigating 
measures. 
III. Injunction 
I am inclined to think that the Court should not 
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overbroad. Yet the question may also be moot, while the NAACP 
did not brief the question before the state Supreme Court. 
Perhaps it is best considered on a remand. 
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the outskirts of Port Gibson. The legend on the signs 
carried by them advised that the NAACP had Port Gib-
son under boycott. Although less frequent, there was 
marching and picketing in the small Claiborne County 
communities of Hermanville and Pattison. 
The "store watchers" or "enforcers" on occasion physi-
cally stopped and blocked black customers and instructed 
them not to trade with white merchants. Black people 
were threatened with physical violence, and threatening 
and abusive telephone calls were made to blacks who 
were seen trading with white merchants. Some blacks 
were physically assaulted for continuing to trade with 
white merchants after being warned. Personal property 
purchased in white-owned stores by blacks was taken . 
from them and destroyed. On at least two occasions gun-
shots were fired into the houses of black people who con-
tinued to trade with white-owned business establishments. 
The names of black citizens who were seen trading 
with whites were read out at NAACP meetings, and 
these names were published in a mimeographed tabloid 
callect the "Black Times." They were branded as traitors 
to the black cause, called demeaning names, and socially 
ostracized for merely trading with whites. 
In July, 1966, a group of young black men organized 
-.a_militant unit called the "Deacons" or "Black Hats." 
They armed themselves and purchased radio transmitters 
and receivers ("walkie-talkies") for automobile and foot 
patrol. They used this radio equipment to communicate 
with each other in surveillance of the white business 
houses. There is contradictory evidence as to whether 
or not this unit openly engaged in military drills, but 
the minutes of the organization showed that they carried 
weapons, purchased ammunition, and engaged in prac-
l
tice-shooting on a target range south of Port Gibson. 
The minutes showed that the membership of the "Deac-
ons" or "Black Hats" was comprised of the following: 
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The "prime mover" of this group was Rudolph S~, 
who came to this area of Mississippi rrorrr-eli1cago. 
Shields said that the organization was for the purpose 
of "frightening the Klan" and to protect blacks. The 
evidence is silent as to whether a unit of the Ku Klux 
Klan even existed in Claiborne County. But it is clear 
that this group of "Deacons" or "Black Hats" was a 
cause of pervasive fear among black citizens of Claiborne 
County, at le,ast to the extent of preventing trade with 
white businesses. 
Some time in the month of September, 1966, in Yazoo 
City, Mississippi, Owen Cooper, LeRoy Percy, and Rod-
ding Carter, III, met and resolved to secure a charter 
from the State of Mississippi for a corporation called 
"Mississippi Action for Progress, Inc." (MAP). The 
purpose of MAP was to develop a community action pro-
gram in twenty counties within the state "to eliminate 
the paradox of poverty." The charter of incorporation 
was approved on September 13, 1966. 
Claiborne is one of the twenty counties in which MAP 
operates. Many of the leaders of the NAACP and the 
- -
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SUPRE1\1E COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
~~2#~~ 
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NATIONAL ASSOCIATION Fblt"'rHE ADVAl-rciMEN ~ 1-<A__ 
. OF COLORED PEOPLE, ET AL, PETITIONERS v. ~ ~ _ 'f/ 
CLAIBORNE HA D~ E ;:oMJ A~ Y } : AL. N h J)-0 p 
~ RIT CERT 0RARI 1~ ii!ouRT · 
~~ ~O~ l\II SISSIPPI ~ _ If -Z 
· - - -- 'Jlun - , 1982] 
JUSTICE STEVENS deliven~d the opinion of the Court. ~ ~ 
The term "concerted action" encompasses unlawful ~  
spiracics and constitutionally p1·otected assemblies . q'l1¢ .... ~~.-,::::-
"looseness and pliability" of legal dodrine a~ ble to g!EJ -
ce1ted action led Justice Jack son to note at ·tain joint a~-
tivities haYe a "chameleon-like" cha:2.' he boycot~ 
white merchants in Claiborne County, ijlissis, ippi, that gave ?d _,,, 
rise to this litigation l1ad such a charncter; 1t included &-/ ~ ; ; 
mcnts of criminality and elements of majesty. Evid en?f - T 5 
that fear of reprisals caused some black citizens to withho~ /~ ) ) 
their patl'Onage from respondents' businesses convinced the .___ / 
Sup1·eme Court of Mississippi that the entire boycott was un- -- l..J.. })-~ _,, 
lawful and that each of the 92 petitioners was liable for all of -
its economic consequences. EYidence that persuasive rheto-
ric, determination to remedy past injustices, and a host of 
voluntary decisions by free citizens ,vere the critical factors 
in the boycott's success wesents us with the question 
whether the State Court's judgment is consistent with the 
Constitution of the United States. 
'See Krnlewitch v. U11ited States, 336 U. S. 440, 447-449 (Jackson, J . , 
concuning). 
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I 
In March 1966, black citizens of Port Gibson, Mississippi, 
and other areas of Claiborne County presented white elected 
officials with a list of particulai·ized demands for racial equal-
ity and integration. 2 The complainants did not 1·ecei ve a sat-
isfactory response and, at a local NAACP meeting at the 
First Baptist Church, several hundred black persons voted to 
place a boycott on white merchants in the area. On October 
31, 1969, several of the merchants filed suit in state court to 
recover losses caused by the boycott and to enjoin future boy-
cott activity. We recount first the course of that litigation 
and then consider in more detail the events that gave rise to 
the merchants' claim for damages. 
A 
The complaint was filed in the Chancery Court of Hinds 
County by 17 white merchants. 3 The merchants named two 
corporations and 146 individuals as defendants: the National 
Association for the Advancement of Colored People 
(NAACP), a New York membership corporation; Mississippi 
Action for ProgTess (MAP), a Mississippi corporation that im-
plemented tl1e federal "Head Start" program; Aaron Henry, 
the President of the Mississippi Branch of the NAACP; 
2 Port Gibson is the county seat and largest municipality in Claiborne 
County. 
3 The affected businesses represent.eel by the men.:hants included four 
grocery st.ores, two ha1·cl,rnre stores, a pharmacy, two general variety 
stores, a laundry, a liquor store, two car dealers, two aut.o parts stores, 
and a gas station. Many of the om1ers of 1.hese boycotted stores were 
civic leaders in Port Gibson and Claiborne County. Respondents Allen an 
Al Batten \Yere aldermen in Pmt Gibson, R. 15111; Robert Vaughan, part 
o\\·ner and operator of one of the boycot.ted st.ores, represented Claiborne 
County in 1.he Mississippi House of Represcntat.i,·es, R. 15160; respondents 
Abraham and Hay had served on the school board, R. 14906, 14678; re-
spondent Hudson served on the Claiborne County Democratic Committee, 
R. 840. 
- -
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Charles Evers, the Field Secretary of the NAACP in Missis-
sippi; and 144 other individuals who had participated in the 
boycott.4 The complaint sought injuncti\'e relief and an at-
tachment of property, as well as damages. Although it al-
leged that the plaintiffs were suffering i1Teparable injury 
from an ongoing conspiracy, no preliminary relief ,Yas 
sought. 
T1-ial was begun before a chancellor in equity on June 11, 
1973.5 The court heard the testimony of 144 witnesses dur-
ing an eight-month trial. In August 1976, the chancellor is-
sued an opinion and decree finding that "an overwhelming 
preponderance of the evidence" established the joint and sev-
eral liability of 130 of the defendants on three separate con-
'The complaint also named 52 banks as "attachment defendants." The 
banks answered that the NAACP had $16,800 on deposit in Mississippi. 
5 As a result of the plaintiffs' prayer for an attachment in equity, juris-
diction existed in chancery com-t. The trial judge ruled: "It was incum-
bent upon this court Lo hear the case in full once jurisdiction was assumed. 
To ha\'e heard the portions of thi s matter sounding in equity, only, and to 
have transferred the questions of tort liability and damages to the circuit 
court would have been contrary to the maxim 'equity delights to do com-
plete justice, and not by halves.'" App. to Pet. for Cert. 5Gb. The defen-
dants thus were denied a jury trial on the liability issues. Although the 
court recognized that, it had power to empanel a jury, it declined to exer-
cise its discretion to do so. Ibid. The Mississippi non-resident attach-
ment statute that pro\'icled the basis for equitable jurisdiction has since 
been declared unconstitutional by both federal di strict courts in Missis-
sippi. MP! Inc. v. McCullough, 463 F. Supp. 887 (ND Miss. 1978); Mis-
sissippi Chem. C017J. v. Chemical Constr. Co17J., 444 F. Supp. 925 (SD 
Miss. 1977). 
Commencement of trial was delayed by collateral proceedings in fed eral 
court. See H enry v. First National Bank of Clarksdale, 50 F.R.D. 251 
(ND Miss. 1970), rei•ersed, 444 F. 2d 1300 (CA5 1971), cert. denied, 405 
U. S. 1019. The District Court entered a preliminary injunction restrain-
ing the state proceedings on the theory that the merchants sought to in-
fringe the defendants' First Amendment rights. The Court of Appeals re-
\'ersed, holding that the mere commencement of a priYate tort suit did not 
itself involve "state action" for purposes of 28 U. S. C. § 1343(3). 
) - -
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spiracy theories . 6 First, the court held that the defendants 
were liable for the tort of malicious interference with the 
plaintiffs' businesses, which did not necessai·ily require the 
presence of a conspiracy. 7 Second, the chancellor found a vi-
"App. to Pet. for Cert. 2g. Of the original 148 named defendants, 16 
were dismissed by stipulation of counsel (12 had died, two were minors, 
one was non compos mentis, and one-the Re\'erend Dominic Cangemi-
,rns dismissed by agreement without explanation). One defendant ,ms 
dismissed because he had been misidentified in the complaint. The chan-
cellor dismissed one defendant-state NAACP leader Aaron Henry-be-
cause "the complainants failed to meet the burden of proof as to [his] 
\\Tongdoing." Id., at 28b. Thus, except for the defendants dismissed by 
stipulation, the plaintiffs preYailed on the merits in lhe trial court against 
all but one of the defendants. 
'Although the bulk of the court's discussion of the defendants' common 
law tort liability focused on the presence of a ciYil conspiracy, the chancel-
lor did not appear to hold that a concerted refusal to deal-without more-
was actionable under the common law of Mississippi. The court appar-
ently based its first theo1·y of liability on the ground that the "malicious 
interference by the defendants \\1th the businesses of the complainants as 
shown by the eYidence in this case is tortious per se, and this would be true 
even without the element of conspiracy." Id. , at 42b. (footnote omitted). 
In Mississippi, "(e]ither an individual or a corporation, whether acting in 
conjunction with others, or not," may be liable in an action for "malicious 
interference with a trade or calling." Memphis Laund1·y-Cleaners v. 
Lindsey, 192 Miss. 224, 239 (1941). The chancellor in this case slated that 
the necessary element of malice is established by proof of "the intentional 
performance of an act harmful to another without just or lawful cause or 
excuse." Id ., at 42b, n. 8. 
The repeated references to the presence of a conspiracy might be ex-
plained by the court's finding that each of the defendants-with the excep-
tion of Aaron Henry-was jointly and seYerally liable for the plain~iffs' 
losses. As noted, an element of the plaintiffs' common law act.ion was the 
defendants' intentional performance of an "unpriYileged" act harmful to an-
other. The chancellor staled that the evidence clearly established that 
"certain defendants" had committed "oYert acts which were injurious to 
the trade and business of complainants." Id., at 39b. The coUJ-t contin-
ued: "Where two or more persons conspire together, the conspiracy makes 
the wrongful act of each person the joint acts of them all," id., at 41 b; "[i]t 
follows that each act done in pursuance of the conspiracy by one of the sev-
,) - -
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olation of a state statutory prohibition against secondary boy-
cotts, on the theory that the defendants' primary dispute was 
with the governing authorities of Port Gibson and Claiborne 
County and not with the white merchants at \Yhorn the boy-
cott was directed . 8 Third, the court found a Yiolation of Mis-
sissippi's antitrust statute, on the grnund that the boycott 
had diYerted black patronage from the white merchants to 
black rne1·chants and to other merchants located out of 
Claiborne County and thus had unreasonably limited compe-
tition between black and white merchants that had tradition-
ally existed . 9 The chancellor specifically rejected the defen-
dants' claim that their conduct ,ms protected by the First 
Amendment. 10 
era! conspirators is, in contemplation of the law, an act for which each is 
jointly and severally liable." Ibid. Thus, the presence of a conspiracy 
rendered all of the "conspirators" liable for the wrongful acts of any mem-
ber of that conspiracy. 
8 See Miss. Code Ann. § 97-23-85. The chancellor found : "The testi-
mony in the case at bar clearly shows that the principal objective of the 
boycott was to force the white me1·chants of Port Gibson and Claibome 
County to bring pressure upon goYerning authorities to grant defendants' 
demands or, in the alternative, to suffer economic ruin." App. to Pet. for 
Cert. 51b. As noted, howeYer, many of the merchants thcmselYes were 
civic leaders. See n. 3, supra. 
9 See Miss. Code Ann. § 75-21-9. The court made clear that under this 
theory intentional participation in the concerted action rendered each de-
fendant directly liable for all resulting damages "as a legal principle, it is 
sufficient to show that the concert of action on the part of the defendants 
,ms deliberately invited, and that the defendants gave their adherence to 
the scheme and participated in it ." App. to Pet. for Cert. 54b. The same 
was true of the court's secondary boycott theory; "since an illegal boycott is 
an inYasion ofa property right, the members of the boycotting combination 
are liable for the resulting damages." Id., at 53b. 
10 In its discussion of the secondary boycott statute, the comt rejected an 
argument that the statute was unconstitutional under the First and Four-
teenth Amendments. Noting as a "basic premise" that "secondary boy-
cotts are unlawful under both United States and Mississippi law," the court 
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Five of the merchants offered no evidence of business 
losses. The chancellor found that the remaining 12 had suf-
fered lost business earnings and lost good will during a seven-
year period from 19GG to 1972 amounting to $944,699. That 
amount, plus statutory antitrust penalties of $6,000 and a 
$300,000 award of attorney's fees, produced a final judgment 
of $1,250,699, plus interest from the date of judgment and 
costs . As noted, the chancellor found all but ~8 of the origi-
nal 148 defendants jointly and severally liable for the entire 
judgment. The court justified imposing full liability on the 
national organization of the NAACP on the gTound that it 
had failed to "repudiate" the actions of Cl1arles Evers, its 
Field Secretary in Mississippi. 
In addition to imposing damage liability, the chancellor en-
tered a broad permanent injunction. He permanently en-
joined petitioners from stationing "store ,vatchers" at the re-
spondents' business premises; from "persuading" any person 
to withhold his patronage from 1·espondents; from "using de-
meaning and obsence language to or about any person" be-
cause that person continued to patronize the respondents; 
from "picketing or patroling" the premises of any of the re-
spondents; and from using violence against any person or in-
flicting damage to any real or pe1·sonal property. 11 
by the constitutional provisions relating to freedom of speech." Id ., at 
46b. In imposing liability under the state restraint of trade statute, the 
chancellor added: "Afler a careful consideration of the constitutional claims 
of defendants, the Court finds that none of the acts or conduct of defen-
dants ,ms shielded or protected by the Constitution of the United Slates or 
the Constitution of the State of Mississippi." Id., at 56b. Finally, in as-
sessing damages, the court stated: "Defendants base their defense ori the 
concept that the right to boycott and inflict losses on complainants was a 
legally protected right afforded them under the laws and Constitution of 
the United States. This Court has hereinbefore found that the conduct of 
the defendants was unlawful and unprotected." Id., at 62b. 
11 Id., at 19g. Follo\\·ing the entry of judgment, the defendants moved 
for relief from Mississippi's 125 percent supersedeas bonding requirement. 
Although the Mississippi Supreme Court denied the motion, a federal court 
- -
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In December 1980, the Mississippi Supreme Court re-
versed significant portions of the trial court's judgment. It 
held that the secondary boycott statute was inapplicable be-
cause it had not been enacted until "the boycott had been in 
operation for upward of two years." 12 The court declined to 
rely on the restraint of trade statute, noting that the "United 
States Supreme Court has seen fit to hold boycotts to achieve 
political ends are not a Yiolation of the Sherman Act, 15 
U. S. C. § 1 (1970), after which our statute is patterned." 13 
Thus, the court rejected two theories of liability that were 
consistent with a totally voluntary and nonYiolent withhold-
ing of patronage from the \\·hite merchants. 
The Missi ssippi Supreme Court upheld the imposition of li-
ability, however, on the basis of the chancellor's common law 
tort theory. After reviewing the chancellor's r ecitation of 
the facts, the court quoted the following finding made by the 
trial court: 
"In carrying out the agreement and design, certain of 
the defendants, acting for all others, engaged in acts of 
physical force and violence against the persons and prop-
erty of certain customers and prnspective customers. 
Intimidation, threats, social ostracism, vilification, and 
traduction were some of the deYices used by the defen-
dants to achieve the desired results. Most effective, 
also, was the stationing of guards ('enforcers,' 'deacons,' 
or 'black hats') in the ,·icinity of white-owned businesses. 
Unquestionably, the eYidence shows that the volition of 
many black persons was overcome out of sheer fear, and 
they were forced and compelled against their personal 
wills to \v:ithhold their trade and business intercourse 
enjoined execution of the chancery court judgment pending appeal. 
Henry v. First Nat iona l Bank, 424 F. Supp. 633 (ND Miss. 1976), af-
firmed, 595 F. 2d 291 (CA5 1979), cert. denied, 444 U. S. 1074. 
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from the complainants." App. to Pet. for Cert. 39b 
(quoted id., at 20a) . 
On the basis of this finding, the court concluded that the en-
tire boycott was unlavdul. "If any of these factors-force, 
Yiolence, or threats-is present, then the boycott is illegal re-
gardless of whether it is primary, secondary, economical, po-
litical, social or other." 14 In a brief passage, the court re-
jected petitioners' reliance on the First Amendment: 
"The agreed use of illegal force, violence, and threats 
against the peace to achieve a goal makes the present 
state of facts a conspi1·acy. We know of no instance, and 
our attention has been drawn to no decision, wherein it 
has been adjudicated that free speech guaranteed by the 
First Amendment includes in its protection the right to 
commit crime." Id., at 23a. 
The theory of the Mississippi Supreme Court, then, -Y\'as that 
petitioners had agreed to use force, violence, and "threats" to 
effectuate the boycott. 15 To the trial court, such a finding 
had not been necessary. 16 
Although the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed the 
cl1ancellor's basic finding of liability, the court held that re-
spondents "did not establish their case" ,,,ith respect to 38 of 
1
' Id., at 23a. 
15 The court did not specifically identify the e\'idence linking any of the 
defendants to such an agreement. 
16 As noted, liability under the set:onclary boycott and restraint of trade 
statutes could be found on the basis of an entirely voluntary and nonviolent 
agreement to withhold patronage. See n. 9, supra. It is not ~!ear 
\Yhether-in its imposition of tort liability-the tria l court rested on a the-
ory similar to that ultimately adYanced by the Mississippi Supreme Court. 
In finding an unla\\·ful ci\'il conspiracy-which rendered each conspirator 
liable for the actions of others, see n. 7, supra-the chancellor arguably 
believed that it was necessary to connect all defendants to an agreement to 
use force or violence to effectuate the conspiracy. See id., at 40b-41 b. 
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the defendants. 17 The court found that MAP was a victim, 
rather than a ,villing participant, in the conspiracy and dis-
missed-without further explanation-37 individual defen-
dants for lack of proof. Finally, the court ruled that certain 
damages had been improperly awarded and that other dam-
ages had been inadequately proved. The court remanded for 
further proceedings on the computation of damages. 18 
We granted a petition for certiorari. -- U. S. --. At 
oral argument, a question arose concerning the factual basis 
for the judgment of the Mississippi Supreme Court. As 
noted, that t:ourt affo·med petitioners' liability for damages 
on the ground that each of the petitioners had agreed to effec-
tuate the boycott through force, violence, and threats . Such 
a finding was not necessary to the trial court's imposition of 
liabilty and neither state court had identified the evidence ac-
tually linking the petitioners to such an agreement. In re-
sponse to a request from this Court, respondents filed a sup-
plemental brief "specifying the acts committed by each of the 
petitioners giving rise to liability for clam ages." Respond-
ents' Supplemental Brief 1. That brief helpfully places the 
petitioners in different categories; we accept respondents' 
framework for analysis and identify these classes as a preface 
to our review of the rele\'ant incidents that occm-red during 
the seven-year period for which damages were assessed . 19 
Fil-st, respondents contend that liability is justified by evi-
dence of participation in the "management" of the boycott. 20 
" Id ., at 26a. 
"Concerning the permanent injunction entered by the chancellor, the 
court stated: "Although the granting of injunction has been assigned as 
error, the error has not been argued, and NAACP, et al. say, at the col'iclu-
sion of their brief ' ... the injunctive aspects of the case are now moot. 
"' Id., at 5a. Despite this finding, the court did not Yacate the 
injunction. 
"Respondents ackno\,·leclge that "[t]he basis on which the Mississippi 
Supreme Court held that petitioners were liable for damages was 'the 
agreed use of illegal force, violence and threats.'" Respondents' Supple-
mental Brief 1-2. 
'" Respondents argue that anyone "who participates in the 
- -
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Respondents identify two gToups of persons who may be 
found liable as "managers": 79 incliYicluals who 1·egularly at-
tended Tuesday night meetings of the NAACP at the First 
Baptist Church; and 11 persons who took "leadership roles" 
at those meetings.21 
Second, respondents contend that liability is justified by 
evidence that an indiYidual acted as a boycott "enforcer." 22 
In this category, respondents identify 22 persons as members 
of the "Black Hats"-a special group organized during the 
boycott-and 19 individuals who were simply "store 
watchers." 
Third, respondents argue that those petitioners "who 
themselves engaged in violent acts or who threatened vio-
lence have provided the best possible evidence that they 
\ranted the boycott to succeed by coercion whenever it could 
not succeed by persuasion." J d., at 10. They identify 16 in-
clfriduals for whom there is direct evidence of participation in 
what respondents characterize as violent acts or tbrcats of 
violence. 
decisionmaking functions of an enterprise, "·ith full knmdedge of the tac-
tics by \Yhich the enterprise is being conducted, manifests his assent to 
those tactics . . .. " Id., at 2. Respondents thus would impose liaLility for 
the managers' failnre to act; respondents argue that, despite evidence that 
boycott "enforcers" caused fear of injury to persons and property, "they 
,,·ere not taken from their posts and replaced by a system of voluntary 
compliance; there is no evidence that any of the petitioners ever admon-
ished them for their enforcement methods; the successful system of para-
military enforcers on the streets and 'rhetorical' threats of violence by boy-
cott leaders ,rns left in place for the duration." Id., at 5. 
"These groups are not meant to be exclusive. . 
'.!'.' "Once the pattern had been established-warnings to pl'Ospective cus-
tomers, destruction of goods purchased at boycotted stores, public displays 
of \\·eapons and military discipline, denunciation of names gathered by the 
store-watchers, and subsequent violence ;1gainst the persons and property 
of boycott breakers-store-watching in Port Gibson became the sort of ac-
tiYity from which a court could reasonably infer an intention to frighten 
people away from the stores." Id., at 8. 
- -
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Fourth, r espondents contend that Charles EYers may be 
held li able because he "threatened ,·iolence on a number of 
occasions against boycott breakers." Id., at 13. Like the 
chancellor, respondents would impose liability on the national 
NAACP because Evers "was acting in his capacity as Field 
Secretary of the NAACP when he committed these tortious 
and constitutionally unproLected acts ." Ibid. 
Finally, respondents state that they are "unable to deter-
mine on what record eYidence the state courts reli ed in find-
ing liability on the part of seYen of the petitioners." Id . , at 
16. With these allegations of wrongdoing in mind, we turn 
to consider the factual events that gave rise to this 
controversy. 
B 
The cl1ancellor held petitionel'S liable for all of respondents' 
lost earnings during a seven year pel'iod from 1966 to Decem-
ber 31, 1972. We first review chronologically the principal 
events that occurred during that period, describe some fea-
tures of the boycott that are not in dispute, and then id entify 
the most significant evidence of violent activity. 
In late 1965 or early 1966, Charles Evers, the Field Secre-
tary of the NAACP, helped organize the Claiborne County 
Branch of the NAACP. The pastor of the First Baptist 
Church, James Dorsey, was elected president of the Branch; 
regular meetings were conducted each Tuesday evening at 
the Church. At about the same time, a group of black citi-
zens formed a Human Relations Committee and presented a 
petition for redress of grievances to civic and business lead-
ers of the white community. In response, a biracial commit-
tee- including five of the petitioners and several of the re-
spondents-was organized and held a se1·ies of unproductive 
meetings. 
The black members of the committee then prepared a fur-
ther petition entitled "Demands for Racial Justice." This pe-
tition was presented for approval at the local NAACP meet-
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ing conducted on the first Tuesday evening in March. As 
described by the chancellor, "the approximately 500 people 
present voted their approval unanimously." 23 On March 
14, 19GG, the petition was presented to public officials of Port 
Gibson and Claiborne County. 
The petition included 19 specific demands. It called for 
the desegregaLion of all public schools and public facilities, 
the hiring of black policemen, public: improvements in black 
residential areas, seledion of blacks for jury duty, integTa-
tion of bus stations so that blacks could use all facilities, and 
an end to verbal abuse by law enforcement officers. It 
stated that "Negroes are not to be addressed by terms as 
'boy,' 'girl,' 'shine,' 'uncle, ' or any other offensive term, but as 
'Mr.,' 'Mrs.,' or Miss,' as is the case with other citizens." 24 
As described by the chancellor, the purpose of the demands 
"was to gain equal rights and oppo1tunities for Negro citi-
zens." 25 The petition furth er pl'Ovided that black leaders 
hoped it would not be necessary to resort to the "seledive 
buying campaigns" that had been used in other communi-
ties . 26 On March 23, two demands that had been omitted 
23 App. to Pet. for Cert. at 15b. 
2
' Id., at 10b. 
25 Id., at 12b. 
26 Th e petition stated: 
"We hope it will not be necessary to resort to the kind of peaceful dem-
onstrations and selective buying campaigns \\'hich haYe had to be used in 
other communities. It takes manpower, time and energy which could be 
bett.er directed at solving these problems which exist in Port Gibson and 
Claiborne County by mutual cooperation and efforts at tolerant 
understanding. 
"No one likes to have to resort to picketing and other kinds of dem-
onstration-just, as no one likes to be the target of this kind of demonstra-
tion. But this sort of thing is inevitable unless there can be real progress 
toward giYing all citizens their equal rights. There seems sometimes to be 
no other alternative. 
"Objectives of Negro citizens of Port Gibson and Claiborne County are, 
simply put, to have equality of opportunity, in every aspect of life, and to 
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from the original petition were added, one of which provided: 
"All stores must employ Negro clerks and cashiers." 27 This 
supplemental petition stated that a response ,;,,-as expected by 
April 1. 
A favorable response was not received . On April 1, 1966, 
the Claiborne County NAACP conducted another meeting at 
the First Baptist Church. As described by_ the chancellor: 
"Several hundred black people attended the meeting, 
and the purpose was to decide what action should be 
taken relative to the twenty-one demands. Speeches 
were made by Evers and others, and a vote \vas taken. 
It was the unanimous vote of those present, without dis-
sent, to place a boycott on the white merchants of Port 
Gibson and Claiborne County." App. to Pet. for Cert. 
15b. 
The boycott was underway. 28 
In September 1966, Mississippi Action for Progress, Inc. 
(MAP) was organized to develop community action programs 
in 20 counties of Mississippi. One of MAP's programs-
known as Head Start--involved the use of federal funds to 
provide food for young children. Originally, food purchases 
in Claiborne County were made alternately from white-
end the white supremacy \Yhich has pervaded community life . This im-
plies many long-range objectives such as participation in decision-making 
at every level of community, civic, business and political affairs." Id., at 
9b. 
2
' ld., at 13b. . 
26 Although Evers' speech on April 1, 1966 was not recorded, the chan-
cellor found: "Evers told his audience that they would be watched and that 
blacks who traded with white merchants would be answerable to him. Ac-
cording to Sheriff Dan McKay, who was present during the speech, Evers 
told the assembled black people that any 'uncle toms' who broke the boy-
cott would 'have their necks broken' by their own people. Evers' remarks 
were directed to all 8,000-plus black residents of Claiborne County, and not 
merely the relatively few members of the Claiborne NAACP." Id., at 
17b-18b (footnote omitted). 
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owned and black-owned stores, but in February 1967 the di-
rectors of MAP authorized their Claiborne County represent-
atives to purchase food only from black-owned stores. Since 
MAP bought substantial quantities of food, the consequences 
of this decision were significant. A large portion of the trial 
was devoted to the question wl1ether MAP participated in 
the boycott voluntarily and-under the chancellor's theories 
of liability-could be held liable for the resulting damages. 
The chancellor found MAP a \\illing participant, noting that 
"during the course of the trial, the only Head Start cooks 
called to the witness stand testified that they refused to go 
into white-owned stores to purchase groceries for the chil-
dren in the program for the reason that they were inf avor of 
the boycott and wanted to honor it." 29 
Several events occurred during the boycott that had a 
strong effect on boycott activity. On February 1, 1967, Port 
Gibson employed its first black policeman. During that 
month, t he boycott was lifted on a number of merchants . On 
April 4, 1968, Dr . Martin Luther King was assassinated in 
Memphis. The chancellor found that this tragic event had a 
depressing effect on the black community and , as a result, 
the boycott "tightened." 30 
29 I d., at 22b (emphasis in original). The chancellor also noted that 
MAP's Board of Directors "did not seek help from local law-enforcement 
officers, nor did they complain to United States authorities for protection 
of their cooks from possible reprisals arising from trade with the white 
merchants"; and that "MAP employees in Claiborne County continued to 
take an active part in the NAACP activities and to support the boycott by 
picketing and marching." Id. , at 23b. The Mi ssissippi Supreme Court 
rejected the chancellor's findings and concluded that MAP was not a willing 
participant in the boycott, thus absolving it from liability. 
30 Id., at 25b. One of the respondents awarded the most in damages , Bar -
bara Ellis-a partner in Ellis Variety Store- testifi ed that the store was 
boycotted from April 1, 1966 until January 27, 1967. On the latter date, 
the store agTeed- apparently at the urging of a biracial committee-to hire 
a black cashier . R. 1183. The boycott was reimposed on April 17, 1968, 
after the death of Martin Luther King, but again was lifted on May 1, 1968. 
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One event that occurred during the boycott is of particular 
significance. On Ap1·il 18, 1969, a young black man named 
Roosevelt Jackson vcas shot and killed during an encounter 
with two Port Gibson police officers. 31 Large crowds imme-
diately gathered, first at the hospital and later at the church. 
Tension in the community neared a breaking point. The 
local police requested reinforcements from .the State High-
way Patrol and sporadic acts of violence ensued . The Mayor 
and Board of Aldermen placed a dawn to dusk curfew into 
effect. 
On April 19, Charles Evers spoke to a group assembled at 
the First Baptist Church and led a march to the courthouse 
where he demanded the discharge of the ·entire Port Gibson 
Police Force. vVhen this demand was refused, the boycott 
was reimposed on all white merchants . One of Evers' 
speeches on this date was recorded by the police. In that 
speech-significant portions of which are reproduced in an 
appendix to this opinion-Evers stated that boycott violators 
would be "disciplined" by their own people and warned that 
the sheriff could not sleep with boycott violators at night. 
On April 20, Aaron Henry came to Port Gibson, spoke to a 
large gathering, urged moderation, and joined local leaders in 
a protest march and a telegram sent to the Attorney General 
of the United States. On April 21, Evers gave another 
speech to several hundred people, in which he again called for 
a discharge of the police force and for a total boycott of all 
white-owned businesses in Claiborne County. Although this 
speech was not recorded, the chancellor found that Evers 
stated: "If we catch any of you going in any of them tacist 
stores, we're gonna break your damn neck." 32 
R. 1184. The boycott finally was reimposed on April 19, 1969, the day fol-
lowing the shooting of Roosevelt Jackson. Ibid. 
31 The officers had gone to Jackson's home to arrest him. A scuffle en-
sued and Jackson was shot by a white officer allegedly while being held by 
a black officer. 
32 Id. , at 27b. 
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As noted, this lawsuit was filed in October 1969. No sig-
nificant events concerning the boycott occurred after that 
time. The chancellor identified no incident of violence that 
occurred after the suit was brought. He did identify, how-
ever, several significant incidents of boycott-related violence 
that occurred some years earlier. 
Before describing that evidence, it is appropriate to note 
that certain practices generally used to encourage support for 
the boycott were uniformly peaceful and orderly. The few 
marches associated with the boycott were carefully con-
trolled by black leaders. Pickets used to advertise the boy-
cott were often small children. The police made no arrests-
and no complaints are recorded-in connection with the pick-
eting and occasional demonstrations supporting the boycott. 
Such activity was fairly irregular, occurred primarily on 
weekends, and apparently was largely discontinued around 
the time the lawsuit was filed . 33 
One form of "discipline" of black persons who violated the 
boycott appears to have been employed with some regularity. 
Individuals stood outside of boycotted stores and identified 
those who traded with the mercl1ants . Some of these indi-
viduals were members of a group known as the "Black Hats" 
or the "Deacons." 34 The names of persons who violated the 
33 R. 1146. The sheriff of Claiborne County testified: "There were pick-
ets off and on from April, 1966 to 1970." R. J 060. ',\Then asked to de-
scribe "how they conducted themselves, \\"hat they did, what they went 
about doing," he stated: "Most of them ca1Tied or either had signs on their 
shoulders and they walked up and down the streets in front of the stores. 
They wouldn't always picket the same stores at the same time. At differ-
ent times they might picket M &M then they would move up and picket 
Claiborne Hardware down Market Street to other businesses. Most of the 
time it was teenagers and at the last it was little bitty fellows, as young as 
about six years old. That was '69 and '70." Ibid. The sheriff also testi-
fied that the boycott was "tight" in April of 1966, April of 1968, and April of 
1969. R. 1152. 
34 Evidence concerning the aims and practices of the "Black Hats" is 
contradictory. Respondents describe them as a "paramilitary organiza-
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boycott ,,,ere read at meetings of the Claiborne County 
NAACP and published in a mimeographed paper entitled the 
"Black Times." As stated by the chancellor, those persons 
"were branded as traitors to tl1e black cause, called demean-
ing names, and socially ostracized for merely trading with 
whites ." 35 
The chancellor also concluded that a quite different form of 
discipline had been used against certain violators of the boy-
cott. He specifically identified ten incidents that "strik-
ingly" revealed the "atmosphere of fear that prevailed among 
blacks from 1966 until 1970." 36 The testimony concerning 
four incidents convincingly demonstrates that they occurred 
because the victims were ignoring the boycott. In two 
cases, shots were fired at a house; in a third, a brick was 
thrown through a windshield; in the fourth, a flower garden 
was damaged.37 None of these four victims, however, ceased 
trading with white merchants. 
tion." Petitioner Elmo Scott, a member oft.he group, testified concerning 
instructions that \Yere given to him: "It was giYen to the Deacons to give 
respect to the people t,hat was on lhe street and, regardless of what they 
say back to you, for you not to use bad language to them or not to curse 
them or no kind of way, just talk to them in the right manner of way." R. 
2985. It is undisputed that the "Black Hats" were formed during the boy-
cott, that members of the organization engaged in "store watching" and 
other "enforcement" activities, and that some indiYiduals \\·ho belonged to 
the group committed acts of Yiolence. 
35 App. to Pet. for Cert. 19b. 
36 /d ., at 35b. 
37 On August 22, 1966, birdshot was fired into the home of J ames 
Gilmore, a black man who ignored the boycott. He immediately grabbed a 
shotgun, leapt into his car, pursued the Yehicle from which he believed the 
shots had come, forced it to the side of the road, and apprehended three 
young black men who were active supporters of the boycott. They were 
indicted, tried, and conYicted, but the conYictions were set aside on appeal. 
Gilmore continued to patronize white merchants after the incident. 
In June 1966, while Murriel Cullens was having a beer in Wolfs Store, a 
brick was thrown through the windshield of his parked car. He had been 
patronizing white merchants and continued to do so thereafter. R. 14049. 
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The evidence concerning four other incidents is less clear, 
but again it indicates that an unlawful form of discipline was 
applied to certain boycott violators. In April 1966, a black 
couple asked for a police escort to go into a white-owned dry 
cleaner and, a week later, shots were fired into their home. 
In another incident, an NAACP member took a bottle of 
v,,hiskey from a black man who had purchased it in a white-
owned store. The third incident involved a fight beh veen a 
commercial fisherman who did not observe the boycott and 
four men who "grabbed me and beat me up and took a gun off 
me." 38 In a fourth incident, described only in hearsay testi-
mony, a group of young blacks apparently pulled clown the 
overalls of an elderly brick mason known as "Preacher 
White" and spanked him for not observing the boycott.39 
In November 1966, shotgun pellets were fired into the wall of hi s mother's 
home. She had received a number of threatening telephone calls criticiz-
ing her for patronizing white stores. She continued to do so after the 
indicent. R. 14003. At trial, Laura Cullens testifi ed, in response to a 
question whether she had been scared: "No indeed . I haven't had a bone 
in me scared in my life from nobody. And I have always told them, they 
say, 'You're j ust an uncle tom.' And I say, 'Well, uncle tom can be blue , 
black, green or purple or white . If I feel I am in the right, I stand in that 
right and nobody tells me what to do.'" R. 14017. 
J ames Bailey, who was a t eenager at the time of the incident, testified 
that he had noticed that an elderly black lady named Willie Butler traded 
with a white merchant and had groceries delivered to her home. He testi-
fied that he destroyed flowers in her garden to punish her for violating the 
boycott. R. 3656. He stated that he acted on his own initiati ve and that 
Mrs. Butler continued to trade with the merchant . R. 3660, 3741. 
35 R. 13868. One of his assailants testified that the incident resulted 
from an automobile accident, rather than the boycott. R. 3656. 
39 "Preacher White" had di ed by the time of trial. No witness admitted 
being present at \\·hat respondents' counsel characterized as "the spanking 
of Preacher White." R. 3696. The Port Gibson Chief of Police testified, 
however, that Wnite had come in and complained that a group of young 
blacks had pulled his overalls down and whipped him. R. 2176. In de-
scribing this incident, the chancellor stated that Preacher White "was 
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Two other incidents discussed by the chancellor are of less 
certain significance. Jasper Coleman testified that he par-
ticipated in an all-night poker game at a friend's house on 
Christmas Eve 1966. The following morning he discovered 
that all four tires of his pick-up truck had been slasl1ed with a 
knife. Coleman testified that he did not participate in the 
boycott but was never threatened for refusing to do so. R. 
13791. Finally, Willie Myles testified that ·he and his wife 
received a threatening phone call and that a boy on a barge 
told him that he would be whipped for buying his gas at the 
wrong place. 
Five of these incid ents occurred in 1966. The other five 
are not dated . The chancellor thus did not find that any act 
of violence occurred after 1966. 40 In particular, he made no 
reference to any act of violence or threat of violence-with 
the exception, of course, of Charles Evers' speeches-after 
the shootings of Martin Lutlier King in 1968 or Roosevelt 
Jackson in 1969. The chancellor did not find that any of the 
incidents of violence was discussed at the Tuesday evening 
meetings of the NAACP.41 
stripped of his clothing and whipped by a group of young blacks bec:ause he 
refused to honor the boycott." App. to Pet. for Cert. 37b. 
'
0 In describing the "atmosphere of fear" existing during the boycott, the 
chancellor emphasized the participation of petitioner Rudy Shields. He 
stated: 
"Defendant Rudolph J. (Rudy) Shields, formerly of Chicago, was the prin-
cipal figure in seYeral altercations. He boasted that he was 'the most 
j ai led person in the Claiborne County boycott .' This man was the ac-
knowledged leader of the 'Deacons.' " App. to Pet. for Cert. 35b . . 
See also Respondents' Supplemental Brief 10-13. The record indicates 
that Shields was in Port Gibson for approximately eight months during 
1966. R. 4993. 
41 The chancellor did find-and apparently believed this fact to be signifi-
cant-that the NAACP provided attorneys to black persons arrested in 
connection with acts arising from the boycott. App. to Pet. for Cert. 38b. 
The NAACP provided legal representation to the three black persons ar-
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II 
This Court's jurisdiction to review the judgment of the 
Mississippi Supreme Court is, of course, limited to the fed-
eral questions necessarily decided by that court. 42 We con-
sider first whether petitioners' activities are protected in any 
respect by the Federal Constitution and, if they are, what ef-
fect such protection has on a lawsuit of this nature. 
A 
The boycott of white merchants at issue in this case took 
many forms . The boycott was launched at a meeting of a 
local branch of the NAACP attended by several hundred per-
sons. Its acknowledged purpose was to secure compliance 
by both civic and business leaders with a lenghty list of de-
mands for equality and racial justice. The boycott was sup-
ported by speeches and nonviolent picketing. Participants 
repeatedly encouraged others to join in its cause. 
Each of these elements of the boycott is a form of speech or 
conduct that is ordinarily entitled to protection under the 
First and Fourteenth Amendments. 43 The black citizens 
named as defendants in this action banded together and col-
lectively expressed their dissatisfaction with a social struc-
ture that had denied them rigl1ts to equal treatment and re-
spect. As we so recently acknowledged in Citizens Against 
R ent Control v. Berkeley, -- U. S. --, - -, "the prac-
rested in August 1966 following the Gilmore shooting. 
42 Although the Mississippi Supreme Court remanded for a recomputa-
tion of damages, its judg111ent is final for purposes of our jurisdiction. See 
Cox Broadcasting v. Coh n , 420 U. S. 469, 480. 
43 "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, 
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of 
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assembly, 
and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." U. S. 
Const., Arndt. I. First Amendment freedoms are protected by the Four-
teenth Amendment from invasion by the States. Edwards v. South Caro-
lina, 372 U. S. 229, 235. 
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tice of persons sharing common views banding together to 
achieve a common end is deeply embedded in the American 
political process." We recognized that "by collective effort 
individuals can make their views known, when, individually, 
their voices would be faint or lost." Ibid. In emphasizing 
"the importance of freedom of association in guaranteeing the 
right of people to make their voices heard on public issues," 
ibid. , v,1e noted the words of Justice Harlan; writing for the 
Court in NAACP v. Alabania, 357 U. S. 449, 460: 
"Effective advocacy of both public and private points of 
view, particularly controversial ones, is undeniably en-
hanced by group association, as this Court has more than 
once recognized by remarking upon the close nexus be-
tween the freedoms of speech and assembly." 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE stated for the Court in Citizens Against 
Rent Control: "There are , of course, some activities, legal if 
engaged in by one, yet illegal if performed in concert with 
others, but political expression is not one of them." - -
U.S., at--. 
The right to associate does not lose all constitutional pro-
tection merely because some members of the gToup may have 
participated in conduct or advocated doctrine that itself is not 
protected. In De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U. S. 353, the Court 
unanimously held that an individual could not be penalized 
simply for assisting in the conduct of an otherwise lawful 
meeting held under the auspices of tl1e Communist Party, an 
organization tl1at advocated "criminal syndicalism." After 
reviewing the rights of citizens "to meet peaceably for. con-
sultation in respect to public affairs and to petition for a re-
dress of grievances," id., at 364, Chief Justice Hughes, writ-
ing for the Court stated: 
"It follows from these considerations that, consistently 
with the Federal Constitution, peaceable assembly for 
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of meetings for peaceable political action cannot be pro-
scribed. Those who assist in the conduct of such meet-
ings cannot be branded as criminals on that score. The 
question, if the rights of free speech and peaceable as-
sembly are to be preserved, is not as to the auspices 
under which lhe meeting is held but as to its purpose; not 
as to the relations of the speakers, but whether their ut-
terances transcend the bounds of the freedom of speech 
which the Constitution protects. If the persons assem-
bling have committed crimes elsewhere, if they have 
formed or are engaged in a conspiracy against the public 
peace and order, they may be prnsecuted for their con-
spiracy or other violation of valid laws. But it is a dif-
ferent matter when the Slate, instead of prosecuting 
them for such offenses, seizes upon mere participation in 
a peaceable assembly and a lawful public discussion as 
the basis for a u iminal charge." Id., at 365. 
Of course, the petitioners in this case did more than assem-
ble peaceably and discuss among themselves their grievances 
against governmental and business policy. Other elements 
of the boycott, however, also inYolved activities ordinarily 
safeguarded by the F irst Amendment. In Tho rnhill v. Ala-
bania, 310 U. S. 88, the Court held that peaceful picketing 
was entitl ed to constitutional protection, even though, in that 
case, the purpose of the picketing "was concededly to advise 
customers and prospective customers of the relationsl1ip ex-
isting between the employer and its employees and thereby 
to induce such customers not to patronize the employer." 
Id., at 99. Cf. Ch auffeurs Union v. N ewell, 356 U. s.· 341. 
In Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U. S. 229, V1-'e held tl1at a 
peaceful march and demonstration was protected by the 
rights of free speech, free assembly, and freedom to petition 
for a redress of grievances. 
Speech itself also was used to further the aims of the boy-
cott. Nonparticipants r epeatedly were urged to join the 
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common cause, both through public address and through per-
sonal solicitation. These elements of the boycott involve 
speech in its most direct form . In addition, names of boycott 
violators were read aloud at meetings at the First Baptist 
Church and published in a local black newspaper. Petition-
ers admittedly sought to persuade others to join the boycott 
tl1rough social pressure and the "threat" of social ostracism. 
Speech does not lose its protected characte1\ however, sim-
ply because it may embarrass others or coerce them into ac-
tion. As Justice Rutledge, in describing the protection af-
forded by the First Amendment, explained: 
"It extends to more than abstract discussion, unrelated 
to action. The First Amendment is a charter for gov-
ernment, not for an institution of learning. 'Free trade 
in ideas' means free trade in the opportunity to persuade 
to action, not merely to decribe facts ." Thomas v. Col-
lins, 323 U. S. 516, 537. 
In Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U. S. 
415, the Court considered the validity of a prior restraint on 
speech that invaded the "privacy" of the respondent. Peti-
tioner, a racially integrated community organization, charged 
that respondent, a real estate broker, had engaged in tactics 
known as "blockbusting" or "panic peddling." 44 Petitioner 
asked respondent to sign an agreement that he would not so-
licit property in their community. When he refused, peti-
tioner distributed leaflets near respondent's home that ,;vere 
critical of his business practices. 45 A state court enjoined pe-
titioner from distributing the leaflets; an appellate court af-
"Specifically, petitioner contended that respondent "aroused the fears 
of the local white resiclents that Negroes were coming into the area and 
then, exploiting the reactions and emotions so aroused, was able to secure 
listings and homes to Negroes." 402 U. S., at 416. 
•
5 One of petitioner's officers testified at trial that he had hoped that re-
spondent would be induced to sign the no-solicitation agreement by letting 
"his neighbors know what he ,,·as doing to us." Cf. id., at 417. 
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firmed on the ground that the alleged activities were coercive 
and intimidating, rather than informative, and therefore not 
entitled to First Amendment protection. Cf. id., at 418. 
This Court reversed . THE CHIEF JUSTICE explained: 
"This Court has often recognized that the ac:tivity of 
peaceful pamphleteering is a form of communication pro-
tected by the First Amendment. E . g., Martin v. City 
of Struthers , 319 U. S. 141 (1943); Sch11eider v. State, 
308 U . S. 147 (1939); Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U . S. 444 
(1938). In sustaining the injunction, however, the Ap-
pellate Court \Yas apparently of the view that petition-
ers' purpose in distributing their literature was not to in-
form the public, but to 'force' respondent to sign a 
no-solicitation agreement. The claim that the expres-
sions were intended to exercise a coercive impact on re-
spondent does not remove them from the reach of the 
First Amendment. Petitioners plainly intended to in-
fluence respondent's conduct by their activities; this is 
not fundamentally different from the function of a news-
paper. See Schneider v. State, supra; Thornhill v. Ala-
ba1na, 310 U. S. 88 (1940). Petitioners were engaged 
openly and vigorously in making the public aware of re-
spondent's real estate practices. Those practices were 
offensive to them, as the vie,vs and practices of petition-
ers are no doubt offensive to others. But so long as the 
means are peaceful, the communication need not meet 
standards of acceptability." Id., at 419. 
In dissolving the prior restraint, the Court recognized. that 
"offensive" and "coercive" speech was nevertheless protected 
by the First Amendment. 46 
•• Cf. Watts v. United Stales, 394 U. S. 705, 708 ("The language of the 
political arena, like the language used in labor disputes, see Linn v. United 
Plant Gil(J,rd Workers of America, 383 U. S. 53, 58 (1966), is often vitu-
perative, abusive, and inexact.") See also Cohen v. California, 403 U. S. 
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In sum, the boycott clearly involved constitutionally pro-
tected activity. The established elements of speech, assem-
bly, association and petition, "though not identical, are insep-
arable." Thom.as v. Collins, 323 U. S. 516, 530. Through 
exercise of these First Amendment rights, petitioners sought 
to bring about political, social, and economic change. 
Through speech, assembly, and petition-rather than 
through 1-iot or revolution- petitioners sought to change a so-
cial order that had consistently treated them as second-class 
citizens. 
The presence of protected activity, however, does not end 
tl1e relevant constitutional inquiry . Governmental regula-
tion that has an incidental effect on First Amendment free-
doms may be justified in certain narrowly defined instances. 
Cf. United Slates v. O'Brien, 391 U. S. 367. 4; A nonviolent 
and totally voluntary boycott may have a disruptive effect on 
local economic conditions. This Court has recognized the 
strnng governmental interest in certain forms of economic 
regulation, even though such regulation may have an inci-
dental effect on rights of speech and association. Cf. 
Giboney v. Enipire Storage, 336 U. S. 490; NLRB v. R etail 
Store Employees Union, 447 U. S. 607. The right of busi-
ness entities to "associate" to suppress competition may be 
curtailed. National Soc . of Professional Engineers v. 
15; Farber, Commercial Speech and First Amendment Theory, 74 Nw. U. 
L. Rev. 372 (1979) . 
47 "To characterize the quality of the governmental interest which must 
appear, the Court has employed a variety of descriptive terms: compelling; 
substantial; subordinating; paramount; cogent; strong. Whatever impre-
cision inheres in these terms, we think it clear that a government regula-
tion is sufficiently justified if it is ,rithin the constitutional pO\rnr of the 
Go,·ernment; if it furthers an important or substantial governmental inter-
est; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free ex-
pression; and if the incidental restriction on all eged First Amendment free-
doms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest. " 
391 U. S. , at 376-377 (footnotes omitted). 
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United States, 435 U. S. 679. Unfair trade practices may be 
restricted. Secondary boycotts and picketing by labor 
unions may be prohibited, as part of "Congress' striking of 
the delicate balance between union freedom of expression and 
the ability of neutral employers, employees, and consumers 
to remain free from coerced participation in industrial strife." 
Id., at 617-618 (BLACKMUN, J., concuning). Cf. Intenia-
tional Longshore1nen's Assoc . v. Allied Intemcitional, --
U. 8. --,--. 
·while States haYe broad power to regulate economic activ-
ity, we do not find a comparable right to prohibit peaceful po-
litical activity such as that found in the boycott in this case. 
This Court has recognized that expression on public issues 
"has always rested on the highest rung of the hierarchy of 
First Amendment values." Carey v. Brown, 447 U . S. 455, 
467. "[S]peech concerning public affairs is more than self-
expression; it is the essence of self-goYernment." Gm-rison 
v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 64, 74-75. There is a "profound na-
tional commitment" to the principle that "debate on public is-
sues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open." New 
York Tinies v. Sullivan, 376 U . S. 254, 270. 
In Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Mo-
tor Freight, 365 U. S. 127, the Comt considered whether the 
Sherman Act prohibited a publicity campaign waged by rail-
roads against the trucking industry that was designed to fos-
ter the adoption of laws destructive of the trucking business, 
to create an atmosphere of distaste for truckers among the 
general public, and to impair the relationships existing be-
tween truckers and their customers. Noting that the "right 
of petition is one of the freedoms protected by the Bill of 
Rights, and we cannot, of course, lightly impute to Congress 
an intent to invade tl1ese freedoms," the Court held that the 
Shennan Act did not proscribe the publicity campaign. Id., 
at 137- 138. The Court stated that it could not see how an 
intent to infl uence legislation to destroy the truckers as com-
petitors "could transform conduct otherwise la,Yful into a vi-
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olation of the Sherman Act." Id., at 138-139. Noting that 
the right of the people to petition their representatives in 
government "cannot properly be made to depend on their in-
tent in doing so," the Court held that "at least insofar as the 
railroads' campaign was directed toward obtaining govern-
mental action, its legality ,vas not at all affected by any anti-
competitive purpose it may have had." Id ., at 139-140. 
This conclusion was not changed by the fact that the rai l-
l'Oads' anticompetitive purpose produced an anticompetitive 
effect; the Court rejected the truckers' Sherman Act claim 
despite the fact that "the truckers sustained some direct in-
jury as an incidental effect of the railroads' campaign to influ-
ence governmental action. " I d. , at 143. 
It is not disputed that a major purpose of the boycott in 
this case ,vas to influence governmental action. Like the 
railroads in Noerr, the petitioners certainly foresaw-and di-
rectly intended-that the merchants ,vould sustain economic 
injury as a result of their campaign. Unlike the railroads in 
that case, however, the purpose of petitioners' campaign was 
not to destroy legitimate competition. Petitioners sought to 
vindicate rights of equality and of freedom that lie at the 
heart of the Fourteenth Amendment itself. The right of the 
States to 1·egulate economic activity could not justify a com-
plete prohibition against a nonviolent, politically-motivated 
boycott designed to force governmental and economic change 
and to effectuate rights guaranteed by the Constitution it-
self. 48 
"In NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, the Court unanimously re-
jected Alabama's effort to oust the NAACP from that State. The State 
claimed, in part, that the NAACP was" 'engaged in organizing, supporting 
and financing an illegal boycott'" of Montgomery's bus system. Id. , at 
302. Writing for the Court, Justice Harlan described as "doubtful" the 
"assumption that an organized refusal to ride on Montgomery's buses in 
protest against a policy of racial segregation might, without more, in some 
circumstances violate a valid state law." Id., at 307. In Missouri v. 
NOW, 620 F. 2d 1301, 1317 (CA8 1980), cert. denied, 449 U. S. 842, Judge 
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In upholding an injunction against the state supersecleas 
bonding requirement in this case, J uclge Ainsworth of the 
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit cogently stated: 
"At the heart of the Chancery Court's opinion lies the be-
lief that the mere organization of the boycott and every 
activity undertaken in support thereof could be subject 
to judicial prohibition under state law. This view ac- I 
cords insufficient weight to the First Ai11enclrnent's pro-
tection of political speech and association. There is no 
suggestion that the NAACP, MAP or the individual de-
fendants were in competition with the white businesses 
or that the boycott arose from parochial economic inter-
ests. On the contrary, the boycott grew out of a racial 
dispuJ,e with the white mfrchanfs and city goyernment 
of Port Gibson and all of the picketing, speeches, and 
other communication associated with the boycott were 
directed to the elimination of racial discrimination in the \ 
town. This differentiates this case from a boycott orga-
nized for economic ends, for speech to protest racial dis- ~ 
crimination is essential political speech lying at the core d 
of the First Amendment." Henry v. Fint National 
Bank of Clarksdale, 595 F. 2d 291, 303 (1979)(footnote 
omitted). 
We hold that the nonviolent elements of petitioners' activities 
are entitled to the protection of the First Amendment. 
B 
The Mississippi Supreme Court did not sustain the chancel-
lor's imposition of liability on a theory that state law p1~ohib-
ited a nonviolent, politically-motivated boycott. Tl1e fact 
that such activity is constitutionally protected, however, im-
Stephenson stated that "the right to petition is of such importance that it is 
not an improper interference [under state tort law] even when exercised by 
way of a boycott." 
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poses a special obligation on this Court to examine critically 
the basis on ·which liability was imposed. 49 In particular, we I 
consider here the effect of our holding that much of petition-
ers' conduct was constitutionally protected on the ability of 
the State to impose liability for elements of the boycott that 
were not so protected . 50 
The First Amendment does not protect violence. "Cer-
tainly v iolence has no sanctua1·y in the Ffrst Amendment, 
and the use of weapons, gunpowder, and gasoline may not 
constitutionally masquerade under the guise of 'advocacy."' 
Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U. S. GG, 75 (Douglas, J., concur-
ring) . Although the extent and significance of the violence 
in this case is vigorously disputed by the parties, there is no 
question that acts of violence occurred. No federal rufe o f 
law restricts a'"slate from imposing tort liability for business 
losses that are caused by violence and by threats of violence. 
'''hen such conduct occurs in the context of constitutionally 
•• "This Court's duty is not limited to the elaboration of constitutional 
principles; we must also in proper cases reYiew the evidence to make cer-
tain that those principles have been constitutionally applied. This is such 
a case, particularly since the question is one of alleged trespass across 'the 
line bet.ween speech unconditionally guaranteed and speech which may le-
gitimately be regulated.' Speiser v. Randall, 357 U. S. 513, 525. In 
cases where that line must be drawn, the rule is that we 'examine for our-
selves the statements in issue and the circumstances under which they 
\Yere made to see ... \\·hether they are of a character ,,·hich the principles 
of the First Amendment, as adopted by the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, protect.' Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U. S. 331, 
335; see also One, Inc., v. Olesen, 355 U. S. 371; Sunshine Book Co. v. 
Swnmeifield, 355 U. S. 372. We must 'make an independent examination 
of the whole record,' Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U. S. 229, 235, so as 
to assure ourselves that the judgment does not constitute a forbidden in-
trusion on the field of free expression." New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 
376 U. S. 254, 285. 
50 Although this is a civil lawsuit between private parties, the application 
of state rules of law by the Mississippi state courts in a manner alleged to 
restrict First Amendment freedoms constitutes "state action" under the 
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protected activity, however, "precision of regulation" is de-
manded . NAACP v. Button, 371 U . S. 415, 438.01 Specifi-
cally, the presence of activity protected by the First Amend-
ment imposes restraints on the amount of damages that may 
be awarded and on the persons who may be held accountable 
for those losses. 
In United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U. S. 715, the Court 
considered a case in many respects similar tci the one before 
us. The case grew out of the rivalry between the United 
Mine Workers (UMW) and the Soutl1 ern Labor Union (SLU) 
over representation of workers in the southern Appalachian 
coal fields . A coal company laid off 100 miners of UMW's 
Local 5881 when it closed one of its mines . That same year, 
a subsidiary of the coal company hi1·ed Gibbs as mine superin-
t endent to attempt to open a new mine on nearby property 
through use of members of the SLU. Gibbs also received a 
contract to haul the mine's coal to the nearest railroad loading 
point . When he attempted to open the mine, however, he 
was met by armed members of Local 5881 \Yho threatened 
Gibbs and beat an SL U organizer. These incidents occurred 
on August 15 and 16. Thereafter, there ,,,as no further vio-
lence at the mine site and UMV/ members maintained a 
peaceful picket line for nine months . No attempts to open 
the mine were made during that period. 
Gibbs lost his job as superintendent and never began per-
formance of the haulage contract. Claiming to have suffered 
losses as a result of the union's concerted plan against him, 
Gibbs filed suit in federal court against the international 
UMW. He alleged an unlawful secondary boycott under the 
federal labor laws and, as a pendent state law claim, "an un-
lawful conspiracy and an unlawful boycott aimed at him . . . 
to maliciously, ,rnntonly and willfully interfere \Yith his con-
tract of employment and with his contract of haulage." Id ., 
51 Cf. Carroll v. Princess Aune, 393 U. S. 175, 184; Keyishian v. Board 
of Regents, 385 U. S. 589, 604. 
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at 720. The federal claim was dismissed on the ground that 
the dispute was "primary" and therefore not cognizable 
under the federal prohibition of secondary labor boycotts. 
Damages were awarded against the UMW, however, on the 
state claim of interference with an employment relationship. 
This Court reversed . The Court found that the pleadings, 
arguments of counsel, and jury instructions had not ade-
quately defined the compass within ,vhich damages could be 
a\\'arded under state law. The Court noted that it had "con-
sistently recognized the right of States to deal with violence 
and threats of violence appearing in labor disputes" and had 
sustained "a Yariety of measures against the contention that 
state law was pre-empted by the passage of federal labor leg-
islation." Id., at 729. To accomodate federal labor policy, 
however, the Court in Gibbs held: "the permissible scope of 
state remedies in this area is strictly confined to the direct 
consequences of such [ violent] conduct, and does not include 
consequences resulting from associated peaceful picketing or 
other union activity." Ibid. The Court noted that in United 
Constrnction Workers v. Laburnum, Construction Corp., 347 
U. S. 656, damages were restricted to those directly and 
proximately caused by wrongful conduct chargeable to the 
defendants. "'Thus there [ was] nothing in the measure of 
damages to indicate that state power was exerted to compen-
sate for anything more than the direct consequences of the 
violent conduct."' Id., at 730 (quoting San Diego Building 
Trades Council v. Garinon, 359 U. S. 236, 248, n. 6). 
) 
The careful limitation on damage liabilit imposed in Gibbs 
resulted from t e nee to ccomodate state law with federal 
labor policy. That limitation is no less applicable, however, 
to the important First Amendment interests at issue in this 
case. Petitioners withheld their patronage from the white 
establishment of Claiborne County to challenge a political and 
economic system that had denied them the basic rights of dig-
nity and equality that this country had fought a civil war to 
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for the conse uences of violent conduct, it may not award 
compensation for 1e consequences of nonviolent, protected 
activity. Only those !osses proximately caused by unlawful 
conduct may be recovered. - -
The First Amendment similarly restricts the abil ity of the 
State to impose liability on an individual solely because of his 
association with another. In Scales v. United States, 367 
U. S. 203, 229, the Court noted that a "blanket prohibition of 
association \\'ith a group having both legal and illegal aims" 
would present "a real danger that legitimate political expres-
sion or association would be impaired." The Court sug-
gested that to punish association with such a group, there 
must be "clear proof that a defendant 'specifically intend[s] to 
accomplish [the aims of the organization] by resort to vio-
lence."' Ibid. (quoting Noto v. United States, 367 U. S. 290, 
299). 52 Moreover, in Noto v. United States the Court empha-
sized that this intent must be judged "according to the strict-
est law," 53 for "othen,ise there is a cl anger that one in sympa-
thy with the legitimate aims of such an organization, but not 
specifically intending to accomplish them by resort to vio-
lence, might be punished for his adherence to lawful and 
constitionally protected purposes, because of other and un-
protected purposes which he does not necessarily share." 
367U. ~0-. 
· I1 ealy v. James 08 U. S. 169, the Court applied these 
princ· Jles in a no ·riminal context. In that case the Court 
held tha u ent group could not be denied recognition at a 
state-supported college merely because of its affiliation with 
an national organization associated ·with disruptive and vio-
lent campus activity. It noted that "the Court has consis-
tently di sapproved governmental action imposing criminal 
sanctions or denying rights and pri,·ileges solely because of a 
62 Cf. United States v. R obel, 389 U. S. 258; E ljbrandt v. R ussell, 384 
U. S. 11; Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U. S. 500. 
53 "Strictissiini juris ." 367 U. S., at 299. 
~ 
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citizen's association with an unpopular organization." Id., at 
185-186. The Court stated that "it l1as been established that 
'guilt by association alone , v;ithout [establishing] that an indi-
vidual's association poses the threat feared by the Govern-
ment,' is an impermissible basis upon Yvhich to deny First 
Amendment rights." Id ., at 186 (quoting United States v. 
Robel, 389 U. S. 258, 265). ''The government has the bur-
den of establishing a kno,ving affiliation with an organization 
possessing unlawful aims and goals, and a specific intent to 
furtb er those illegal aims." Ibid.f,4 
The principles announced in ~ Hea ly are 
relevant to this case. Civil liability may not be imposed 
merely because an individual belonged to a group, some 
members of which committed acts of violence. For liability 
to be imposed by reason of association alone, it is necessary 
to establi sh that the group itself possessed unlawful goals and 
that the individual held a specific intent to further those ille-
gal aims. Moreover, the First Amendment demands that 
these elements be established by strict proof. Noto v. 
United States, s1.lpra, at 299- 300. "In this sensitive fi eld, 
the State may not employ 'means that broadly stifle funda-
mental personal liberti es when the end can be more narrowly 
achieved.' Shelton v. Tilcker, 364 U. S. 479, 488 (1960)." 
Carroll v. Princess Anne, 393 U. S. 175, 184. 
III 
The chancellor a,Yarded r espondents damages for all busi-
ness losses that were sustained during a seven year period 
beginning in 1966 and ending December 31, 1972.55 With the 
M In Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U. S. 362, the Court vacated an injunction, di-
rected against an entire police depar tment, that had resulted from 20 spe-
cific incidents of police misconduct. The Court held that such collective 
responsibility should be limited to instances in which a concerted design 
existed to accomplish a wrongful objective. Id. , at 373-376. 
,. It is noteworthy that the portion of the chancellor's opinion di scussing 
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exception of Aaron Henry, all defendants were held jointly 
and severally liable for these losses. The chancellor's find-
ings were consistent with his view that voluntary participa-
tion in the boycott was a sufficient basis on which to impose 
liability. The Mississippi Supreme Court properly rejected 
that theory; it nevertheless held that petitioners were liable 
for all damages "1·esulting from the boycott." 56 In light of 
the principles set forth above, it is evident t11at such a dam-
age award may not be sustained in this case. 
The opinion of the Mississippi Supreme Court itself demon-
strates that all business losses were not proximately caused 
by the violenccanctt hreats of vio!ence found to 15e present. 
The court stated tbat "coercion, intimidation, and threats" 
formed "part of the boycott activity" and "contributed to its 
almost complete success." 57 The court broadly asserted-
without differentiation-that "intimidation, threats, social 
ostracism, vilification, and traduction" were deYices used by 
the defendants to effectuate the boycott. 58 The court re-
peated the chancellor's finding that "the volition of many 
black persons was overcome out of sheer fear ." 59 These find-
ings are inconsistent with the court's imposition of all dam-
ages "resulting from the boycott." To tbe extent that the 
court's judgment rests on the gTound that "many" black citi-
zens were "intimidated" by "threats" of "social ostracism, 
the Mississippi Supreme Court rej ected: 
"The complainants proved, in this record, that they $Uffered injury to 
their respective businesses as the direct and proximate result of the unlaw-
fu l secondary boycott and the defendants' actions in restraining trade, all of 
which was accomplished by defendants through a conspiracy." App. to 
Pet. for Cert. 57b. 
In a footnote, the chancellor added that "any kind of boycott is unla\\·fu l if 
executed with force or Yiolence or threats." Id., at 57b, n. 21. 
56 I d., at 35a. 
"' I d., at 24a (emphasis added). 
58 l d., at 20a (quoting id., at 39b). 
59 Ibid. (emphasis added). 
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vilification, and traduction," it is flatly inconsistent with the 
First Amendnient. The ambiguous findings of the Missis-
sippi Sliprerne Court are inadequate to assure the "precision 
of regulation" demanded by that constitutional provision. l 
The record in this case demonstrates that all of respond-
ents' losses ,vere not proximately caused by violence or 
threats of violence. As respondents themselves stated at 
page 12 of their brief in the Mississippi Supreme Court: 
"Most of the witnesses testified that they voluntarily 
went along witb the NAACP and their fellow black citi-
zens in honoring and observing the boycott because they 
wanted tbe boycott." 
This assessment is amply supported by the record . 60 It is in-
deed inconceivable that a boycott launched by tl1e unanimous 
611The testimony of Julia J ohnson- although itself only a small portion of 
a massive record- perhaps best illustrates this point: 
Q. "How did you observe the boycott? 
A. "I just stayed out of the stores, because I had my om1 personal rea-
sons to stay out of the stores. There were some things I really wanted, 
and the things I \\·anted were the right to vote, the rigl1t to have a title-
Mrs. or Mr. or whateYer I am, and not uncle or aunt, boy or girl. So that's 
\\·hat I wanted . And if I wanted a job--a qualified job, I wanted to have 
the opportunity to be hired. Not because I'm black or white, but just 
hired. 
Q. "And this was your r eason for observing the boycott? 
A. "Yes, it was. 
Q. "And you were in farnr of Lhe boycott? 
A. "Yes, I was in fayor of the boycott. 
Q. "And it wasn't because somebody threatened you? 
A. "No, it wasn't because nobody threatened me. 
Q. "You weren't afraid? 
A. "Was I afraid? 
Q. "Yes. 
A. "No, I was not afraid." R. 15476. 
It is clear that losses were sustained because persons like Julia Johnson 
"wanted justice and equal opportunity." R. 6864 (testimony of Margaret 
Liggins). Cf. R. 6737, 12419, 13543-13544. 
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vote of several hundred persons succeeded solely through 
fear and intimidation. Moreover, the fact that the boycott 
"intensified" follov:ing the shootings of Martin Luther King 
and Roosevelt Jackson demonstrates that factors other than 
force and violence (by the petitioners) figured prominently in 
the boycott's success. The chancellor made no finding that 
any act of violence occurred after 1966. ·while the timing of 
the acts of violence was not important to the chancellor's im-
position of liability, it is a critical factor under the narrower 
rationale of the Mississippi Supreme Court. That court has 
completely failed to demonstrate that business losses suf-
fered in 1972-three years after this lawsuit was filed-were 
proximately caused by the isolated acts of violence found in 
1966. 61 It is impossible to conclude that state power l1as not 
been exerted to compensate respondents for the direct conse-
quences of nonviolent, constitutionally protected activity. 
This case is not like Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. 
Meadoumwor Dairies, 312 U. S. 287, in which the Court l1eld 
that the presence of violence justified an injunction against 
both violent and n01wiolent activity. 62 The violent conduct 
present in that case was pervasive. 63 The Court in 
M eadowmooT stated that "utterance in a context of violence 
•
1 It is also noteworthy that virtually eYery Yictim of the acts of Yiolence 
found by the chancellor testified that he or she continued to patronize the 
white merchants. See ----, s11p1·a. 
"
2 In Mine Wo1kers v. Gibbs, supra, the Court stated that if "special 
facts" such as those presented in l\f eadowmoor "appeared in an action for 
damages after picketing marred by Yiolence had occurred," they might 
"support the conclusion that all damages resulting from the picketing were 
proximately caused by its violent component or by the fear " ·hich that vio-
lence engendered." 383 U. S., at 731-732. 
&
3 As described by the Court: "Witnesses testified to more than fifty in-
stances of " ·indo\\·smashing; explosive bombs caused substantial injury to 
the plants of Meadowmoor and another diary using the vendor system and 
to five stores; stench bombs were dropped in fiye stores; three trucks of 
vendors were \\Tecked, seriously injuring one driver, and another was 
driven into a river; a store \\·as set on fire and in large measure ruined; two 
trucks of Yenclors were burned; a storekeeper and a truck driver were se-
- -
81- 202- OPINION 
NAACP v. CLAIBORNE HARDWARE CO. 37 
can lose its signific:ance as an appeal to reason and become 
part of an instrument of force ." Id., at 293. The Court em-
phasized, however: 
"Still it is of p1·ime importance that no constitutional 
freedom, least of all the guarantees of the Bill of Rights, 
be clef eated by insubstantial findings of fact screening re-
ality. That is why this Court has the ultimate power to 
search the records in the state courts \\:here a claim of 
constitutionality is effectively made. And so the right 
of free speech cannot be denied by drawing from a trivial 
rnugh incid ent or a moment of animal exuberance the 
conclusion that othe1wise peaceful picketing has the 
taint of force." Ibid. 
Such "insubstantial findings" were not present m 
M eaclownw or. But in this case, the Mississippi Supreme 
Court has r elied on isolated acts of violence during a limited 
period to uphold respondents' r ecovery of all business losses 
sustained over a seven-year period. No losses are attrib-
uted to the ,·oluntary parti cipation of individuals dete1·mined 
to secure "justice and equal opportunity ." 64 The court's 
judgment "scr eens r eality" and cannot stand. 65 ( 
Respondents' supplemental brief also demonstrates Eiat on 
the present record no judg111ent may be sustained agamst 
mo'sl of the pelit10ners. Regular aftendance at the Tuesday --
verely beaten; workers at a diary which, like Mea clowmoor, used the ven-
dor system were held with guns and severely beaten about the head " ·hile 
being told 'to join the union'; carloads of men followed vendors' trucks, 
threatening the drivers, and in one instance shot at the truck and drfver." 
312 U. S., at 291-292. 
r~ See n. --, supi-a. 
.. For the same reasons, the permanent injunction entered by the chan-
cellor must be di ssolved. Since the boycott apparently has ended, the 
Mississippi Supreme Court may wish to vacate the entire injunction on the 
ground that it is no longer necessary; alternatively, the injunction must be 
modified to r estrain only unlawful conduct, and only the persons responsi-
ble for conduct of that character . 
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meetings of the Claiborne County Branch of the NAACP is 
an insufficient predicate on which to impose liability. The 
cliancellor's findings do not suggest that any ill egal conduct 
was authorized, ratified, or even discussed at any of the 
meetings. The sheriff testified that he was kept inforn1ed of 
wl1at transpired at the meetings; he made no reference to any 
discussion of unlawful activity. f,6 The chancellor did not find 
that the Claiborne County Branch of the NAACP possessed 
unlawful aims and goals; we have been referred to no evi-
dence that any of the petitioners-whethe1· leaders or partici-
pants at the weekly meetings- had a specific intent to fur-
ther an unlawful aim of the organization. 67 To impose 
liability for presence at \Ycekly meetings of the NAACP 
would-ironically- not even constitute "guilt by association," 
since there is no eYidence of the association's guilt. Rather, 
liability could only be imposed on a "guilt for association" the-
ory. Neither is permissible under the First Amendment. 68 
'~ Cf. R. 1172. 
6
' The strongest ev idence of wrongdoing at the meetings was presented 
by petitioner Marjorie Brandon, who sen-ed at times as the local NAACP 
secretary . She testified that "in the meetings there were statements say-
ing you would be dealt with" if found trading in boycotted stores. R. 5637. 
She stated that she understood "dealt with" to mean "they would t ake care 
of you, do something to you, if you were caught going in." J bid. Her 
testimony does not disclose \\·ho made the statements, how often they were 
made, or that they were in any way endorsed by others at the meetings. 
A massive damage judgment may not be ;;:ustained on the basis of this tes-
timony; t.he fact. that certain anonymous persons made such statements at 
some point during a seven-year period is insufficient to establi sh that the 
association itself possessed unlawful aims or that any petitioner specifically 
intended to furth er an unlawfu l goal. 
6
' Those who attended the Tuesday evening meetings had no duty to "re-
pudiate" t.he acts of violence that occurred during the early clays of the boy-
cott. The chancellor made no finding that the individuals who committed 
those acts of violence were "agents" or "servants" of those who attended 
the NAACP meetings; certainly such a relationship cannot be found simply 
because both shared certain goals. Cf. General Building Constraclors 
A ssn. v. Pennsylvania, -- U.S. --, - -. 
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Respondents also argue tl1at liability may be imposed on 
individuals who were either "store watchers" or members of 
the "Black Hats." There is nothing unlawful in standing out-
side of a store and recording names. Similarly, there is 
nothing unlawful in wearing black hats, although such ap-
parel may cause apprehension in others. As established 
above, mere association \Yith either voup--absent a specific 
intent to further an unlawful aim embraced by that group-is 
an insufficient predicate for liability. At the same time, the 
evidence does support tl1e conclusion that some members of 
each of these groups engaged in violence or threats of \'io-
lence. Unquestionably, these individuals may be held re-
sponsible for the injuries that they caused; a judgment tai-
lored to the consequences of their unlawful conduct may be 
sustained. 
Respondents have sought separately to justify tl1e judg-
ment entered against Charles EYers and the national 
NAACP. As set forth by the chancellor, Evers was spe-
connected with the boycott in four respects. First, 
E\'ers sigi1ea the Ma1·ch "2~ supplementafcTumand letter and 
unquestionably played the primary leader ship rnle in the 
organization of the boycott. Second, Evers participated in 
negotiations with MAP and successfully c01winced MAP to 
abandon its practice of purcl1asing food alternatly from white-
owned and black-owned stores. Third, he apparently pre-
sided at the April 1, 1966 meeting at which the vote to begin 
the boycott was taken; he delivered a speech to the large au-
dience that was gathered on that occasion. Cf. n. 28, supra. 
Fourth, Evers delivered the speeches on April 19 and 21, 
1969, which we have discussed preYiously. Cf. supra, at 
--; appendix. 
For the reasons set forth above, liability may not be im-
posed on Evers for his presence at NAACP meetings or his 
active participation in the boycott itself. To the extent that 
Evers caused respondents to suffer business losses through 
his organization of the boycott, his emotional and persuasive 
~ 
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appeals for unity in the joint effort, or his "threats" of vilifica-
tion or social ostracism, Evers' conduct is constitutionally 
protected and beyond the reach of a damage award . The 
mere fact that violence occurred during a boycott that Evers 
inspired is an insufficient basis on which to impose liability; 
absent a finding that Evers authorized, clii'ected, or approved 
specific tortious activity, he may not be held responsible for 
t he unlawful conduct of others. Cf. n. --; supra. 
Respondents point to Evers' speeches, however, as justifi-
cation for the chancellor's damage a,ya1·d. Since respond-
ents would impose liability on the basis of a public address-
which predominantly contained highly charged politi cal rl1et-
oric lying at the core of the First Arnendment-w~ app1:9ach 
this su_ggested basi~abgili:_;yith extr~ care. In an-
alyzing the speecries, it is important to distinguish two differ-
ent concepts. Arguably, the speeches might be found un-
lawful in tl1ernselves; alternatively, they might be taken as 
evidence that Evers gave other specific instructions to carry 
out violent acts or threats . 
While many of the comments in Evers' speeches might 
J1ave contemplated "discipline" in the permissible fonn of so-
cial ostracism, it cannot be denied that r eferences to the_pos-
sibility that necks would be broken and to the fact that the 
chief of police could not sleep with boycott violators at night 
implicitly conveyed a sterner message. In the passionate at-
mosphere in which the speeches we1·e delivered, they might 
have been understood as inviting appropriate discipline or, at 
least, as intending to create a fear of violence wl1ether or not 
improper discipline was specifically intended. 
It is clear that "fighting words"-those that p1·oyoke imme-
diate violence-are not protected by t}1e First Amendment. 
Chaplinsky v. New Hmnshire, 315 U. S. 568, 572. Simi-
larly, words tl1at create an immediate panic are not entitled 
to constitutional protection. Schenck v. United States, 249 
U. S. 47. 69 This Court has made clear, hov,1ever, that mere 
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advoc ci of the use of force or violence does not remove 
speech from tne pro ec 1011 o 1e irs rnendment. In 
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U. S. 444, we rever sed the convic-
tion of a Ku Klux Klan leader for threatening "revengeance" 
if the "sl1ppression" of the white race continued; we relied on 
"the principle that the constitutional guarantees of free 
speech and free press do not pe1·mit a State to forbid or pro-
scribe advocacy of the use of force or of law \·iolation except 
where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing im-
minent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such 
action." Id., at 447. Cf. Noto v. United States, 367 U. S. 
299, 297-298 ("the mere abstract t eaching ... of the moral 
pro~ y or even moral ~ecessity for a resort to force a!1d vi-
olence, is not the same as preparmg a group for violent action 
and steeling it to such action .") See also Whitney v. Califor-
nia, 274 U. S. 357, 372 (Brandeis, J ., concurring). 
The emotionally charged rhetoric of Charles Evers' 
speeches did not transcend the bounds of protected speech 
set forth in Brandenburg. The lengthy addresses generally 
contained an impassioned plea for black citizens to unify, to 
support ::incl respect each other, and to realize the political 
and economic power available to them. In the course of 
those pleas , strong language was used. We cannot conclude, 
however, that such language- read in context-was intended 
or likely to incite imminent lawl ess action. Certainly there 
is no evidence that any speech had such an effect . The inci-
dents of violence identified in 1966 occurred weeks or months 
alter tl1e"j~iJriT1.l96'ffsneech;t he c"Jiancellor made no find1ng 
of any violence after the c 1a lenged 1969 speech. Strong and 
effective extemporaneous rhetoric cannot be nicely channeled 
in purely dulcet phrases. As long as an advocate do~ s not 
incite imminent lawless action, he must be free to stimulate 
his audience with spontaneous and emotional appeals for 
unity and action in a common cause. To rule otherwise 
in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic." 249 U. S., at 52. 
I 
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would ignore the "profound national commitment" that "de-
bate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-
open." N ew York Tim es v. Sullivan, s11pra, 376 U . S. , at 
270. 70 
For these reasons, we conclude that EYers' addresses did J 
not exceed the bounds of protected speech. If there were 
other evidence of his authorization of \\Tongfol conduct, the 
references to discipline in the speeches co"uld be used to 
corroborate that evidence. But any such theory fails for the 
simple reason that there is no evidence-apart from the 
speeches themselves-that EYers autho1·ized, ra tifie d, or di-
rectly threatened acts of violence.71 The Chancellor's find-
ings are not sufficient to establish that Evers had a ·c1uty to 
"repudiate" the acts of violence that occuned. 72 Those fin d-
ings are constitutionally inadequate to support the damage 
judgment against him. 
The liabilit oft 1e NAACP derived solely from the liability 
of Charles Evers. 73 The chance !or oun : 
'
0 In Walls v. United States, 394 U. S. 705, the petitioner ,ms convicted 
of willfully making a threat to take the life of the Pre~ident. During a pub-
lic rally at the Washington Monument, petitioner ~lated in a small discus-
sion group: 
"They always holler at us to get an education. And now I have already 
r eceived my draft classification as 1-A and I haYe got to report for my 
physical this Monday morning. I am not going. If they ever make me 
carry a rifle the first man I want to get in my sights is L.B.J." Id., at 706 
This Court summarily reversed. The Court agreed with the petitioner 
that the statement, taken in context, was "a kind of very crude offensive 
method of stating a political opposition to the President." Id., at 708. 
"There is evidence that Evers occasionally serYed as a "store watcher," 
but there is no suggestion that anything improper occuned on those 
occasions. 
"' See n. --, supra. 
73 Indeed it is noteworthy that Aaron Henry-\\·ho was president of the 
Mississippi State Conference of the NAACP, president of the Coahoma 
County Branch of the NAACP, and a member of the Board of Directors of 
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"The national NAACP was well-advised of Evers' ac-
tions, and it had the option of repudiating his acts or rati-
fying them. It never repudiated those acts, and there-
fore, it is deemed by this Court to have affirmed them." 
App. to Pet. for Cert. 42b-43b. 
Of course, to the extent that Charles Evers' acts are insuffi-
cient to impose liability upon him, they may not be used to 
impose liability on his principal. The judgment awarded 
against the NAACP may not stand, howeYer, for an alterna-
tive and more fundamental reason. 
The associational rights of the NAACP and its members 
have been recognized repeatedly by this Court. 74 The 
NAACP- like any other organization-of course may be held 
responsible for the acts of its agents throughout the country 
that are undertaken within the scope of their actual or appar-
ent autho1·ity. 75 Moreover, the NAACP may be found liable 
for other conduct of which it had knowledge and specifically 
ratified. Neither type of evidence, however, is present in 
this case. 76 
There is no evidence that Charles Evers or any other 
NAACP member had either actual or apparent authority to 
commit acts of violence or to threaten v iolent conduct: The 
only evidence in the r ecord suggests the contrary. Aaron 
on the merits. 
"Cf. NAACP v. Alabama e.i: rel. Patterson, 357 U. S. 449; Bates v. 
City of Little R ock, 361 U. S. 516; Louisiana ex rel. GJ"em illion v. 
NAACP, 366 U. S. 293; NAACP v. B utton, 371 U. S. 415; Gibson v. Flor-
ida L egislative Comm., 372 U. S. 539; NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Flow-
ers, 377 U. S. 288. 
'"There is no question that Charles EYers-as its only paid represent-
atiYe in Mississippi- was an agent of the NAACP. 
'" The chancellor found that the NAACP had posted bond and proYicled 
legal representation for arrested boycott violators. Since the NAACP 
regularly provides such assistance to indigent black persons throughout 
the country, this finding is inelernnt. Counsel for respondents does not 
contend otherwise. 
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Henry, president of the Mississippi State Branch of the 
AACP and a member of the Board of Directors of the na-
tional organization, teslified that the statements at,ti-ibuted 
to Evers were di1~ ntrary to NAACP policy. R. 
4930.n Similarly, there is no evidence that the NAACP rati-
fied- or even had specific knowledge of-any of the acts of 
violence or threats of discipline associated with the boycott. 
Henry testified that the NAACP never authorized, and 
never considered taking, any official action with respect to 
the boycott. R. 4896. The NAACP supplied no financial 
aid to the boycott. R. 4940. The chancellor made no find-
ing that the national organization was involved in any way in 
the boycott. ( 
To impose liability without evidence of authorization or 
ratification would impermissibly burden the rights of political 
association that are protected by the First Amendment. As 
Justice Douglas noted in NAACP v. Overstreet, 384 U. S. 
118, dissenting from a dismissal of a writ of certiorari found 
to have been improvidently gTanted: 
77 In a footnote to his discussion of the NAACP's liability, the chancellor 
\\TOte: 
"Aaron E. Henry a prominant black leader in the State of Mississippi, 
who ,ms president of the Mi ssissippi State Conference of the NAACP, 
president of the Coahoma County Branch of the NAACP, and a member of 
the Board of Directors of the national NAACP, testified that the NAACP 
'absolutely did not approve of the way the boycott was being conducted in 
Port Gibson.' There is al so e\'idence in the record t ending to show that 
Evers was called to account by the national NAACP because oflhe manner 
in which the boycott was conducted. However, the NAACP took n_o ac-
tion whatever to curb Evers' activities in this connection." App. to Pet. 
for Cert.42b n. 9. 
Henry's testimony concerning E\'ers' having been "called to account by the 
National NAACP" concerned Evers' failure to make proper reports and 
Hemy's understanding that there was a personality clash between Evers 
and an executive of the NAACP. R. 4905, 4907. We have found no evi-
dence in the record that any representative of the national NAACP was 
advised of any facts concerning the manner in which the Port Gibson boy-
cott was conducted. 
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"To equate the liability of the national organization 
with that of the Branch in the absence of any proof that 
the national authorized or ratified the misconduct in 
question could ultimately destroy it. The rights of po-
litical association are fragile enough ,vithout adding the 
additional threat of destruction by lawsuit. We have 
not been slow to recognize that the protection of the 
First Amendment bars subtle as well as obvious devices 
by which political association might be stifled. See 
Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U . S. 516, 523. Thus we have 
held that forced disclosure of one's political associations 
is, at least in the absence of a compelling state interest, 
inconsistent with the First Amendment's guaranty of 
associational privacy. E.g., DeGregory v. New Ha.mp-
shire, 338 U . S. 825; Gibson v. Florida Legislative 
Ganim., 372 U. S. 539, 543-546; Shelton v. Tucker, 364 
U . S. 479; N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabania, 357 U . S. 449, 
462---463 . Recognizing that guilt by association is a phi-
losophy alien to the traditions of a free society (see 
Schware v. Board of Bar E::eaminers, 353 U. S. 232, 
245-246) and the First Amendment itself, \Ve have held 
that civil or criminal disabilities may not be imposed on 
one who joins an organization which has among its pur-
poses the violent overthrow of the Government, unless 
the individual joins knowing of the organization's illegal 
purposes (Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U. S. 183) and with 
the specific intention to further those purposes. See 
Eljbrandt v. Russell, ante , p. 11; Aptheker v. Secretary 
of State, 378 U. S. 500." Id., at 122. 
The chancellor's findings are not ad.equate to support the 
judgment against the NAACP. 
IV 
In litigation of this kind the stakes are high. Concerted 
action is a powerful weapon. History teaches that special 
dangers are associated with conspiratorial activity. 78 And 
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ions of our society rest on the right of individ-
ine with other persons in pursuit of a common 
At tim'es the difference between lawful and unlawful collec-
tive action may be identified easily by reference to its pur-
pose. In this case, however, petitioners' ultimate obj ectives 
were unquestionably legitimate. The charge of illegality-
like the claim of constitutional protection-derives from the 
means employed by tl1e participants to achieve those goals. 
The use of speeches, marches, pickets , and threats of social 
ostracism cannot provide the basis for a dmamge award. 
But violent conduct-or an agreement to use violence-is be-
yond the pale of constitutional protection. · 
The taint of violence colored the conduct of some of the pe-
titioner~ en of demonstrating that it colored the 
entire collective effort, however, is not satisfied by evidence 
that violence occurred or even that violence contributed to 
the success of the boycott. A massive and prolonged effort 
to change the social, poli tical, and economic structure of a 
local environment cannot be characterized as a violent con-
spiracy simply by reference to the ephemeral consequences of 
noted: 
"The crime comes down to us wrapped in \'ague but unpleasant connota-
tions. It sounds historical undertones of treachery, secret plotting and vi-
olence on a scale that menaces social stability and the security of the state 
itself. 'Privy conspiracy' ranks with sedition and rebellion in the Litany's 
prayer for deliverance. Conspiratorial movements do indeed lie back of 
the polit ical assassination, the coup d'etat , the putsch, the revolution, and 
seizures of power in modern times, as they have in all history." 
Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U. S. 440, 448 (Jackson, J ., concun-ing). 
" "The most natural privilege of man, next to the right of acting for him-
self, is that of combining his exertions with those of his fellow creatures 
and in acting in common with them. The right of association therefore ap-
pears to me almost as inalienable in its nature as the right of personal lib-
erty. No legislator can attack it without impairing the foundations of soci-
ety." de Tocqueville, Democracy in America 203 (Bradley ed. 1954). 
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relatively few violent acts . Such a characterization must be 
supported by findings that adequately disclose the eviden-
tiary basis for concluding that specific parties agreed to use 
unlawful means, that carefully identify the impact of such un-
lawful conduct, and that recog11ize the importance of avoiding 
the imposition of punishment for constitutionally protected 
activity. The burden of demonstrating that fear rather than 
protected conduct was the dominant force in the movement is 
heavy. A court must be wary of a claim that the true color 
of a forest is better revealed by reptiles hidden in the ,veeds 
than by the foliage of countless free-standing trees . The 
findings of the chancellor, framed largely in the light of two 
legal theories rejected by the Mississippi Supreme Court, are 
constitutionally insufficient to suppo1t the ·ud ·ment hat"alr 
petitioners are ia e or a osses resulting from the boycot . 
The judgment is reversed . The case is remanded for fur-
ther proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. 










Portions of speech delivered by Charles Evers 
on April 19, 1969 (R. 1091- 1130): 
"Thank you very much. We want our white friends here to 
know what we tell them happens to be so. Thank you for 
having the courage to walk down those streets with us. We 
thank you for letting our white brothers know that Port Gib-
son ain't none of their tov,n. (Amen) (Applause) That 
Port Gibson is all of our town. (Applause) That black folks, 
red folks, Chinese and J apanese alike (Yeah) (That's 
right.), that we are going to have our share . (Yeah, ,va are.) 
"We are going to beat you because we know you can't trick 
us no more. (yea) You are not going to be able to fool us by 
getting somebody to give us a drink of whiskey no more. 
(Applause) You ain't gonna be able to fool us by somebody 
giving us a few dollars no more. (Applause) We are gonna 
take your money and di-ink with you and then we're gonna 
(Applause) vote against you. Then we are going to elect a 
sheriff in this county and a sheriff that is responsible, that 
won't have to run and grab the telephone and call up the 
blood-thirsty highway patrol when he gets ready (Yeah) to 
come in and beat innocent folks down to the ground for no 
cause. (That's right) (Applause) (Boo) We are going to 
elect a sheriff that can call his deputies and r epresent black 
leaders in the community and stop whatever problem there 
is . (Yeah) (That's right.) 
"Then we are going to do more than that. The white mer-
chants of this tov;n are so wrapped up in the power structure 
here, since you love your Police Department so well, since 
you support them so well (Yeah), we are going to let them 
buy your dirty clothes and your filthy, rotten groceries. 
"Oh, no, white folks, we ain't going to shoot you with no 
bullet. (That's right.) We are going to shoot you with our 
ballots and with our bucks. (Yea) (That's right.) We are 
going to take away from you the thing that you have had over 
- -
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us all these years . (Yeah) Political power and economic 
power. While you kill our brothers and our sisters and rape 
our wives and our friends. (Yeah) You're guilty. You're 
guilty because you don't care a thing about anybody. (Yes.) 
And \Yhen you go and let a big, black burly nigger like you 
get on the police force (Yea) go down and grab another black 
brother's arm and hold it while a white racist. stole him from 
us, and he's a li ar if he says he didn't hold him. 
"We mean what we are saying. Yfve are not playing. 
(Right) We better not even think one of us is black. You 
better not even be caught near one of these stores. 
(Applause) 
"We don't want you caught in Piggly-"\Viggly. You re-
member how he grinned at us four years ago? (Yeah) You 
know how when he took office he gTinned at us? (Yeah) He 
ain't hired nobody yet. (That's right) (No) And you know 
old Jitney Jungle down there with those funny letters down 
on the end? (That's right) (Applause) He haven't hired 
nobody in there yet. (No) Do you know poor ole M & Mor 
whatever it stands for, mud and mush, I guess. (Applause) 
They're out here on the high·way and they l1aven't hired none 
of us yet. 
"Do you know Ellis who had a part-time boy all his life? 
He ain't hired nobody, is he, yet? (No) Then we got ole 
Stampley, and ninety-nine and three-fourths of his sales are 
black folks business. He got the nerve to tell me he ain't 
gonna put no nigger ringing his cash register. I got news for 
you, Brother Stampley. You can ring it your damn self. 
(Extra loud applause.) I want some of you fat cats after this 
meeting who wants three of our young boys who ain't a'scar'd 
of white folks· (Applause) (Me) and we want you that's willing 
to follow the rules now to go down by Brother Stampley's and 
serve notice on him with our placards that we ain't coming no 
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more. 
"Then we are going to tell all the young men that drive 
Piggly-Wiggly trucks now (Yeah) (Be careful, Son.) because 
the soul brothers and the spirit is watching you . (Extra loud 
applause.) 
"All right, Brother Wolf, you're next. (Applause) We 
got a couple of 'em to come down by Brother Wolfs. We 
mean business, white folks . We ain't gonna shoot you all, 
,ve are going to hit you \\·here it hurts most. (In the pocket-
book) (Applause) In the pocketbook and in the ballot box. 
(Applause) Vve may as well tell our friends at Alcorn to stay 
a,vay from up here. (Yea) Now, you say, '\.Vhat's vvrong 
with you niggers?' I'll tell you what is wrong with us nig-
gers; We are tired of you white folks, you racists and you big-
ots mistreating us . (Yeah) We are tired of paying you to 
deny us the right to even exist. (Tell 'em about it.) And we 
ain't coming back, white folks . (We ain't.) 
"You all put a curfew on us at eight o'clock tonight. We 
are going to do you better than that. We are going to leave 
at one-thirty. (Loud applause) We are going to leave at 
one-thirty and we ain't coming back, white folks . 
"We are going to have Brother McCay; we are going t o 
have our newly elected mayor who we elected, we are going 
to have him around here, too. Come on back, my dear 
friend . He say, 'Naw, brother, we ain't coming.' 'Have you 
got rid of all those bigots you got on your police force?' 'No.' 
'Have you hired Negroes in all them stores?' 'No.' 'Well, 
we ain't coming back.' (Right) That's all we gonna· do. 
You know, what they don't realize is that you put on this cur-
few, that is all we needed. Let me just give them some in-
structions. We are going to buy gas only from the Negro-
owned service stations. We agreed on it, remember? Now, 
don't back upon your agreement. (Yea) I don't care how 
- -
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many Negroes working on it, that's too bad . We are going 
only to Negro-owned service stations. And we are going 
only-the only time you will see us around on this street, now 
listen good, you are going to Lee's Grocery and other stores 
on this end . Is that clear? (Yeah) (Applause) 
""\Ve don't want to go to none of them drugstores . They 
get us confused . Now, who am I going to get my medicine 
from? Let us know in time and we will be glad to furnish a 
car free to carry you anywhere you have to go to get a pre-
scription filled . You can't beat this. (No) It won't cost 
you a dime. You go to any of the local black businessmen 
and tell them you have got to go to Vicksburg to get your 
stuff. And then if they don't carry you, let us know. "\Ve'll 
take care of them later. (Applause) Now, you know, we 
have got a little song that says, 'This is your thing, do what 
you want to do.' (Applause) This is our thing, let's do what 
we ,vant to do with it. Let's make sure now-if you be dis-
obedient now you are going to be in trouble . Remember 
that, now, listen. Listen good. They are going to start 
'You know \vhat, Evers is down there with his goon squad , 
' · Now, ,ve know Claiborne County,-'with his goon 
squad harassing poor ole niggers.' 
"Well, good white folks you have been harassing us all our 
lives. (Applause) And if we decided to harass you that's 
our business. (That's right) They are our children and we 
are going to discipline them the way we want to . Now, be 
sure you get all this right on all these tape recorders. ·what-
ever I say on this trip I will say it in Jackson. (Amen) 
(Glory) And I will say it in Washington and New York. 
White folks ain't gonna never control us no more. (Ap-
plause) 
"Now, my dear friends, the white folks have got the mes-
sage. I hope you have got the message and tell every one of 
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our black brotl1ers until all these people are gone, you voted 
on this in the church, don't let me down, and don't let your-
self down. We agreed in the church that \Ye would vacate 
this town until they have met those requests, the white folks 
don't demand nothing out of us . All right, white folks, we 
are just saying until you decide when you want to do these 
little things we beg of you, we are not corning back. (No 
way) 
"None of us better not be caught up here. (Yea) I don't 
care how old you are, I don't care how sick you are, I don't 
care how crazy you are, you better not be caught on these 
streets shopping in these stores until these demands are met. 
(Applause) 
"Now, let's get together. Are you for this or against it? 
(Applause) (For it.) Remember you voted this . We in-
tend to enforce it. You needn't go calling the chief of police, 
he can't help you none. You needn't go calling the sheriff, he 
can't help you none. (That's right.) He ain't going to offer 
to sleep with none of us men, I can tell you that. (Applause) 
Let's don't break our little rules that you agreed upon here. 
"Let's go to the funeral of our young son whenever the fu-
neral is. I don't ,vant you to come with hate because that is 
not going to solve our problems. (No hate.) We don't want 
you to hate the white folks here in Port Gibson. That is not 
going to solve it. If you hate ,vhat they have done, I hate to 
get personal, I hate what they did so much to Medgar, (I 
know.) I ain't going to ever stop hating them for that. But I 
am going to chase them in the way what I know is right and 
just. I am not going to lay out in the bushes and shoot no 
white folks . That's wrong. I am not gonna go out here and 
bomb none of them's home. (No) That's not right. But I 
am going to do everything in my power to take away all the 
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power, political power, legal power that they possess any-
where I live. We are going to compete against them. 
When we blacks learn to support and respect each other, 
then and not until then, will white folks respect us . 
(Applause) 
"Now, you know I trust white folks and I mean every word 
I say. But it comes a time when we got to make up in our 
mind individually, are we going to make those.persons worth-
while . We done talked and raised all kind of sand all day 
here, now, what is really going to prove it, are we going to 
live up to v;hat we have said? (Applause) Now if there is 
any one of us breaks what we agTeed upon, you are just as 
guilty as that little trigger-happy, blood-thirsty rascal. (Tell 
'em about it.) .... 
"I go all over this country, and I ought not to tell you white 
folks this, and I tell other white folks that some day we are 
going to get together in Mississippi, black and white, and 
work out our problems. And we are ready to start when-
ever you are. If you are r eady to start, we are . Vv e ain't 
going to let you push us, not one inch. (That's r ight.) If 
you come on beating us, we are going to fight back. (Right) 
We got our understanding. We are all God's children. The 
same man that brought you all here brought us . You could 
have been black just like we are. We could have been white 
and baldheaded just like you are . (Laughter) (Inaudible) 
We are going to work hard at this , Dan. We are going to be 
organized this time. We ain't going to be bought off and 
talked off. We are going to elect the county sheriff here this 
next time that don't need the highway patrol. Now, you 
see, Dan had a good chance to set himself up right, but he 
goofed it. He goofed. (Yeah) He blew it. (Laughter) 
Don't forget that, heah. (Right) It brings back memories 
like you know you remember things we do. 
"Now, if you don't think it is necessary, we don't have to go 
. ,. .. - -
81-202----APPENDIX 
NAACP v. CLAIBOR:'.\E HARDWARE CO. 7 
back to the church. If you want to go back there, we can. I 
want you to make sure here that we are going to leave this 
town to our white brotl1 ers and we ain't corning back no more 
until all our requests have been met. Is that the common 
consent of all you here? (Applause) (Let's go back to the 
church .) All right. Are \Ye willing to make sure that every-
one of us will be sure that none of the rest of our black broth-
el'S violate our . . . (Yea) We are all saying· it now. Let's 
not say it now so much on my part. You know, I'm just sort 
of leading, you know, how these lawyers are, leading our 
folks on to say wl1at has to be said . And that's the case. 
Let's make us a white town. \Ve would like for you to start 
it. Be courteous now. Don't mistreat nobody. Tell them, 
in a nice forceful ,,,ay, the curfe\v is going to be on until they 
do what we ask them." 
- -.§upr ttttt {qcnrl cf f!rt 'Jlutlt tb .§htt.t.iY 
~ulpngtcn. 10. (q. 20ffeJI.~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WM . J . BRENNAN, JR. June 1, 1982 
RE: No. 81-202 NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware 
Dear John: 
I agr_ee . 
Justice Stevens 
cc: The Conference 
Sincerely, 
/1 , 







TO: David " DATE: June 2, 1982 
FROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
81-202 NAACP v. Claiborne 
On the basis of a first - rather weary - reading 
last night of Justice Stevens' marathon opinion, I think I 
am in agreement with most of it. I certainly agree that 
there is no basis for affirming the judgment below to the 
extent that it held "all petitioners" liable for "all losses 
resulting from a boycott". I will join the opinion to the 
extent that it reverses on this ground. I also suppose with 
JPS's conclusion is right that the liberal First Amendment 
opinions, cited by him, would impose no liability for Evers' 
incitement to violence in the absence of a showing that some 
violence did occur in reasonable proximity to his , 
incitement. If the slate were clean, I might not allow 
quite this loud a call to violence. But, I judge from JPS's 
opinion that the principal acts of violence occurred before 
Evers' most inflamatory incitement. 
In discussing the alleged liability of the NAACP, 
JPS noted that this was predicated only on action of its 
regional officer, Charles Evers. But JPS concluded: 
~ ~ "There is no evidence that Evers or any other 
NAACP member had either actual or apparent 
authority to commit acts of violence or to 
threaten violent conduct. The only evidence 
in the record suggests to the contrary." p. 
43, 44. 
.,,. .f , _ 
- -
JPS notes (p. 44) that NAACP policy specifically 
rejects violence. He then concludeq that absent "evidence 
of authorization or ratification", no liability could be 
imposed on NAACP on the basis of an apparent authority 
argument. (p. 42-45} 
As of now, and subject to your views, and a more 
careful reading of the opinion, I could join most of it -
perhaps all. But at least for the present, I have 
reservations on the following points: 
1. In light of the Court's recent decision in 
Hydrolevel, (you have heard of it), is JPS riqht in what he 
says about "apparent" authority. It is far from clear to me 
that he is. 
2. Although at one or mor~ points, JPS states 
that where damage is oroxi~ateJy caused by violence, those 
who committed the violence may be laible for damages under 
state tort law. JPS concludes his opinion by saying that 
the findings of the Chancellor below "are constitutionally 
insufficient to support the judgment that all petitioners 
are liable for all losses resulting from the boycott". The 
judgment is then reversed and remanded for further 
proceedings. My questions is whether the opinion would 
clearly leave it to the trial court on remand to identify -
if evidence permits - the particular individuals who caused 




A further, more careful reading, may well present 
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June 4, 1982 
81-202 NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware 
Dear John: 
Althouqh I intend to read your araft opinion ~ore 
carefully before making a final decision, I express now 
several thoughts for your consideration. 
First, I agree entirely that insofar as 
indiscriminate liability for damages was placed on all 
participants, the decision below must be reversed. And 
certainly I agree that liability may be imposed upon persons 
whose violence caused damage. At page 39, you say this. It 
would be helpful, I think, if this were reoeaten near the 
end of the opinion - possibly in the final paragraph -
making clear that this question remains open on remand. 
You exonerate the NAACP on a theory that I thought 
a majority of the Court rejected in Hvdrolevel - i.e. the 
doctrine of apparent authority does not apply to 
unauthorized acts of members of voluntary, nonprofit 
associations. In light of Hydrolevel, despite my 
disagreement with it, I am not sure I could exonerate the 
N~~CP if one of its full tim~ employees - and regional 
representative - was found to have incited others to violent 
activjty. I wonder, though, whether you need to consider 
this agency question at all. My understanding of your draft 
is that you conclude that Evers' activity was 
constitutionally protected because the major part of the 
violence occurred before his inflamatory oratory, and none 
could be traced proximately to it. If Evers is exonerated, 
would not the NAACP be free of lia~ility also? 
I do have a somewhat broader concern. The 
protection afforded "political" boycotts by your draft 
appears to be without any limiting principle. If, for 
example, a state had a law against boycotts of racial or 
religious groups, do you think it could be enforced in light 
# ,_· , 
- - 2. 
of this opinion. Also, suppose that all of the whites in a 
town decide that blacks have too much economic and political 
power, and refuse to deal with any black business people. 
There are, of course, federal laws against such "boycotts". 
I do not think the mere fact that the activity is concerterl 
is sufficient to protect it. Participants in such a boycott 
can, I suppose, always claim it is "political". 
Although the blacks in this town seem to have had 
just cause for strong political activity, in this agP of 
numerous special interest groups - many with passionate ana 
extreme feelings - it is well not to exonerate too broa~ly 
the type of activity present in this case. It was activity 
- on the edge of violence much of the time - that injured 
t~e innocent with the quilty. 
I hesitate to a~d to your bur~ens, esp~ciallv now. 
But I think it best to invite your considPration of these 
thoughts early. ~his must be as difficult a case to write 
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rfty'f;hl 1~Af; NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT '\s ~ /-
v( OF COLORED PEOPLE, ET AL, PETITIONERS v. IA~~ v-. 
h,,v4{ •'~' CLAIBORNEHARDWARECOMPANYETAL. r-r--uCJv 
~-Lb""~ ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT ~,-...,. I-;;.~ . ~ 4- '3 5 OF MISSISSIPPI 
~ l - 1 · [June-, 1982] 
, JUSTICE STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court. 
7 ~ /;t...,I The term "concerted action" encompasses unlawful con-
d..1.Ll 1.1 ,
6
-u O spiracies and constitutionally protected assemblies. The ,-! ~ ..- _ _ _ fJ ~iooseness and pliability" of legal doctrine applicable to con-
~ . i:tt.tr ,,,.,_-~ certed action led Justice Jackson to note that certain joint ac-
¢--' ~ L . ; .. f) ,, .::> tivities have a "chameleon-like" character. 1 The boycott of 
~ ' white merchants in Claiborne County, Mississippi, that gave 
- Jf o J 'f, ~ rise to this litigation had such a character; it included ele-
/ 1 ments of criminality and elements of majesty. Evidence ),::J ~L,,,___ _ that fear of reprisals caused some black citizens to withhold 
.....-':-~  their patronage from respondents' businesses convinced the 
t:>-{ Supreme Court of Mississippi that the entire boycott was un-
/A- IA_~ I_ ., 1 '\ lawful and that each of the 92 petitioners was liable for all of 
/_,,,_~ ' its economic consequences. Evidence that persuasive rheto-
ric, determination to remedy past injustices, and a host of 
'";/ .1 • voluntary decisions by free citizens were the critical factors 
..._ 'f:.J_ S ..ee.- lf 2..- in the boycott's success presents us with the question 
/ .~ ..J A • 
1
. _ _ . whether the State Court's judgment is consistent with the 
fiV ,-- ~r~ . Constitution of the United States. 
1 See Krulev.ritch v. United States, 336 U. S. 440, 447-449 (Jackson, J ., 
concurring). 
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2 NAACP v. CLAIBORNE HARDWARE CO. 
I 
In March 1966, black citizens of Port Gibson, Mississippi, 
and other areas of Claiborne County presented white elected 
officials with a list of particularized demands for racial equal-
ity and integration. 2 The complainants did not receive a sat-
isfactory response and, at a local NAACP meeting at the 
First Baptist Church, ·several hundred black persons voted to 
place a boycott on white merchants in the area. On October 
31, 1969, several of the merchants filed suit in state court to 
recover losses caused by the boycott and to enjoin future boy-
cott activity. We recount first the course of that litigation 
and then consider in more detail the events that gave rise to 
the merchants' claim for damages. 
A 
The complaint was filed in the Chancery Court of Hinds 
County by 17 white merchants. 3 The merchants named two 
corporations and 146 individuals as defendants: the _National 
Association for the Advancement of Colored People 
(NAACP), a New York membership corporation; Mississippi 
Action for Progress (MAP), a Mississippi corporation that im-
plemented the federal "Head Start" program; Aaron Henry, 
the President of the Mississippi Branch of the NAACP; 
2 Port Gibson is the county seat and largest municipality in Claiborne 
County. 
3 The affected businesses represented by the merchants included four 
grocery stores, two hardware stores, a pharmacy, two general variety 
stores, a laundry, a liquor store, two car dealers, two auto parts stores, 
and a gas station. Many of the owners of these boycotted stores were 
civic leaders in Port Gibson and Claiborne County. Respondents Allen 
and Al Batten were aldermen in Port Gibson, R. 15111; Robert Vaughan, 
part owner and operator of one of the boycotted stores, represented 
Claiborne County in the Mississippi House of Representatives, R. 15160; 
respondents Abraham and Hay had served on the school board, R. 14906, 
14678; respondent Hudson served on the Claiborne County Democratic 
Committee, R. 840. 
\ - -
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Charles Evers, the Field Secretary of the NAACP in Missis-
sippi; and 144 other individuals who had participated in the 
boycott. 4 The complaint sought injunctive relief and an at-
tachment of property, as well as damages. Although it al-
leged that the plaintiffs were suffering irreparable injury 
from an ongoing conspiracy, no preliminary relief was 
sought. 
Trial was begun before a chancellor in equity on June 11, 
1973. 5 The court heard the testimony of 144 witnesses dur-
ing an eight-month trial. In August 1976, the chancellor is-
sued an opinion and decree finding that "an overwhelming 
preponderance of the evidence" established the joint and sev-
eral liability of 130 of the defendants on three separate con-
• The complaint also named 52 banks as "attachment defendants." The 
banks answered that the NAACP had $16,800 on deposit in Mississippi. 
5 As a result of the plaintiffs' prayer for an attachment in equity, juris-
diction existed in chancery court. The trial judge ruled: "It was incum-
bent upon this court to hear the case in full once jurisdiction was assumed. 
To have heard the portions of this matter sounding in equity, only, and to 
have transferred the questions of tort liability and damages to the circuit 
court would have been contrary to the maxim 'equity delights to do com-
plete justice, and not by halves.' " App. to Pet. for Cert. 56b. The defen-
dants thus were denied a jury trial on the liability issues. Although the 
court recognized that it had power to empanel a jury, it declined to exer-
cise its discretion to do so. Ibid. The Mississippi non-resident attach-
ment statute that provided the basis for equitable jurisdiction has since 
been declared unconstitutional by both federal district courts in Missis-
sippi. MP! Inc. v. McCullough, 463 F. Supp. 887 (ND Miss. 1978); Mis-
sissippi Chem. Corp. v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 444 F. Supp. 925 (SD 
Miss. 1977). 
Commencement of trial was delayed by collateral proceedings in federal 
court. See Henry v. First National Bank of Clarksdale, 50 F.R.D. 251 
(ND Miss. 1970), reversed, 444 F. 2d 1300 (CA5 1971), cert. denied, 405 
U. S. 1019. The District Court entered a preliminary injunction restrain-
ing the state proceedings on the theory that the merchants sought to in-
fringe the defendants' First Amendment rights. The Court of Appeals re-
versed, holding that the mere commencement of a private tort suit did not 
itself involve "state action" for purposes of 28 U. S. C. § 1343(3). 
\ - -
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spiracy theories. 6 First, the court held that the defendants 
were liable for the tort of malicious interference with the 
plaintiffs' businesses, which did not necessarily require the 
presence of a conspiracy. 7 Second, the chancellor found a vi-
• App. to Pet. for Cert. 2g. Of the original 148 named defendants, 16 
were dismissed by stipulation of counsel (12 had died, two were minors, 
one was non compos mentis, and one-the Reverend Dominic Cangemi-
was dismissed by agreement without explanation). One defendant was 
dismissed because he had been misidentified in the complaint. The chan-
cellor dismissed one defendant-state NAACP leader Aaron Henry-be-
cause "the complainants failed to meet the burden of proof as to [his] 
wrongdoing." Id., at 28b. Thus, except for the defendants dismissed by 
stipulation, the plaintiffs prevailed on the merits in the trial court against 
all but one of the defendants. 
7 Although the bulk of the court's discussion of the defendants' common 
law tort liability focused on the presence of a civil conspiracy, the chancel-
lor did not appear to hold that a concerted refusal to deal-without more-
was actionable under the common law of Mississippi. The court appar-
ently based its first theory of liability on the ground that the "malicious 
interference by the defendants with the businesses of the complainants as 
shown by the evidence in this case is tortious per se, and this would be true 
even without the element of conspiracy." Id., at 42b. (footnote omitted). 
In Mississippi, "[e]ither an individual or a corporation, whether acting in 
conjunction with others, or not," may be liable in an action for "malicious 
interference with a trade or calling. " Memphis Laundry-Cleaners v. 
Lindsey, 192 Miss. 224, 239 (1941). The chancellor in this case stated that 
the necessary element of malice is established by proof of "the intentional 
performance of an act harmful to another without just or lawful cause or 
excuse." App. to Pet. for Cert. 42b, n. 8. 
The repeated references to the presence of a conspiracy might be ex-
plained by the court's finding that each of the defendants-with the excep-
tion of Aaron Henry-was jointly and severally liable for the plaintiffs' 
losses. As noted, an element of the plaintiffs' common law action was the 
defendants' intentional performance of an "unprivileged" act harmful to an-
other. The chancellor stated that the evidence clearly established that 
"certain defendants" had committed "overt acts which were injurious to 
the trade and business of complainants." Id. , at 39b. The court contin-
ued: "Where two or more persons conspire together, the conspiracy makes 
the wrongful act of each person the joint acts of them all," id., at 41b; "[i]t 
follows that each act done in pursuance of the conspiracy by one of the sev-
~ - -
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olation of a state statutory prohibition against secondary boy-
cotts, on the theory that the defendants' primary dispute was 
with the governing authorities of Port Gibson and Claiborne 
County and not with the white merchants at whom the boy-
cott was directed. 8 Third, the court found a violation of Mis-
sissippi's antitrust statute, on the ground that the boycott 
had diverted black patronage from the white merchants to 
black merchants and to other merchants located out of 
Claiborne County and thus had unreasonably limited compe-
tition between black and white merchants that had tradition-
ally existed. 9 The chancellor specifically rejected the defen-
dants' claim that their conduct was protected by the First 
Amendment. 10 
eral conspirators is, in contemplation of the law, an act for which each is 
jointly and severally liable." Ibid. Thus, the presence of a conspiracy 
rendered all of the "conspirators" liable for the wrongful acts of any mem-
ber of that conspiracy. 
8 See Miss. Code Ann. § 97-23-85. The chancellor found: ''The testi-
mony in the case at bar clearly shows that the principal objective of the 
boycott was to force the white merchants of Port Gibson and Claiborne 
County to bring pressure upon governing authorities to grant defendants' 
demands or, in the alternative, to suffer economic ruin. " App. to Pet. for 
Cert. 51b. As noted, however, many of the merchants themselves were 
civic leaders. See n. 3, supra. 
• See Miss. Code Ann. § 75--21-9. The court made clear that under this 
theory intentional participation in the concerted action rendered each de-
fendant directly liable for all resulting damages. "As a legal principle, it is 
sufficient to show that the concert of action on the part of the defendants 
was deliberately invited, and that the defendants gave their adherence to 
the scheme and participated in it. " App. to Pet. for Cert. 54b. The same 
was true of the court's secondary boycott theory; "since an illegal boycott is 
an invasion of a property right, the members of the boycotting combination 
are liable for the resulting damages. " Id. , at 53b. 
10 In its discussion of the secondary boycott statute, the court rejected an 
argument that the statute was unconstitutional under the First and Four-
teenth Amendments. Noting as a "basic premise" that "secondary boy-
cotts are unlawful under both United States and Mississippi law," the court 
stated that "conduct and communication which are illegal are not protected 
> - -
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Five of the merchants offered no evidence of business 
losses. The chancellor found that the remaining 12 had suf-
fered lost business earnings and lost good will during a seven-
year period from 1966 to 1972 amounting to $944,699. That 
amount, plus statutory antitrust penalties of $6,000 and a 
$300,000 award of attorney's fees, produced a final judgment 
of $1,250,699, plus interest from the date of judgment and 
costs. As noted, the chancellor found all but 18 of the origi-
nal 148 defendants jointly and severally liable for the entire 
judgment. The court justified imposing full liability on the 
national organization of the NAACP on the ground that it 
had failed to "repudiate" the actions of Charles Evers, its 
Field Secretary in Mississippi. 
In addition to imposing damage liability, the chancellor en-
tered a broad permanent injunction. He permanently en-
joined petitioners from stationing "store watchers" at the re-
spondents' business premises; from "persuading" any person 
to withhold his patronage from respondents; from "using de-
meaning and obsence language to or about any person" be-
cause that person continued to patronize the respondents; 
from "picketing or patroling'' the premises of any of the re-
spondents; and from using violence against any person or in-
flicting damage to any real or personal property. 11 
by the constitutional provisions relating to freedom o speech." Id., at 
46b. In imposing liability under the state restraint ot trade statute, the 
chancellor added: "After a careful consideration of the constitutional claims 
of defendants, the Court finds that none of the acts or conduct of defen-
dants was shielded or protected by the Constitution of the United States or 
the Constitution of the State of Mississippi." Id. , at 56b. Finally, in as-
sessing damages, the court stated: "Defendants base their defense on the 
concept that the right to boycott and inflict losses on complainants was a 
legally protected right afforded them under the laws and Constitution of 
the United States. This Court has hereinbefore found that the conduct of 
the defendants was unlawful and unprotected." Id., at 62b. 
11 Id., at 19g. Following the entry of judgment, the defendants moved 
for relief from Mississippi's 125 percent supersedeas bonding requirement. 
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In December 1980, the ~hsis_§iE§-i.....§u2r~e ...Q.ourt re-
versed significant portions of t e tria court's judgment. It 
held that the seconda b c tt statute was inapplicable be-
cause it had not been enacted until "t e oycot a been in 
operation for upward of two years." 12 The court declined to 
rely on the restraint of trade statute, noting that the "United 
States Supreme Court has seen fit to hold boycotts to achieve 
political ends are not a violation of the Sherman Act, 15 
U. S. C. § 1 (1970), after which our statute is patterned." 13 
Thus, the court rejected two theories of liability that were 
consistent with a totally voluntary and nonviolent withhold-
ing of patronage from the white merchants. 
The Mississippi Supreme Court upheld the imposition of li-
ability, however, on the basis of the chancellor's common law 
to}i, th.e!)ry. After reviewing the chancellor's recitation of 
the facts, the court quoted the following finding made by the 
trial court: ~ ..... • 
"In carrying out the agreement and design, certain of 
the defendants, acting for all others, engaged in acts of 
physical force and violence against the persons and prop-
erty of certain customers and prospective customers. 
Intimidation, threats, social ostracism, vilification, and 
traduction were some of the devices used by the defen~ 
dants to achieve the desired results. Most effective, 
also, was the ~ationin_g_ of gua:r:ds ('enforcers,' 'deacons,' 
or 'black hats') in the vicinity of white-owned businesses. 
Unquestionably, the evidence shows that the volition of 
many black persons was overcome out of sheer fear, and 
they were forced and compelled against their personal 
wills to withhold their trade and business intercourse 
enjoined execution of the chancery court judgment pending appeal. 
Henry v. First National Bank, 424 F. Supp. 633 (ND Miss. 1976), af-
firmed, 595 F . 2d 291 (CA5 1979), cert. denied, 444 U. S. 1074. 
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from the complainants." App. to Pet. for Cert. 39b 
(quoted id., at 20a). 
On the basis of this finding, the court concluded that the en-
- ? tire bo_ycott was ...,unla~ l. "If any of tliese factors- force, 
violence, or threats=--is present, then the boycott is illegal re-
gardless of whether it is primary, secondary, economical, po-
litical, social or other." 14 In a brief passage, the court re-
jected petitioners' reliance on the First Amendment: 
"The ~ se of illegal force, violence, and threats 
agains e peace to achieve a goal makes the present 
state of facts a conspiracy. We know of no instance, and 
our attention has been drawn to no decision, wherein it 
has been adjudicated that free speech guaranteed by the 
First Amendment includes in its protection the right to 
commit crime." Id., at 23a. 
The theory of the Mississippi Supreme Court, then, was that 
petitioners had agreed to use force, violence, and "threats" to 
effectuate the boycott. 10 To the trial court, such a finding 
had not been necessary. 16 
Although the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed the 
chancellor's basic finding of liability, the court held that re-
" Id. , at 23a. 
1
• The court did not specifically identify the evidence linking any of the 
defendants to such an agreement. 
16 As noted, liability under the secondary boycott and restraint of trade 
statutes could be found on the basis of an entirely voluntary and nonviolent 
agreement to withhold patronage. See n. 9, supra. It is not clear 
whether-in its imposition of tort liability-the trial court rested on a the-
ory similar to that ultimately advanced by the Mississippi Supreme Court. 
In finding an unlawful civil conspiracy-which rendered each conspirator 
liable for the actions of others, see n. 7, supra-the chancellor arguably 
believed that it was necessary to connect all defendants to an agreement to 
use force or violence to effectuate the conspiracy. See id. , at 40b-41b. 
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spondents "did not establish their case" with respect to 38 of 
the defendants. 17 The court found that MAP was a victim, 
rather than a willing participant, in the conspiracy and dis-
missed- without further explanation-37 individual defen-
dants for lack of proof. Finally, the court ruled that certain 
damages had been improperly awarded and that other dam-
ages had been inadequately proved. The court remanded for 
further proceedings on the computation of damages. 18 
We granted a petition for certiorari. - - U. S. --. At 
oral argument, a question arose concerning the factual basis 
for the judgment of the Mississippi Supreme Court. As 
noted, that court affirmed petitioners' liability for damages 
on the ground that each of the petitioners had ~d to effec-
tuate the boycott through force, violence, and threats. Such 
a finding was not necessary to the trial court's imposition of 
liabilty and neither state court had identified the evide ce ac-
tually linkin t e peti 10ners o sue an a eement. In re-
sponse to a request om t · s ou , respondents filed a sup-
plemental brief "specifying the acts committed by each of the 
petitioners giving rise to liability for damages." Respond-
ents' SUl,)plemental Brief 1. That brief helpfully places the 
petitioners in cluferenf c ategories; we accept respondents' 
framework for analysis and identify these classes as a preface 
to our review of the relevant incidents that occurred during 
the seven-year period for which damages were assessed. 19 
First, respondents contend that liability is justified by evi-
17 Id. , at 26a. 
18 Concerning the permanent injunction entered by the chancellor, the 
court stated: "Although the granting of injunction has been assigned as 
error, the error has not been argued, and NAACP, et al. say, at the conclu-
sion of their brief ' ... the injunctive aspects of the case are now moot. 
"' Id. , at 5a. Despite this finding, the court did not vacate the 
injunction. 
19 Respondents acknowledge that "[t]he basis on which the Mississippi 
Supreme Court held that petitioners were liable for damages was 'the 
agreed use of illegal force , violence and threats." ' Respondents' Supple-
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dence of participation in the "management" of the boycott. 20 
Respondents identify two groups of persons who may be 
found liable as "managers": 79 individuals who regularly at-
tended Tuesday night meetings of the NAACP at the First 
Baptist Church; and 11 persons who took "leadership roles" 
at those meetings. 21 
Second, respondents contend that liability is justified by 
evidence that an individual acted as a boycott "enforcer." 22 
In this category, respondents identify 22 persons as members 
of the_"Black Hats"-a special group organized during the 
boycott-ana 19 individuals who were simply "store 
watchers." 
Third, respondents argue that those petitioners "who 
themselves e~ ~~i~ eni _3:s!:..J' or who threatened _!!o-
lence have pr es possible evidence that they 
wanted the boycott to succeed by coercion whenever it could 
not succeed by persuasion." Id., at 10. They identify 16 in-
dividuals for whom there is direct evidence of participati~ n 
20 Respondents argue that anyone "who participates in the 
decisionmaking functions of an enterprise, with full knowledge of the tac-
tics by which the enterprise is being conducted, manifests his assent to 
those tactics .... " Id., at 2. Respondents thus would impose liability for 
the managers' failure to act; respondents argue that, despite evidence that 
boycott "enforcers" caused fear of injury to persons and property, "they 
were not taken from their posts and replaced by a system of voluntary 
compliance; there is no evidence that any of the petitioners ever admon-
ished them for their enforcement methods; the successful system of para-
military enforcers on the streets and 'rhetorical' threats of violence by boy-
cott leaders was left in place for the duration." Id. , at 5. 
21 These groups are not meant to be exclusive. 
22 "Once the pattern had been established-warnings to prospective cus-
tomers, destruction of goods purchased at boycotted stores, public displays 
of weapons and military discipline, denunciation of names gathered by the 
store-watchers, and subsequent violence against the persons and property 
of boycott breakers-store-watching in Port Gibson became the sort of ac-
tivity from which a court could reasonably infer an intention to frighten 
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what respondents characterize as violent acts or threats of 
violence. l · 
Fourth, tr~ ondents cont~ d ~ at Charles Evers may be ~ 
held liable because'lie "threatened violence on a number of 
occasions against boycott breakers." Id., at 13. Like the 
chancellor, respondents would impose liability on the national 
NAACP because Evers "was acting in his capacity as Field 
Secretary of the NAACP when he committed these tortious 
and constitutionally unprotected acts." Ibid. 
Finally, respondents state that they are "unable to deter-
mine on what record evidence the state courts relied in find-
ing liability on the part of seven of the petitioners." Id., at 
16. With these allegations of wrongdoing in mind, we turn 
to consider the factual events that gave rise to this 
controversy. 
B 
The chancellor held petitioners liable for all of respondents' 
lost earnings during a seven year period from 1966 to Decem-
ber 31, 1972. We first review chronologically the principal 
events that occurred during tfiat penod, describe some fea-
tures of the boycott that are not in dispute, and then identify 
the most significant evidence of violent activity. 
In late 1965 or early 1966, Charles Evers, the Field Secre-
tary of the NAACP, helped organize the Claiborne County 
Branch of the NAACP. The pastor of the First Baptist 
Church, James Dorsey, was elected president of the Branch; 
regular meetings were conducted each Tuesday evening at 
the Church. At about the same time, a group of black citi-
zens formed a Human Relations Committee and presented a 
petition for redress of grievances to civic and business lead-
ers of the white community. In response, a biracial commit-
tee-including five of the petitioners and several of the re-
spondents-was organized and held a series of unproductive 
meetings. 
The black members of the committee then prepared a fur-
i • - -
81-202-OPINION 
12 NAACP v. CLAIBORNE HARDWARE CO. 
ther petition entitled "Demands for Racial Justice." This pe-
tition was presented for approval at the local NAACP meet-
ing conducted on the first Tuesday evening in March. As 
described by the chancellor, "the approximately 500 people 
present voted their approval unanimously." 23 On March 
14, 1966, the petition was presented to public officials of Port 
Gibson and Claiborne County. 
The petition included 19 SJ2..ecific demands. It called for 
the desegregation of all public schools and public facilities, 
the hiring of black policemen, public improvements in black 
residential areas, selection of blacks for jury duty, integra-
tion of bus stations so that blacks could use all facilities, and 
an end to verbal abuse by law enforcement officers. It 
stated that "Negroes are not to be addressed by terms as 
'boy,' 'girl,' 'shine,' 'uncle,' or any other offensive term, but as 
'Mr.,' 'Mrs.,' or Miss,' as is the case with other citizens." 24 
As described by the chancellor, the purpose of the demands 
"was to gain equal rights and opportunities for Negro citi-
zens." 25 The petition further provided that black leaders 
hoped it would not be necessary to resort to the "selective 
buying campaigns" that had been used in other communi-
ties. 26 On March 23, two demands that had been omitted 
23 App. to Pet. for Cert. at 15b. 
"' Id. , at 10b. 
26 /d. , at 12b. 
26 The petition stated: 
"We hope it will not be necessary to resort to the kind of peaceful dem-
onstrations and selective buying campaigns which have had to be used in 
other communities. It takes manpower, time and energy which could be 
better directed at solving these problems which exist in Port Gibson and 
Claiborne County by mutual cooperation and efforts at tolerant 
understanding. 
"No one likes to have to resort to picketing and other kinds of dem-
onstration-just as no one likes to be the target of this kind of demonstra-
tion. But this sort of thing is inevitable unless there can be real progress 
toward giving all citizens their equal rights. There seems sometimes to be 
no other alternative. 
) ' - -
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from the original petition were added, one of which provided: 
"All stores must employ Negro clerks and cashiers." 21 This 
supplemental petition stated that a response was expected by 
April 1. 
A favorable response was not received. On April 1, 1966, 
the Claiborne County NAACP conducted another meeting at 
the First Baptist Church. As described by the chancellor: 
"Several hundred black people attended the meeting, 
and the purpose was to decide what action should be 
taken relative to the twenty-one demands. Speeches 
were made by Evers and others, and a vote was taken. 
It was the unanimous vote of those present, without dis----sent, to place a boycott on the white merchants of Port 
Gibson and Claiborne County." App. to Pet. for Cert. 
15b. 
The boycott was underway. 28 
In September 1966, Mississippi Action for Progress, Inc. 
(MAP) was organized to develop community action programs 
in 20 counties of Mississippi. One of MAP's programs-
known as Head Start-involved the use of federal funds to 
"Objectives of Negro citizens of Port Gibson and Claiborne County are, 
simply put, to have equality of opportunity, in every aspect of life, and to 
end the white supremacy which has pervaded community life. This im-
plies many long-range objectives such as participation in decision-making 
at every level of community, civic, business and political affairs." Id . , at 
9b. 
21 Id. , at 13b. 
28 Although Evers' speech on April 1, 1966 was not recorded, the chan-
cellor found: "E vers told his audience that they would be watched and that 
blacks who traded with white merchants would be answerable to him. Ac-
cording to Sheriff Dan McKay, who was present during the speech, Evers 
told the assembled black people that any 'uncle toms' who broke the boy-
cott would 'have their necks broken' by their own people. Evers' remarks 
were directed to all 8,000-plus black residents of Claiborne County, and not 
merely the relatively few members of the Claiborne NAACP. " Id. , at 
17b-18b (footnote omitted). 
~ 
116{, 
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provide food for young children. Originally, food purchases 
in Claiborne County were made alternately from white-
owned and black-owned stores, but in February 1967 the di-
rectors of MAP authorized their Claiborne County represent-
atives to purchase food only from black-owned stores. Since 
MAP bought substantial quantities of food, the consequences 
of this decision were significant. A large portion of the trial 
was devoted to the question whether MAP participated in 
the boycott voluntarily and-under the chancellor's theories 
of liability-could be held liable for the resulting damages. 
The chancellor found MAP a willing participant, noting that 
"during the course of the trial, the only Head Start cooks 
called to the witness stand testified that they refused to go 
into white-owned stores to purchase groceries for the chil-
dren in the program for the reason that they were in favor of 
the boycott and wanted to honor it." 29 
Several events occurred during the boycott that had a 
strong effect on boycott_activity. On February 1, 1967, Port 
Gibson empToyea its first black policeman. During that 
month, the boycott was lifted on a number of merchants. On 
April 4, 1968, Dr. Martin Luther King was assassinated in 
Memphis. The chancellor found that this tragic event had a 
depressing effect on the black community and, as a result, 
the boycott "tightened." 30 
29 Id., at 22b (emphasis in original). The chancellor also noted that 
MAP's Board of Directors "did not seek help from local law-enforcement 
officers, nor did they complain to United States authorities for protection 
of their cooks from possible reprisals arising from trade with the white 
merchants"; and that "MAP employees in Claiborne County continued to 
take an active part in the NAACP activities and to support the boycott by 
picketing and marching." Id., at 23b. The Mississippi Supreme Court 
rejected the chancellor's findings and concluded that MAP was not a willing 
participant in the boycott, thus absolving it from liability. 
30 Id., at 25b. One of the respondents awarded the most in damages, Bar-
bara Ellis-a partner in Ellis Variety Store-testified that the store was 
boycotted from April 1, 1966 until January 27, 1967. On the latter date, 
') - -
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One event that occurred during the boycott is of particular 
significance. On April 18, 1969, a young black man named 
Roosevelt Jackson was shot and killed during an encounter /4 _,,,,, ~ ,.I 
1 2 with two Port Gibson police officers.31 Large crowds imme- ,_,../_..----
diately gathered, first at the hospital and later at the church. 
Tension in the community neared a breaking point. The 
local police requested reinforcements from the State High-
way Patrol and sporadic acts of violence ensued. The Mayor 
and Board of Aldermen placed a dawn to dusk curfew into 
effect. 
On April 19, Qharles Evers spoke to a group assembled at 
the First Baptist ~hurcfi a nd led a march to the courthouse 
where he demanded the discharge of the entire Port Gibson 
Police Force. When this demand was refused, the bo c 
was reimposed on all white merchants. One o ver ~ 
speeches on this date was recorded by the police. n at 
speech si~ ificant°p6rtions of which are reproduced in an 
appendix to this opinion-Evers stated that boycott violators 
would be "disciplined" by their own people and warned that 
the sheriff could not sleep with boycott violators at night. 
On April 20, Aaron Henry came to Port Gibson, spoke to a 
large gathering, urged moderation, and joined local leaders in 
a protest march a~ m sent to~ torney General 
2 
~ ~ 
of the United States. On April 21 Eve gave another -
speech t several hundred people, in wh1c he again called for 
a discharge of the police force and for a total boycott of all 
white-owned businesses in Claiborne County. Although this 
speech was not recorded, the chancellor found that Evers 
the store agreed-apparently at the urging of a biracial committee-to hire 
a black cashier. R. 1183. The boycott was reimposed on April 17, 1968, 
after the death of Martin Luther King, but again was lifted on May 1, 1968. 
R. 1184. The boycott finally was reimposed on April 19, 1969, the day fol-
lowing the shooting of Roosevelt Jackson. Ibid. 
31 The officers had gone to Jackson's home to arrest him. A scuffle en-
sued and Jackson was shot by a white officer allegedly while being held by 
a black officer. 
') - -
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stated: "If we catch any of you going in any of them racist 
stores, we're onna break our damn neck." 32 
As noted, this lawsmt was e m ctober 19~ No sig-
nifi.cant events concerning the boycott occurred after that 
time. The chancellor identified no incident of violencu hat I 
occurred after Tfie suit was ""brougfif. Ile did iaentu'y, how-
ever, s signi cant incidents of boycott-related violence 
that occurred some years earlier. 
~ 
?~ 
Before describing that evidence, it is appropriate to note 
that certain practices generally used to encourage support for 
the boycott were uniformly peaceful and orderly. The few 
rv,arches associated with the boycott were carefully con-
trolled by black leaders. Pickets used to advertise the boy-
cott were often small children. The police made no arrests-
and no complaints ~ e recgrded-in connection with the pick-
etin and occasionalcternonstrations SU ortin the bo cott. 
Such ac ivi y was arr y irregu ar, occurred primarily on 
weekends; and apparently was largely discontinued around 
the time the lawsuit was filed. 33 
1~ 
One form of "discipline" of black persons who violated the 
boycott appears to have been employed with some regularity. 
Individuals stood outside of boycotted stores and identified 
those who traded with the merchants. Some of these indi-
32 Id., at 27b. 
33 R. 1146. The sheriff of Claiborne County testified: "There were pick-
ets off and on from April, 1966 to 1970." R. 1060. When asked to de-
scribe "how they conducted themselves, what they did , what they went 
about doing," he stated: "Most of them carried or either had signs on their 
shoulders and they walked up and down the streets in front of the stores. 
They wouldn't always picket the same stores at the same time. At differ-
ent times they might picket M&M then they would move up and picket 
Claiborne Hardware down Market Street to other businesses. Most of the 
time it was teenagers and at the last it was little bitty fellows , as young as 
about six years old. That was '69 and '70." Ibid. The sheriff also testi-
fied that the boycott was "tight" in April of 1966, April of 1968, and April of 
1969. R. 1152. 
- -
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viduals were members of a group known as the "Black Hats" 
or the "Deacons." 34 The names of persons who violated the 
boycott were read at meetings of the Claiborne County 
NAACP and published in a mimeographed paper entitled the 
"Black Times." As stated by the chancellor, those persons 
"were branded as traitors to the black cause, called demean-
ing na~ y ostracized for merely trading with 
whites." 35 
The chancellor also concluded that a quite different form of 
discipline had been used against certain violators of the boy-
cott. He specifically identified ten incidents that "strik-
ingly" revealed the "atmosphere of fear that prevailed among 
blacks from 1966 until 1970." 36 The testimony concerning 
four incidents convincingly demonstrates that they occurred 
because the victims were ignoring the boycott. In two 
cases, shots were fired at a house; in a third, a brick was 
thrown through a windshield; in the fourth, a flower garden 
was damaged. None of these four victims, however, ceased 
trading with white m ercna:rits. 3"I"" -
34 Evidence concerning the aims and practices of the "Black Hats" is 
contradictory. Respondents describe them as a "paramilitary organiza-
tion." Petitioner Elmo Scott, a member of the group, testified concerning 
instructions that were given to him: "It was given to the Deacons to give 
respect to the people that was on the street and, regardless of what they 
say back to you, for you not to use bad language to them or not to curse 
them or no kind of way, just talk to them in the right manner of way." R. 
2985. It is undisputed that the "Black Hats" were formed during the boy-
cott, that members of the organization engaged in "store watching'' and 
other "enforcement" activities, and that some individuals who belonged to 
the group committed acts of violence. 
35 App. to Pet. for Cert. 19b. 
36 Id., at 35b. 
37 On August 22, 1966, birdshot was fired into the home of James 
Gilmore, a black man who ignored the boycott. He immediately grabbed a 
shotgun, leapt into his car, pursued the vehicle from which he believed the 
shots had come, forced it to the side of the road, and apprehended three 
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The evidence concerning four other incidents is less clear, 
but again it indicates that an unlawful form of discipline was 
appl_ied to certain boycott VIolafors. In April 1966, a black 
couple named Cox asked for a police escort to go into a white-
owned dry cleaner and, a week later, shots were fired into 
their home. In another incident, an NAACP member took a 
bottle of whiskey from a black man who had purchased it in a 
white-owned store. The third incident involved a fight be-
tween a commercial fisherman who did not observe the boy-
cott and four men who "grabbed me and beat me up and took 
a gun off me." 38 In a fourth incident, described only in hear-
say testimony, a group of young blacks apparently pulled 
down the overalls of an elderly brick mason known as 
"Preacher White" and spanked him for not observing the 
boycott. 39 
indicted, tried, and convicted, but the convictions were set aside on appeal. 
Whitney v. State, 205 So. 2d 284 (Miss. 1967). Gilmore continued to pa-
tronize white merchants after the incident. 
In June 1966, while Murriel Cullens was having a beer in Wolfs Store, a 
brick was thrown through the windshield of his parked car. He had been 
patronizing white merchants and continued to do so thereafter. R. 14049. 
In November 1966, shotgun pellets were fired into the wall of his mother's 
home. She had received a number of threatening telephone calls criticiz-
ing her for patronizing white stores. She continued to do so after the 
indicent. R. 14003. At trial, Laura Cullens testified , in response to a 
question whether she had been scared: "No indeed. I haven't had a bone 
in me scared in my life from nobody. And I have always told them, they 
say, 'You're just an uncle tom.' And I say, 'Well , uncle tom can be blue, 
black, green or purple or white. If I feel I am in the right, I stand in that 
right and nobody tells me what to do. " ' R. 14017. 
James Bailey, who was a teenager at the time of the incident, testified 
that he had noticed that an elderly black lady named Willie Butler traded 
with a white merchant and had groceries delivered to her home. He testi-
fied that he destroyed flowers in her garden to punish her for violating the 
boycott. R. 3656. He stated that he acted on his own initiative and that 
Mrs. Butler continued to trade with the merchant. R. 3660, 3741. 
38 R. 13868. One of his assailants testified that the incident resulted 
from an automobile accident, rather than the boycott. R. 3656. 
39 "Preacher White" had died by the time of trial. No witness admitted 
- -
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Two other incidents discussed by the chancellor are of less 
certain significance. Jasper Coleman testified that he par-
ticipated in an all-night poker game at a friend's house on 
Christmas Eve 1966. The following morning he discovered 
that all four tires of his pick-up truck had been slashed with a 
knife. Coleman testified that he did not participate in the 
boycott but was never threatened for refusing to do so. R. 
13791. Finally, Willie Myles testified that he and his wife 
received a threatening phone call and that a boy on a barge 
told him that he would be whipped for buying his gas at the 
wrong place. 
Five of these incidents occurred in 1966. The other five 
are n ot ctatea. The chancellor thus di_d not findtiiat'any_act 
of violence occurred after 1966.40 In particular, he made no 
reference to~ act o1 violence or threat of violence-with 
the exception, of course, of Charles Evers' speeches-after 
the shootings of Martin Luther King in 1968 or Roosevelt 
Jackson in 1969. The chancellor did not find that any of the 
incidents of violence was discussed at the Tuesday evening 
being present at what respondents' counsel characterized as "the spanking 
of Preacher White." R. 3696. The Port Gibson Chief of Police testified, 
however, that White had come in and complained that a group of young 
blacks had pulled his overalls down and whipped him. R. 2176. In de-
scribing this incident, the chancellor stated that Preacher White "was 
stripped of his clothing and whipped by a group of young blacks because he 
refused to honor the boycott." App. to Pet. for Cert. 37b. 
'° In describing the "atmosphere of fear'' existing during the boycott, the 
chancellor emphasized the participation of petitioner Rudy Shields. He 
stated: 
"Defendant Rudolph J . (Rudy) Shields, formerly of Chicago, was the prin-
cipal figure in several altercations. He boasted that he was 'the most 
jailed person in the Claiborne County boycott.' This man was the ac-
knowledged leader of the 'Deacons."' Id. , at 35b. 
See also Respondents' Supplemental Brief 10-13. The record indicates 
that Shields was in Port Gibson for approximately eight months during 
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meetings of the NAACP. 41 
II 
This Court's jurisdiction to review the judgment of the 
Mississippi Supreme Court is, of course, limited to the fed-
eral questions necessarily decided by that court. 42 We con-
sider first whether petitioners' activities are protected in any 
respect by the Federal Constitution and, if they are, what ef-
fect such protection has on a lawsuit of this nature. 
A 
The boycott of white merchants at issue in this case took 
many forms. The boycott was launched at a meeting of a 
local branch of the NAACP attended by several hundred per-
sons. Its acknowledged purpose was to secure compliance 
by both civic and business leaders with a lenghty list of de-
mands for equality and racial justice. The boycott was sup-
ported by speeches and nonviolent picketing. Participants 
repeatedly encouraged others to join in its cause. 
Each of these elements of the boycott is a form of speech or 
conduct that is ordinarily entitled to protection unae~ the 
First and Fourteenth Amendments. 43 The black citizens 
" The chancellor did find-and apparently believed this fact to be signifi-
cant-that the NAACP provided attorneys to black persons arrested in 
connection with acts arising from the boycott. App. to Pet. for Cert. 38b. 
The NAACP provided legal representation to the three black persons ar-
rested in August 1966 following the Gilmore shooting. 
-12 Although the Mississippi Supreme Court remanded for a recomputa-
tion of damages, its judgment is final for purposes of our jurisdiction. See 
Cox Broadcasting v. Cohn, 420 U. S. 469, 480. 
.a "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, 
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of 
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assembly, 
and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances. " U. S. 
Const., Arndt. I. First Amendment freedoms are protected by the Four-
teenth Amendment from invasion by the States. Edwards v. South Caro-
lina, 372 U. S. 229, 235. 
- -
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named as defendants in this action banded together and col-
lectively expressed their dissatisfaction with a social struc-
ture that had denied them rights to equal treatment and re-
spect. As we so recently acknowledged in Citizens Against 
Rent Control v. Berkeley, -- U.S.--,--, "the prac-
tice of persons sharing common views banding together to 
achieve a common end is deeply embedded in the American 
political process." We recognized that "by collective effort 
individuals can make their views known, when, individually, 
their voices would be faint or lost." Ibid. In emphasizing 
"the importance of freedom of association in guaranteeing the 
right of people to make their voices heard on public issues," 
ibid., we noted the words of Justice Harlan, writing for the 
Court in NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460: 
"Effective advocacy of both public and private points of 
view, particularly controversial ones, is undeniably en-
hanced by group association, as this Court has more than 
once recognized by remarking upon the close nexus be-
tween the freedoms of speech and assembly." 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE stated for the Court in Citizens Against 
Rent Control: "There are, of course, some activities, legal if 
engaged in by one, yet illegal if performed in concert with 
others, but political expression is not one of them." 
U.S., at--. 
The right to associate does not lose all constitutional pro-
tection merely because some members of the group may have 
participated in conduct or advocated doctrine that itself is not 
protected. In De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U. S. 353, the Court 
unanimously held that an individual could not be penalized 
simply for assisting in the conduct of an otherwise lawful 
meeting held under the auspices of the Communist Party, an 
organization that advocated "criminal syndicalism." After 
reviewing the rights of citizens "to meet peaceably for con-
sultation in respect to public affairs and to petition for a re-
dress of grievances," id., at 364, Chief Justice Hughes, writ-
- -
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ing for the Court, stated: 
"It follows from these considerations that, consistently 
with the Federal Constitution, peaceable assembly for 
lawful discussion cannot be made a crime. The holding 
of meetings for peaceable political action cannot be pro-
scribed. Those who assist in the conduct of such meet-
ings cannot be branded as criminals on that score. The 
question, if the rights of free speech and peaceable as-
sembly are to be preserved, is not as to the auspices 
under which the meeting is held but as to its purpose; not 
as to the relations of the speakers, but whether their ut-
terances transcend the bounds of the freedom of speech 
which the Constitution protects. If the persons assem-
bling have committed crimes elsewhere, if they have 
formed or are engaged in a conspirac a ainst the ublic 
peace and order, t ey may e prosecuted for their con-
spiracy or other violation of valid laws. But it is a dif-
ferent matter when the State, instead of prosecuting 
them for such offenses, seizes upon mere participation in 
a peaceable assembly and a lawful public discussion as 
the basis for a criminal charge." Id., at 365. 
Of course, the petitioners in this case did more than assem-
ble peaceably and discuss among themselves their grievances 
against governmental and business policy. Other elements 
of the boycott, however, also involved activities ordinarily 
safeguarded by the First Amendment. In Thornhill v. Ala-
bama, 310 U. S. 88, the Court held that p,!_aceful Eicketing 
was entitled to constitutional protection, even though, in that 
case, the purpose ottfie picKeting "was concededly to advise 
customers and prospective customers of the relationship ex-
isting between the employer and its employees and thereby 
to induce such customers not to patronize the employer." 
Id., at 99. Cf. Chauffeurs Union v. Newell, 356 U. S. 341. 
In Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U. S. 229, we held that a 
peaceful march and demonstration was protected by the 
f}tt1~~ 
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rights of free speech, free assembly, and freedom to petition 
for a redress of grievances. 
Speech itself also was used to further the aims of the boy-
cott. Nonparticipants repeatedly were urged to join the 
common cause, both through public address and through per-
sonal solicitation. These elements of the boycott involve 
speech in its most direct form. In addition, names of boycott 
violators were read aloud at meetings at the First Baptist 
Church and published in a local black newspaper. Petition-
ers admittedly sought to persuade others to join the boycott 
through social pressure and the "threat" of social ostracism. 
Speech does not lose its protected character, however, sim-
ply because it may embarrass others qr coerce them into ac-
tion. As Justice Rutledge, in describing the protection af-
forded by the First Amendment, explained: 
"It extends to more than abstract discussion, unrelated 
to action. The First Amendment is a charter for gov-
ernment, not for an institution of learning. 'Free trade 
in ideas' means free trade in the opportunity to persuade 
to action, not merely to decribe facts ." Thomas v. Col-
lins, 323 U. S. 516, 537. 
In Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U. S. 
415, the Court considered the validity of a prior restraint on 
speech that invaded the "privacy" of the respondent. Peti-
tioner, a racially integrated community organization, charged 
that respondent, a real estate broker, had engaged in tactics 
known as "blockbusting'' or "panic peddling." 44 Petitioner 
asked respondent to sign an agreement that he would not so-
licit property in their community. When he refused, peti-
tioner distributed leaflets near respondent's home that were 
44 Specifically, petitioner contended that respondent "aroused the fears 
of the local white residents that Negroes were coming into the area and 
then, exploiting the reactions and emotions so aroused, was able to secure 
listings and sell homes to Negroes." 402 U. S., at 416. 
- -
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critical of his business practices. 45 A state court enjoined pe-
titioner from distributing the leaflets; an appellate court af-
firmed on the ground that the alleged activities were coercive 
and intimidating, rather than informative, and therefore not 
entitled to First Amendment protection. Id., at 418. This 
Court reversed. THE CHIEF JUSTICE explained: 
"This Court has often recognized that the activity of 
peaceful pamphleteering is a form of communication pro-
tected by the First Amendment. E. g., Martin v. City 
of Struthers, 319 U. S. 141 (1943); Schneider v. State, 
308 U. S. 147 (1939); Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U. S. 444 
(1938). In sustaining the injunction, however, the Ap-
pellate Court was apparently of the view that petition-
ers' purpose in distributing their literature was not to in-
form the public, but to 'force' respondent to sign a 
no-solicitation agreement. The claim that the expres-
sions were intended to exercise a coercive impact on re-
spondent does not remove them from the reach of the 
First Amendment. Petitioners plainly intended to in-
fluence respondent's conduct by their activities; this is 
not fundamentally different from the function of a news-
paper. See Schneider v. State, supra; Thornhill v. Ala-
bama, 310 U. S. 88 (1940). Petitioners were engaged 
openly and vigorously in making the public aware of re-
spondent's real estate practices. Those practices were 
offensive to them, as the views and practices of petition-
ers are no doubt offensive to others. But so long as the 
means are peaceful, the communication need not meet 
standards of acceptability." Id., at 419. 
In dissolving the prior restraint, the Court recognized that 
"offensive" and "coercive" speech was nevertheless protected 
45 One of petitioner's officers testified at trial that he had hoped that re-
spondent would be induced to sign the no-solicitation agreement by letting 
"his neighbors know what he was doing to us. " Id., at 417. 
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by the First Amendment. 46 
In sum, the boycott clearly: involved constitutionally pro-
tected activity. The esta5lished elements of~ , assem-
bly, assoctation and petition, "though not identical, are insep-
arable." Thomas v. Collins, 323 U. S. 516, 530. Through 
exercise of these First Amendment rights, petitioners sought 
to bring about political, social, and economic change. l 
Through speech, assembly, and petition-rather than 
through_ riot or revolution-petitioners sought to change a so-
cial oraer Uiat haa consistently treated them as second-class 
citizens. 
The presence of protected activity, however, does not end 
the relevant constitutional inquiry. Governmental regula-
tion that has an incidental effect on First Amendment free-
doms may be justified in certain narrowly defined instances. 
See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U. S. 367. 47 A nonviolent 
and totally voluntary boycott may have a disruptive effect on 
local economic conditions. This Court has recognized the 
strong governmental interest in certain forms of eco omic 
re_gu ation, even oug sue regulation may have an inci-
dental effect on rights of speech and association. See 
"' See Watts v. United States , 394 U. S. 705, 708 ("The language of the 
political arena, like the language used in labor disputes , see Linn v. United 
Plant Guard Workers of America, 383 U. S. 53, 58 (1966), is often vitu-
perative, abusive, and inexact.") See also Cohen v. California, 403 U. S. 
15; Farber, Commercial Speech and First Amendment Theory, 74 Nw. U. 
L. Rev. 372 (1979). 
" "To characterize the quality of the governmental interest which must 
appear, the Court has employed a variety of descriptive terms: compelling; 
substantial; subordinating; paramount; cogent; strong. Whatever impre-
cision inheres in these terms, we think it clear that a government regula-
tion is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of the 
Government; if it furthers an important or substantial governmental inter-
est; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free ex-
pression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment free-
doms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest." 
391 U. S., at 376-377 (footnotes omitted). 
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Giboney v. Empire Storage, 336 U. S. 490; NLRB v. Retail 
Store Employees Union, 447 U. S. 607. The right of busi-
ness entities to "associate" to suppress competition may be 
curtailed. National Soc. of Professional Engineers v. 
United States, 435 U. S. 679. Unfair trade practices may be 
restricted. Secondary boycotts and picketin by labor 
unions may be pro 1 1 e , as part o ongress' striking of 
the dehcafe"oatance between union freedom of expression and 
the ability of neutral employers, employees, and consumers 
to remain free from coerced participation in industrial strife." 
NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union, supra, at 617-618 
(BLACKMUN, J., concurring). See International Longshore-
men's Assoc. v. Allied International, -- U. S. --, --. 
While States have broad power to regulate economic activ-
ity, we do not find a comparable right to prohibit peaceful po-
litical activity such as that found in the boycott in this case. 
This Court has recognizea that expression on public issues 
"has always rested on the highest rung of the hierarchy of 
First Amendment values." Carey v. Brown, 447 U. S. 455, 
467. "[S]peech concerning public affairs is more than self-
expression; it is the essence of self-government." Garrison 
v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 64, 74-75. There is a "profound na-
tional commitment" to the principle that "debate on public is-
sues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open." New 
York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254, 270. 
In Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Mo-
tor Freight, 365 U. S. 127, the Court considered whether the 
Sherman Act prohibited a publicity campaign waged by rail-
roads against the trucking industry that was designed to fos-
ter the adoption of laws destructive of the trucking business, 
to create an atmosphere of distaste for truckers among the 
general public, and to impair the relationships existing be-
tween truckers and their customers. Noting that the "right 
of petition is one of the freedoms protected by the Bill of 
Rights, and we cannot, of course, lightly impute to Congress 
an intent to invade these freedoms," the Court held that the 
·e -
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Sherman Act did not proscribe the publicity campaign. Id., 
at 137-138. The Court stated that it could not see how an 
intent to influence legislation to destroy the truckers as com-
petitors "could transform conduct otherwise lawful into a vi-
olation of the Sherman Act." Id., at 138-139. Noting that 
the right of the people to petition their representatives in 
government "cannot properly be made to depend on their in-
tent in doing so," the Court held that "at least insofar as the 
railroads' campaign was directed toward obtaining govern-
mental action, its legality was not at all affected by any anti-
competitive purpose it may have had." . Id., at 13!f-140. 
This conclusion was not changed by the fact that the rail-
roads' anticompetitive purpose produced an anticompetitive 
effect; the Court rejected the truckers' Sherman Act claim 
despite the fact that "the truckers sustained some direct in-
jury as an incidental effect of the railroads' campaign to influ-
ence governmental action." Id., at 143. 
It is not disputed that a major purpose of the boycott in 
this case was to influence governmental action. Like the 
railroads in Noerr, the petitioners certainly foresaw-and di-
rectly intended-that the merchants would sustain economic 
injury as a result of their campaign. Unlike the railroads in 
that case, however, the purpose of petitioners' campaign was 
not to destroy legitimate competition. Petitioners sought to 
vindicate rights of equality and of freedom that lie at the 
heart of the Fourteenth Amendment itself. The right of the 
States to regulate economic activity could not justify a com-
plete prohibition against a nonviolent, politically-motivated 
boycott designed to force governmental and economic change 
and to effectuate rights guaranteed by the Constitution it-
self. 48 
-18 Jn NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, the Court unanimously re-
jected Alabama's effort to oust the NAACP from that State. The State 
claimed, in part, that the NAACP was" 'engaged in organizing, supporting 
and financing an illegal boycott' " of Montgomery's bus system. / d., at 
- -
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In upholding an injunction against the state supersedeas 
bonding requirement in this case, Judge Ainsworth of the 
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit cogently stated: 
"At the heart of the Chancery Court's opinion lies the be-
lief that the mere organization of the boycott and every 
activity undertaken in support thereof could be subject 
to judicial prohibition under state law. This view ac-
cords insufficient weight to the First Amendment's pro-
tection of political speech and association. There is no 
suggestion that the NAACP, MAP or the individual de-
fendants were in competition with the white businesses 
or that the boycott arose from parochial economic inter-
ests. On the contrary, the boycott grew out of a racial 
dispute with the white merchants and city government 
of Port Gibson and all of the picketing, speeches, and 
other communication associated with the boycott were 
directed to the elimination of racial discrimination in the 
town. This differentiates this case from a boycott orga-
nized for economic ends, for speech to protest racial dis-
crimination is essential political speech lying at the core 
of the First Amendment." Henry v. First National 
Bank of Clarksdale, 595 F. 2d 291, 303 (1979)(footnote 
omitted). 
We hold that the nonviolent elements of petitioners' activities 
are entitled to the protection of the First Amendment. ~9 
302. Writing for the Court, Justice Harlan described as "doubtful" the 
"assumption that an organized refusal to ride on Montgomery's buses in 
protest against a policy of racial segregation might, without more, in some 
circumstances violate a valid state law." Id., at 307. In Missouri, v. 
NOW, 620 F. 2d 1301, 1317 (CA8 1980), cert. denied, 449 U. S. 842, Judge 
Stephenson stated that "the right to petition is of such importance that it is 
not an improper interference [under state tort law] even when exercised by 
way of a boycott." 
" We need not decide in this case the extent to which a narrowly tailored 
statute designed to prohibit certain forms of anticompetitive conduct or 
- -
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B 
The Mississippi Supreme Court did not sustain the chancel-
lor's imposition of liability on a theory that state law prohib-
ited a nonviolent, politically-motivated boycott. The fact 
that such activity is constitutionally protected, however, im-
poses a special obligation on this Court to examine critically 
the basis on which liability was imposed. 50 In particular, we 
consider here the effect of our holding that much of petition-
ers' conduct was constitutionally protected on the ability of 
the State to impose liability for elements of the boycott that 
were not so protected. 51 
The First Amendment does not protect violence. "Cer-
tainly violence has no sanctuary in the First Amendment, 
and the use of weapons, gunpowder, and gasoline may not 
constitutionally masquerade under the guise of 'advocacy."' 
certain type·s of secondary pressure may restrict protected First Amend- \ 
ment activity. No such statute is involved in this case. 
50 "This Court's duty is not limited to the elaboration of constitutional 
principles; we must also in proper cases review the evidence to make cer-
tain that those principles have been constitutionally applied. This is such 
a case, particularly since the question is one of alleged trespass across 'the 
line between speech unconditionally guaranteed and speech which may le-
gitimately be regulated.' Speiser v. Randall, 357 U. S. 513, 525. In 
cases where that line must be drawn, the rule is that we 'examine for our-
selves the statements in issue and the circumstances under which they 
were made to see ... whether they are of a character which the principles 
of the First Amendment, as adopted by the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, protect.' Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U. S. 331, 
335; see also One, Inc. , v. Olesen, 355 U.S. 371; Sunshine Book Co. v. 
Summerfield, 355 U. S. 372. We must 'make an independent examination 
of the whole record,' Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U. S. 229, 235, so as 
to assure ourselves that the judgment does not constitute a forbidden in-
trusion on the field of free expression.'' New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 
376 U. S. 254, 285. 
51 Although this is a civil lawsuit between private parties, the application 
of state rules of law by the Mississippi state courts in a manner alleged to 
restrict First Amendment freedoms constitutes "state action" under the 
Fourteenth Amendment. New York Times v. Sullivan, supra, at 265. 
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Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U. S. 66, 75 (Douglas, J., concur-
ring). Although the extent and significance of the violence 
in this case is vigorously disputed by the parties, there is no ~ 
question that acts of violence occurred. No federal rule of 
lawrest'rlcts a State 1'roinTmposingtort liability for business 
losses that are caused by violence and by threats of violence. 
When such conduct occurs in the context of constitutionally 
protected activity, however, "precision of regulation" is de-
manded. NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415, 438. 52 Specifi-
cally, the presence of activity protected by the First Amend-
ment imposes restraints on the amount of damages that may 
be awarded and- on the persons wlio may be held accountable 
for those losses. 
In United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U. S. 715, the Court 
considered a case in many respects similar to the one before 
us. The case grew out of the rivalry between the United 
Mine Workers (UMW) and the Southern Labor Union (SLU) 
over representation of workers in the southern Appalachian 
coal fields. A coal company laid off 100 miners of UMW's 
Local 5881 when it closed one of its mines. That same year, 
a subsidiary of the coal company hired Gibbs as mine superin-
tendent to attempt to open a new mine on nearby property 
through use of members of the SL U. Gibbs also received a 
contract to haul the mine's coal to the nearest railroad loading 
point. When he attempted to open the mine, however, he 
was met by armed members of Local 5881 who threatened 
Gibbs and beat an SLU organizer. These incidents occurred 
on August 15 and 16. Thereafter, there was no further vio-
lence at the mine site and UMW members maintained a 
peaceful picket line for nine months. No attempts to open 
the mine were made during that period. 
Gibbs lost his job as superintendent and never began per-
formance of the haulage contract. Claiming to have suffered 
losses as a result of the union's concerted plan against him, 
52 See also Carroll v. Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 184; Keyishian v. 
Board of R egents, 385 U. S. 589, 604. 
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Gibbs filed suit in federal court against the international 
UMW. He alleged an unlawful secondary boycott under the 
federal labor laws and, as a pendent state law claim, "an un-
lawful conspiracy and an unlawful boycott aimed at him ... 
to maliciously, wantonly and willfully interfere with his con-
tract of employment and with his contract of haulage." Id., 
at 720. The federal claim was dismissed on the ground that 
the dispute was "primary" and therefore not cognizable 
under the federal prohibition of secondary labor boycotts. 
Damages were awarded against the UMW, however, on the / 
state claim of interference with an employment relationship. 
This Court reversed. The Court found that the pleadings, 
arguments of counsel, and jury instructions had not ade-
quately defined the compass within which damages could be 
awarded under state law. The Court noted that it had "con-
sistently recognized the right of States to deal with violence 
and threats of violence appearing in labor disputes" and had 
sustained "a variety of measures against the contention that 
state law was' pre-empted by the passage of federal labor leg-
islation." Id., at 729. To accomodate federal labor policy, 
however, the Court in Gibbs held: "the permissible scope of 
state remedies in this area is strictly confined to the direct I 7 
consequences of such [ violent] conduct, and does not include 
consequences resulting from associated peaceful picketing or 
other union activity." Ibid. The Court noted that in United 
Construction Workers v. Laburnum Construction Corp., 347 
U. S. 656, damages were restricted to those directly and 
proximately caused by wrongful conduct chargeable to the 
defendants. "'Thus there [ was] nothing in the measure of 
damages to indicate that state power was exerted to compen-
sate for anything more than the direct consequences of the 
violent conduct."' Id., at 730 (quoting San Diego Building 
Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U. S. 236, 248, n. 6). ( 
The careful limitation on damage liability imposed in Gibbs 
resulted from the need to accomodate state law with federal 
labor policy. That limitation is no less applicable, however, -- .........._,., 
.. - -
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to the important First Amendment interests at issue in this 
case. Petitioners withheld their patronage from the white 
establishment of Claiborne County to challenge a political and 
economic system that had denied them the basic rights of dig-
nity and equality that this country had fought a civil war to 
secure. While the State legitimately may impose damages 
for the consequences of violent conduct, it may not award 
compensation for the consequences of nonviolent, protected 
activity. Only those losses proximately caused by unlawful · 
conduct may be recovered. 
The First Amendment similarly restricts the ability of the 
State to impose liability on an individual solely because of his 
association with another. In Scales v. United States, 367 
U. S. 203, 229, the Court noted that a "blanket prohibition of 
association with a group having both legal and illegal aims" 
would present "a real danger that legitimate political expres-
sion or association would be impaired." The Court sug-
gested that to punish association with such a ~ oup, tl\ere \ 
must be "clear proof that a defendant 'specifically.IDtend[s] to 
accomplish [the aims of the organizaffimj b~ resort to vio-
lence."' Ibid. (quoting Noto v. United States, 367 U. S. 290, 
299). 53 Moreover, in Noto v. United States the Court empha-
sized that this intent must be judged "according to the strict-
est law," 54f or "otherwise there is a danger that one in sympa-
thy with the legitimate aims of such an organization, but not 
specifically intending to accomplish them by resort to vio-
lence, might be punished for his adherence to lawful and 
constitionally protected purposes, because of other and un-
protected purposes which he does not necessarily share. " 
367 U. S., at 299-300. 
In Healy v. James, 408 U. S. 169, the Court applied these 
principles in a non-criminal context. In that case the Court 
53 See United States v. Robel, 389 U. S. 258; Eljbrandt v. Russell, 384 
U. S. 11; Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U. S. 500. 
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held that a student group could not be denied recognition at a 
state-supported college merely because of its affiliation with 
a national organization associated with disruptive and violent 
campus activity. It noted that "the Court has consistently 
disapproved governmental action imposing criminal sanctions 
or denying rights and privileges solely because of a citizen's 
association with an unpopular organization." Id., at 
18fr186. The Court stated that "it has been established that 
'guilt by association alone, without [establishing] that an indi-
vidual's association poses the threat feared by the Govern-
ment,' is an impermissible basis upon which to deny First 
Amendment rights." Id., at 186 (quoting United States v. 
Robel, 389 U. S. 258, 265). "The government has the bur-
den of establishing a knowing affiliation with an organization 
possessing unlawful aims and goals, and a specific intent to 
further those illegal aims." Ibid. 55 
The principles announced in Scales, Noto, and Healy are 
relevant to this case. Civil liability may not be imposed 
merely because an individual belonged to a group, some 
members of which committed acts of violence. For liability 
to be imposed by reason of association alone, it is necessary 
to establish that the group itself possessed unlawful goals and 
that the individual held a specific intent to further those ille-
gal aims. Moreover, the First Amendment demands that 
these elements be es~ablished by strict proof. Noto v. 
United States, supra, at 29g::300. "In this sensitive field, 
the State may not employ 'means that broadly stifle funda-
mental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly 
achieved.' Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U. S. 479, 488 (1960).'' 
Carroll v. Princess Anne, 393 U. S. 175, 184. 
55 In Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U. S. 362, the Court vacated an injunction, di-
rected against an entire police department, that had resulted from 20 spe-
cific incidents of police misconduct. The Court held that such collective 
responsibility should be limited to instances in which a concerted design 
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III 
The chancellor awarded respondents damages for all busi-
ness losses that were sustained during a seven year period 
beginning in 1966 and ending December 31, 1972. 56 With the 
exception of Aaron Henry, all defendants were held jointly 
and severally liable for these losses. The chancellor's find-
ings were consistent with his view that voluntary participa-
tion in the boycott was a sufficient basis on which to impose 
liability. The Mississippi Supreme Court properly rejected 
that theory; it nevertheless held that petitioners were liable 
for all damages "resulting from the boycott." s; In light of 
the principles set forth above, it is evident that such a dam-
age award may not be sustained in this case. 
The opinion of the Mississippi Supreme Court itself demon-
strates that all business losses were not proximately caused 
by the violence and threats of violence found to be present. 
The court stated that "coercion, intimidation, and threats" 
formed "part of the boycott activity'' and "contributea to its 
almost complete success." 58 The court broa~ erted-
without differentiation- that "intimidation,  social 
ostracism, vilification, and traduction" were devices used by 
the defendants to effectuate the· boycott. 59 The court re-
peated the chancellor's finding that "the volition of many 
56 It is noteworthy that the portion of the chancellor's opinion discussing 
damages begins by referring expressly to the two theories of liability that 
the Mississippi Supreme Court rejected: 
"The complainants proved, in this record, that they suffered injury to 
their respective businesses as the direct and proximate result of the unlaw-
ful secondary boycott and the defendants' actions in restraining trade, all of 
which was accomplished by defendants through a conspiracy." App. to 
Pet. for Cert. 57b. 
In a footnote, the chancellor added that "any kind of boycott is unlawful if 
executed with force or violence or threats." Id., at 57b, n. 21. 
;; Id., at 35a. 
58 Id., at 24a (emphasis added). 
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court's judgment rests on the ground that "many" black citi-
zens were "intimiifated" by "threats" of "social ostE!cism, 
vilification, and traducfion," it is flatly inconsistent with the 
First Amendment. · The ambiguous findings of the Missis-
sippi Supreme Court are inadequate to assure the "precision 
of regulation" demanded by that constitutional provision. 
The record in this case demonstrates that all of respond-
ents' losses were not proximately caused by violence or 
threats of violence. As respondents themselves stated at 
page 12 of their brief in the Mississippi Supreme Court: 
"Most of the witnesses testified that they voluntarily 
went along with the NAACP and their fellow black citi-
zens in honoring and observing the boycott because they 
wanted the boycott." 
This assessment is amply supported by the record. 61 It is in-
60 Ibid. (emphasis added). 
61 The testimony of Julia Johnson-although itself only a small portion of 
a massive record-perhaps best illustrates this point: 
Q. "How did you observe the boycott? 
A. "I just stayed out of the stores, because I had my own personal rea-
sons to stay out of the stores. There were some things I really wanted, 
and the things I wanted were the right to vote, the right to have a title--
Mrs. or Mr. or whatever I am, and not uncle or aunt, boy or girl. So that's 
what I wanted. And if I wanted a job-a qualified job, I wanted to have 
the opportunity to be hired. Not because I'm black or white, but just 
hired. 
Q. "And this was your reason for observing the boycott? 
A. "Yes, it was. 
Q. "And you were in favor of the boycott? 
A. "Yes, I was in favor of the boycott. 
Q. "And it wasn't because somebody threatened you? 
A. "No, it wasn't because nobody threatened me. 
Q. "You weren't afraid? 
- -
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deed inconceivable that a boycott launched by the unanimous 
vote of several hundred persons succeeded solely through 
fear and intimidation. Moreover, the fact that the boycott 
"intensified" following the shootings of Martin Luther King 
and Roosevelt Jackson demonstrates that factors other than 
force and violence (by the petitioners) figured prominently in 
the boycott's success. The chancellor made no finding SPat 
a~ of viol~n~ occurred after 1966. While the timing of 
the acts o1 violence was not important to the chancellor's im-
position of liability, it is a critical factor under the narrower 
rationale of the Mississippi Supreme Court. That court has 
completely failed to demonstrate that business losses suf-
fered in 1972-three years after this lawsuit was filed-were 
proximately caused by the isolated acts of violence found in 
1966. 62 It is impossible to conclude that state power has not 
been exerted to compensate respondents for the direct conse-
quences of nonviolent, constitutionally protected activity. 
This case is not like Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. 
Meadowmoor Dairies, 312 U. S. 287, in which the Court held 
that the presence of violence justified an injunction against 
both violent and nonviolent activity. 6.'l The violent conduct 
present in that case was pervasive. 64 The Court in 
A. "Was I afraid? 
Q. "Yes. 
A. "No, I was not afraid." R. 15476. 
It is clear that losses were sustained because persons like Julia Johnson 
"wanted justice and equal opportunity." R. 6864 (testimony of Margaret 
Liggins). See R. 6737, 12419, 13543-13544. ( 
62 It is also noteworthy that virtually every victim of the acts of violence 
found by the chancellor testified that he or she continued to patronize the 
white merchants. See supra, at 17-18. 
63 In Mine Workers v. Gibbs, supra, the Court stated that if "special 
facts" such as those presented in M eadowmoor "appeared in an action for 
damages after picketing marred by violence had occurred," they might 
"support the conclusion that all damages resulting from the picketing were 
proximately caused by its violent component or by the fear which that vio-
lence engendered." 383 U. S., at 731-732. 
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M eadoivmoor stated that "utterance in a context of violence 
can lose its significance as an appeal to reason and become 
part of an instrument of force." Id., at 293. The Court em-
phasized, however: 
"Still it is of prime importance that no constitutional 
freedom, least of all the guarantees of the Bill of Rights, 
be defeated by insubstantial findings of fact screening re-
ality. That is why this Court has the ultimate power to 
search the records in the state courts where a claim of 
constitutionality is effectively made. And so the right 
of free speech cannot be denied by drawing from a trivial 
rough incident or a moment of animal exuberance the 
conclusion that otherwise peaceful picketing has the 
taint of force." Ibid. 
Such "insubstantial findings" were not present in 
M eadowmoor. But in this case, the Mississippi Supreme 
Court has relied on isolated acts of violence during a limited 
period to uphold respondents' recovery of all business losses 
sustained over a seven-year sr>an. No losses are attributed 
to the voluntary participation of individuals determined to se-
cure "justice and equal opportunity." 65 The court's judg-
ment "screens reality" and cannot stand. 66 
stances of windowsmashing; explosive bombs caused substantial injury to 
the plants of Meadowmoor and another dairy using the vendor system and 
to five stores; stench bombs were dropped in five stores; three trucks of 
vendors were wrecked, seriously injuring one driver, and another was 
driven into a river; a store was set on fire and in large measure ruined; two 
trucks of vendors were burned; a storekeeper and a truck driver were se-
verely beaten; workers at a diary which, like Meadowmoor, used the ven-
dor system were held with guns and severely beaten about the head while 
being told 'to join the union'; carloads of men followed vendors' trucks , 
threatening the drivers, and in one instance shot at the truck and driver." 
312 U. S. , at 291-292. 
65 Seen. 61 , supra. 
66 For the same reasons, the permanent injunction entered by the chan-
cellor must be dissolved. Since the boycott apparently has ended, the 
Mississippi Supreme Court may wish to vacate the entire injunction on the 
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Respondents' supplemental brief also demonstrates that on 
the present record no judgment may be sustained against 
most of the petitioners. Regular attendance at the Tuesday 
meetings of the Claiborne County Branch of the NAACP is 
an insufficient predicate on which to impose liability. The 
chancellor's findings do not suggest that any illegal conduct 
was authorized, ratified, or even discussed at any of the 
meetings. The sheriff testified that he was kept informed of 
what transpired at the meetings; he made no reference to any 
discussion of unlawful activity.67 The chancellor did not find 
that the Claiborne County Branch of the NAACP possessed 
unlawful aims and goals; we have been referred to no evi-
dence that any of the petitioners-whether leaders or partici-
pants at the weekly meetings-had a specific intent to fur-
ther an unlawful aim of the organization. 68 To impose 
liability for presence at weekly meetings of the NAACP 
would- ironically- not even constitute "guilt by association," 
since there is no evidence of the association's guilt. Rather, 
liability could only be imposed on a "guilt for association" the-
ory. Neither is permissible under the First Amendment. 69 
ground that it is no longer necessary; alternatively, the injunction must be 
modified to restrain only unlawful conduct, and only the persons responsi-
ble for conduct of that character. 
67 See R. 1172. 
68 The strongest evidence of wrongdoing at the meetings was presented 
by petitioner Marjorie Brandon, who served at times as the local NAACP 
secretary. She testified that "in the meetings there were statements say-
ing you would be dealt with" if found trading in boycotted stores. R. 5637. 
She stated that she understood "dealt with" to mean "they would take care 
of you, do something to you, if you were caught going in." Ibid. Her 
testimony does not disclose who made the statements, how often they were 
made, or that they were in any way endorsed by others at the meetings. 
A massive damage judgment may not be sustained on the basis of this tes-
timony; the fact that certain anonymous persons made such statements at 
some point during a seven-year period is insufficient to establish that the 
association itself possessed unlawful aims or that any petitioner specifically 
intended to further an unlawful goal. 
66 A legal duty to "repudiate"-to disassociate oneself from the acts of / 
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Respondents also argue that liability may be imposed on 
indi · s - were either "store watchers" or members of 
t e "Black Hats.' There is nothing unlawful in standing out-
si e of a st and recording names. Similarly, there is 
nothmg unlawful in wearing black hats, although such ap-
parel may cause apprehension in others. As established 
above, mere association with either group-absent a specific 
intent to further an unlawful aim embraced by that group-is 
an insufficient predicate for liability. At the same time, the / 
ev}dence does SUJ!port the conclusion that some members of 
each of the e oups en a ed in violence or threats vio-
lence. nques 10na y, these in 1vi uals may be held re- \ J:;--/ 
sponsible for the injuries that they caused; a judgment tai-
lored to the consequences of their unlawful conduct may be 
sustained. 
Respondents have sou ht se ar to justify the judg-
e tered against Charles Evers and the national · As set forth by the c ancellor, Evers was spe-nnected with the boycott in four respects. First, 
Evers signed the March 23 supplemental demand letter and 
unquestionably played the 'fu:imary; le~hip ro}j in the 
organization of the boycott. Second, Evers participated in 
negotiations with MAP and successfully convinced MAP to 
abandon its practice of purchasing food alternately from 
white-owned and black-owned stores. Third, he apparently 
presided at the April 1, 1966 meeting at which the vote to be-
another-cannot arise unless, absent the repudiation, an individual could 
be found liable for those acts. As our decisions in Scales, Noto , and Healy 
make clear, see supra, at 33, civil liability may not be imposed merely be-
cause an individual belonged to a group, some members of which commit-
ted acts of violence. The chancellor in this case made no finding that the 
individuals who committed those acts of violence were "agents" or "ser-
vants" of those who attended the NAACP meetings; certainly such a rela-
tionship cannot be found simply because both shared certain goals. Cf. 
General Building Constractors Assn. v. Pennsylvania, -- V. S. --, 
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gin the boycott was taken; he delivered a speech to the large 
audience that was gathered on that occasion. See n. 28, 
supra. Fourth, Evers delivered the speeches on April 19 
and 21, 1969, which we have discussed previously. See 
supra, at 15; appendix. 
For the reasons set forth above, liability may not be im-
posed on Evers for his presence at NAACP meetings or his 
active participation in the boycott itself. To the extent that 
Evers caused respondents to suffer business losses through 
his organization of the boycott, his emotional and persuasive 
appeals for unity in the joint effort, or his "threats" of vilifica-
tion or social ostracism, Evers' conduct is constitutionally 
protected and beyond the reach of a damage award. The 
mere fact that violence occurred during a boycott that Evers 
inspire]i> is an insuffi~ent b~.liich to impose liability; 
~ a finding that vers ut · d, directed, or approved 
specific tortious activity, he may not be held responsible for 
the unlawful conduct of others. Seen. 69, supra. 
Respondents point to Evers' speeches, however, as justifi-
cation for the chancellor's damage award. Since respond-
ents would impose liability on the basis of a public address--
which predominantly contained highly charged political _rhet-
oric lying at the core of the First Amendment-we approach 
th1s suggested basis of liability with extreme care. In an-
alyzing the speeches, it is important to distinguish two giffer-
ent COg£epts. Arguably, the speecfies m1gfit be found un-
lawful in themselves; alternatively, they might be taken as 
evidence that Evers gave other specific instructions to carry 
' ~out violent acts or threats. 
~ e comments in Evers' speeches might 
have contemplated "discipline" in the permissible form of so-
cial ostracism, it cannot be denied that references to the pos-
sibility that necks would be broken and to the fact that the 
chief of police couTu not sleep with boycott violators at night 
implicitly conveyed a sterner message. In the passionate at-
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have been u erstood as inviting an unlaw 1 fo of disci- 1 
pline or, at least, as inten mg to create a fear o v10lence 
whether or not improper discipline was specifically intended. 
It is clear that "fighting words"-those that provoke imme-
diate violence-are not protected by the First Amendment. 
Chaplinsky v. New Hamshire, 315 U. S. 568, 572. Simi-
larly, words that create an immediate panic are not entitled 
to constitutional protection. Schenck v. United States, 249 
U. S. 47.7° This Court has made clear, however, that ~ 
advocacy of the use of force or violence does not re ve 
sp~ech om t e prQiection of the First Amendment. In 
Brandenourg v. Ohio,3 95 U. S. 444, we reversed the convic-





k/1. if the "suppression" of the white race continued; we relied on 
"the principle that the constitutional guarantees of free 
speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid or pro-
scribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except ) 
where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producin im- ✓ -
mmen aw ess ac 10n an 1s 1 e y to mc1 e or pro uce such 
action.;,- Id., at 447. See Noto v. United States, 367 U. S. 
299, 297-298 ("the mere abstract teaching .. . of the moral 
propriety or even moral necessity for a resort to force and vi-
olence, is not the same as preparing a group for violent action 
and steeling it to such action.") See also Whitney v. Califor-
nia, 274 U. S. 357, 372 (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
The emotionally charg ed rhetoric of Charles Evers' 
speechesa id not fr~scen~ bounds of £!:Otected speech 
set forth in Brandenburg. The lengthy addresses generally 
contained an impassioned plea for black citizens to unify, to 
support and respect each other, and to realize the political 
and economic power available to them. In the course of 
those pleas, strong language was used. We cannot conclude, 
however, that such language-in the context of a public I 
'
0 "The most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man 
in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic." 249 U. S., at 52. 
?kl~ 
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speech- may serve without more as the basis for a civi am-
age award. Certainly there is no evidence that the s eeches 
were intended or likel to incite i minent law e 
With t e possible exception of the Cox..J
0
Beit:teltt:"'l'tl 
violence identified in 1966 occurre eeks or onths after 
the April 1, 1966 speech; the chan ellor made no mg of 
any violence after the challenged ll:!ti!:L.s.llSee11': Strong and 
effective extemporaneous rhetoric cannot be nicely channeled 
in purely dulcet phrases. As long as an advocate does not 
in_~ite immine~ lawless action, he must be free to stimulate 
his audienceM th spontaneous and emotional appeals for 
unity and action in a common cause. To rule otherwise 
would ignore the "profound national commitment" that "de-
bate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-
open." New Yark Times v. Sullivan, supra, 376 U. S., at 
270. 71 
For these reasons, we conclude that Evers' addresses did 
not exceed the bounds of protected speech. If there were 
other evidence of his authorization of wrongful conduct, the 
references to discipline in the speeches could be used to 
corroborate that evidence. But any such theory fails for the 
simple reason that there is no evidence--apart from the 
speeches themselves-that Evers authorized, ratified, or di-
rectly threatened acts of violence. 72 The Chancellor's find-
71 In Watts v. United States, 394 U. S. 705, the petitioner was convicted 
of willfully making a threat to take the life of the President. During a pub-
lic rally at the Washington Monument, petitioner stated in a small discus-
sion group: 
"They always holler at us to get an education. And now I have already 
received my draft classification as 1-A and I have got to report for my 
physical this Monday morning. I am not going. If they ever make me 
carry a rifle the first man I want to get in my sights is L.B.J." Id. , at 706 
This Court summarily reversed. The Court agreed with the petitioner 
that the statement, taken in context, was "a kind of very crude offensive 
method of stating a political opposition to the President." Id., at 708. 
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ings are not sufficient to establish that Evers had a duty to 
"repudiate" the acts of violence that occurred. 73 The findings 
are constitutionally inadequate to support the damage judg-
ment against him. 
The liability of the NAACP derived solely from the liability 
of Charles Evers. 74 The chancellor found: 
"The national NAACP was well-advised of Evers' ac-
tions, and it had the option of repudiating his acts or rati-
fying them. It never repudiated those acts, and there-
fore, it is deemed by this Court to have affirmed them." 
App. to Pet. for Cert. 42b--43b. 
1""\ ,.~~Of course, to the extent that Charles Evers' acts are insuffi-
\ LI"-"" ient to impose liability upon him, they may not be used to 
impose liability on his principal. The judgment awarded 
vV against the NAACP may not stand, however, for an alterna-
tive and more fundamental·reason. 
The associational rights of the NAACP and its members 
have been recognized repeatedly by this Court. 75 The 
NAACP-like any other organization-of course may be held 
responsible for the acts of its agents throughout the country 
that are und~rtaken within the scope of their actual or appar-
ent authority:6 Nroreover, the NAACP may be found liable ------
but there is no suggestion that anything improper· occurred on those 
occasions. 
73 See n. 69, supra. 
74 Indeed it is noteworthy that Aaron Henry-who was president of the 
Mississippi State Conference of the NAACP, president of the Coahoma 
County Branch of the NAACP, and a member of the Board of Directors of 
the national NAACP-was the only defendant dismissed by the chancellor 
on the merits. 
75 Cf. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449; Bates .v. 
City of Little Rock, 361 U. S. 516; Louisiana ex rel. Gremillion v. 
NAACP, 366 U. S. 293; NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415; Gibson v. Flor-
ida Legislative Comm., 372 U. S. 539; NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Flow-
ers, 377 U. S. 288. 
76 There is no question that Charles Evers--as its only paid represent-
/'~ 
~~ ' _____, 
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for other conduct of which it had knowledge and specifically 
ratified. Neither type of evidence, however, is present in 
this case. 77 
There is po evidm].ce that Charles Evers or any other ( 
NAACP member had either actual or apparent authority to 
commit acts of violence or to threaten violent conduct. T-he 
only evidence in the record suggests the contrary. Aaron 
Henry, president of the Mississippi State Branch of the 
NAACP and a member of the Board of Directors of the na-
tional organization, testified that the statements attributed 
to Evers were directly contrary to NAACP policy. R. 
4930. 78 Similarly, there is no evidence that the NAACP rati-
fied-or even had specific knowledge of- any of the acts of 
ative in Mississippi- was an agent of the NAACP. 
77 The chancellor found that the NAACP had posted bond and provided 
legal representation for arrested boycott violators. Since the NAACP 
regularly provides such assistance to indigent black persons throughout 
the country, this finding is irrelevant. Counsel for respondents does not 
contend otherwise. 
78 In a footnote to his discussion of the N AACP's liability, the chancellor 
wrote: 
"Aaron E. Henry, a prominant black leader in the State of Mississippi, 
who was president of the Mississippi State Conference of the NAACP, 
president of the Coahoma County Branch of the NAACP, and a member of 
the Board of Directors of the national NAACP, testified that the NAACP 
'absolutely did not approve of the way the boycott was being conducted in 
Port Gibson.' There is also evidence in the record tending to show that 
Evers was called to account by the national NAACP because of the manner 
in which the boycott was conducted. However, the NAACP took no ac-
tion whatever to curb Evers' activities in this connection." App. to Pet. 
for Cert.42b n. 9. 
Henry's testimony concerning Evers' having been "called to account by the 
National NAACP" concerned Evers' failure to make proper reports and 
Henry's understanding that there was a personality clash between Evers 
and an executive of the NAACP. R. 4905, 4907. We have found no evi-
dence in the record that any representative of the national NAACP was 
advised of any facts concerning the manner in which the Port Gibson boy-
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violence or threats of discipline associated with the boycott. 
Henry testified that the NAACP never authorized, and 
never considered taking, any official action with respect to 
the boycott. R. 4896. The NAACP supplied no financial 
aid to the boycott. R. 4940. The chancellor made no find-
ing that the national organization was involved in any way in 
the boycott. 
To impose liability without evidence of authorization or 
ratification would impermissibly burden the rights of political 
association that are protected by the First Amendment. As 
Justice Douglas noted in NAACP v. Overstreet, 384 U. S. 
118, dissenting from a dismissal of a writ of certiorari found 
to have been improvidently granted: 
"To equate the liability of the national organization 
with that of the Branch in the absence of any proof that 
the national authorized or ratified the misconduct in 
question could ultimately destroy it. The rights of po-
litical association are fragile enough without adding the 
additional threat of destruction by lawsuit. We have 
not been slow to recognize that the protection of the 
First Amendment bars subtle as well as obvious devices 
by which political association might be stifled. See 
Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U. S. 516, 523. Thus we have 
held that forced disclosure of one's political associations 
is, at least in the absence of a compelling state interest, 
inconsistent with the First Amendment's guaranty of 
associational privacy. E.g. , DeGregory v. New Hamp-
shire, 338 U. S. 825; Gibson v. Florida Legislative 
Comm ., 372 U. S. 539, 543-546; Shelton v. Tucker, 364 
U. S. 479; N.A .A.C.P. v. Alabama, 357 U. S. 449, 
46~63. Recognizing that guilt by association is a phi-
losophy alien to the traditions of a ·free society (see 
Schware v. Board of Bar E xaminers, 353 U. S. 232, 
245-246) and the First Amendment itself, we have held 
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one who joins an organization which has among its pur-
poses the violent overthrow of the Government, unless 
the individual joins knowing of the organization's illegal 
purposes (Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U. S. 183) and with 
the specific intention to further those purposes. See 
Eljbrandt v. Russell, ante, p. 11; Aptheker v. Secretary 
of State, 378 U. S. 500." Id., at 122. 
The chancellor's findings are not adequate to support the 
judgment against the NAACP. 
IV ~ 
In~iti ation of this kind e stakes are high. Concerted/ 
action · a powerful we on. History teaches that special 
dange are associat with conspiratorial activity. 79 And 
~ foundation of our society ~ the right of individ-
uals to combine ·th other persons in pursuit of a common 
goal. 80 
At times the difference between lawful and unlawful collec-
tive action may be identified easily by reference to its pur-
pose. In this case, however, petitioners' ultimate objectives 
were unquestionably legitimate. The charge of illegality-
111 In discussing the doctrine of criminal conspiracy, Justice Jackson 
noted: 
"The crime comes down to us wrapped in vague but unpleasant connota-
tions. It sounds historical undertones of treachery, secret plotting and vi-
olence on a scale that menaces social stability and the security of the state 
itself. 'Privy conspiracy' ranks with sedition and rebellion in the Litany's 
prayer for deliverance. Conspiratorial movements do indeed lie back of 
the political assassination, the coup d'etat, the putsch, the revolution, and 
seizures of power in modem times, as they have in all history." 
Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U. S. 440, 448 (Jackson, J ., concurring). 
80 "The most natural privilege of man, next to the right of acting for him-
self, is that of combining his exertions with those of his fellow creatures 
and in acting in common with them. The right of association therefore ap-
pears to me almost as inalienable in its nature as the right of personal lib-
erty. No legislator can attack it without impairing the foundations of soci-















like the claim of constitutional~otection-derives from the 
means employed by the partici ants to achieve those goals. 
The use of speeches, marches, ickets, and threats of social 
ostracism cannot provide the b sis for a <lama e award. But _ ~ 
1 
'" ~ _ L 
violent conduct-or an ag:r:eement o use violence--is 5eyond 
the pale of constitutionalprotection. 
The taint of violence colored the conduct of some of the pe-
titioners. The burden of demonstrating that it colored the 
entire collective effort, however, is not satisfied by evidence 
that violence occurred or even that violence contributed to 
the success of the boycott. A massive and prolonged effort 
to change the social, political, and economic structure of a 
local environment cannot be characterized as a violent con-
spiracy simply by reference to the ephemeral consequences of 
relatively few violent acts. Such a characterization must be 
supported by findings that adequately disclose the eviden-
tiary basis for concluding that specific parties agreed to use 
unlawful means, that carefully identify the impact of such un-
lawful conduct, and that recognize the importance of avoiding 
the imposition of punishment for constitutionally protected 
activity. The burden of demonstrating that fear rather than 
protected conduct was the dominant force in the movement is 
heavy. A court must be wary of a claim that the true color 
of a forest is better revealed by reptiles hidden in the weeds 
than by the foliage of countless free-standing trees. The 
findings of the chancellor, framed largely in the light of two 
legal theories rejected by the Mississippi Supreme Court, are 
constitutionally insufficient to support the judgment that all 
petitioners are liable for all losses resulting from the boycott. 
The judgment is reversed. The case is remanded for fur-
ther proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
- . JUSTICE MARSHALL took no part in the consideration or I 
~ eoHoideratioft of this case. 
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APPENDIX 
Portions of speech delivered by Charles Evers 
on April 19, 1969 (R. 1091-1130): 
"Thank you very much. We want our white friends here 
to know what we tell them happens to be so. Thank you for 
having the courage to walk down those streets with us. We 
thank you for letting our white brothers know that Port Gib-
son ain't none of their town. (Amen) (Applause) That 
Port Gibson is all of our town. (Applause) That black folks, 
red folks, Chinese and Japanese alike (Yeah) (That's 
right.), that we are going to have our share. (Yeah, we are.) 
"We are going to beat you because we know you can't trick 
us no more. (yea) You are not going to be able to fool us by 
getting somebody to give us a drink of whiskey no more. 
(Applause) You ain't gonna be able to fool us by somebody 
giving us a-few dollars no more. (Applause) We are gonna 
take your money and drink with you and then we're gonna 
(Applause) vote against you. Then we are going to elect a 
sheriff in this county and a sheriff that is responsible, that 
won't have to run and grab the telephone and call up the 
blood-thirsty highway patrol when he gets ready (Yeah) to 
come in and beat innocent folks down to the ground for no 
cause. (That's right) (Applause) (Boo) We are going to 
elect a sheriff that can call his deputies and represent black 
leaders in the community and stop whatever problem there 
is. (Yeah) (That's right.) 
"Then we are going to do more than that. The white mer-
chants of this town are so wrapped up in the power structure 
here, since you love your Police Department so well, since 
you support them so well (Yeah), we are going to let them 
buy your dirty clothes and your filthy, rotten groceries. 
"Oh, no, white folks, we ain't going to shoot you with no 
bullet. (That's right.) We are going to shoot you with our 
ballots and with our bucks. (Yea) (That's right.) We are 
going to take away from you the thing that you have had over 
.. - -
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us all these years. (Yeah) Political power and economic 
power. While you kill our brothers and our sisters and rape 
our wives and our friends. (Yeah) You're guilty. You're 
guilty because you don't care a thing about anybody. (Yes.) 
And when you go and let a big, black burly nigger like you 
get on the police force (Yea) go down and grab another black 
brother's arm and hold it while a white racist stole him from 
us, and he's a liar if he says he didn't hold him. 
"We mean what we are saying. We are not playing. 
(Right) We better not even think one of us is black. You 
better not even be caught near one of these stores. 
(Applause) 
"We don't want you caught in Piggly-Wiggly. You re-
member how he grinned at us four years ago? (Yeah) You 
know how when he took office he grinned at us? (Yeah) He 
ain't hired nobody yet. (That's right) (No) And you know 
old Jitney Jungle down there with those funny letters down 
on the end? (That's right) (Applause) He haven't hired 
nobody in there yet. (No) Do you know poor ole M & Mor 
whatever it stands for, mud and mush, I guess. (Applause) 
They're out here on the highway and they haven't hired none · 
of us yet. 
"Do you know Ellis who had a part-time boy all his life? 
He ain't hired nobody, is he, yet? (No) Then we got ole 
Stampley, and ninety-nine and three-fourths of his sales are 
black folks business. He got the nerve to tell me he ain't 
gonna put no nigger ringing his cash register. I got news for 
you, Brother Stampley. You can ring it your damn self. 
(Extra loud applause.) I want some of you fat cats after this 
meeting who wants three of our young boys who ain't a'scar'd 
of white folks (Applause) (Me) and we want you that's willing 
to follow the rules now to go down by Brother Stampley's and 
serve notice on him with our placards that we ain't coming no 
more. 
,,., t - -
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"Then we are going to tell all the young men that drive 
Piggly-Wiggly trucks now (Yeah) (Be careful, Son.) because 
the soul brothers and the spirit is watching you. (Extra loud 
applause.) 
"All right, Brother Wolf, you're next. (Applause) We 
got a couple of 'em to come down by Brother Wolfs. We 
mean business, white folks. We ain't gonna shoot you all, 
we are going to hit you where it hurts most. (In the pocket-
book) (Applause) In the pocketbook and in the ballot box. 
(Applause) We may as well tell our friends at Alcorn to stay 
away from up here. (Yea) Now, you say, 'What's wrong 
with you niggers?' I'll tell you what is wrong with us nig-
gers; We are tired of you white folks, you racists and you big-
ots mistreating us. (Yeah) We are tired of paying you to 
deny us the right to even exist. (Tell 'em about it.) And we 
ain't coming back, white folks. (We ain't.) 
"You all put a curfew on us at eight o'clock tonight. We 
are going to do you better than that. We are going to leave 
at one-thirty. (Loud applause) We are going to leave at 
one-thirty and we ain't coming back, white folks. 
"We are going to have Brother McCay; we are going to 
have our newly elected mayor who we elected, we are going 
to have him around here , too. Come on back, my dear 
friend[, he say.] 'Naw, brother, we ain't coming. ' 'Have 
you got rid of all those bigots you got on your police force?' 
'No.' 'Have you hired Negroes in all them stores?' 'No.' 
'Well, we ain't coming back.' (Right) That's all we gonna 
do. You know, what they don't realize is that you put on 
this curfew, that is all we needed. Let me just give them 
some instructions. We are going to buy gas only from the 
Negro-owned service stations. We agreed on it, remember? 
Now, don't back upon your agreement. (Yea) I don't care 
how many Negroes working on it, that's too bad. We are 
going only to Negro-owned service stations. And we are go-
" ,( - -
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ing only-the only time you will see us around on this street, 
now listen good, you are going to Lee's Grocery and other 
stores on this end. Is that clear? (Yeah) (Applause) 
"We don't want to go to none of them drugstores. They 
get us confused. Now, who am I going to get my medicine 
from? Let us know in time and we will be glad to furnish a 
car free to carry you anywhere you have to go to get a pre-
scription filled. You can't beat this. (No) It won't cost 
you a dime. You go to any of the local black businessmen 
and tell them you have got to go to Vicksburg to get your 
stuff. And then if they don't carry you, let us know. We'll 
take care of them later. (Applause) Now, you know, we 
have got a little song that says, 'This is your thing, do what 
you want to do.' (Applause) This is our thing, let's do what 
we want to do with it. Let's make sure now-if you be dis-
obedient now you are going to be in trouble. Remember 
that, now, listen. Listen good. They are going to start say-
ing 'You know what, Evers is down there with his goon 
squad, .. .' Now, we know Claiborne County,-'with his 
goon squad harassing poor ole niggers.' 
"Well, good white folks you have been harassing us all our 
lives. (Applause) And if we decided to harass you that's 
our business. (That's right) They are our children and we 
are going to discipline them the way we want to. Now, be 
sure you get all this right on all these tape recorders. What-
ever I say on this trip I will say it in Jackson. (Amen) 
(Glory) And I will say it in Washington and New York. 
White folks ain't gonna never control us no more. (Ap-
plause) 
"Now, my dear friends, the white folks have got the mes-
sage. I hope you have got the message and tell every one of 
our black brothers until all these people are gone, you voted 
on this in the church, don't let me down, and don't let your-
self down. We agreed in the church that we would vacate 
\ ,\ - -
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this town until they have met those requests, the white folks 
don't demand nothing out of us. All right, white folks, we 
are just saying until you decide when you want to do these 
little things we beg of you, we are not coming back. (No 
way) 
"None of us better not pe caught up here. (Yea) I don't 
care how old you are, I don't care how sick you are, I don't 
care how crazy you are, you better not be caught on these 
streets shopping in these stores until these demands are met. 
(Applause) 
"Now, let's get together. Are you for this or against it? 
(Applause) (For it.) Remember you voted this. We in-
tend to enforce it. You needn't go calling the chief of police, 
he can't help you none. You needn't go calling the sheriff, he 
can't help you none. (That's right.) He ain't going to offer 
to sleep with none of us men, I can tell you that. (Applause) 
Let's don't break our little rules that you agreed upon here. 
"Let's go to the funeral of our young son whenever the fu-
neral is. I don't want you to come with hate because that is 
not going to solve our problems. (No hate.) We don't want 
you to hate the white folks here in Port Gibson. That is not 
going to solve it. If you hate what they have done, I hate to 
get personal, I hate what they did so much to Medgar, (I 
know.) I ain't going to ever stop hating them for that. But I 
am going to chase them in the way what I know is right and 
just. I am not going to lay out in the bushes and shoot no 
white folks. That's wrong. I am not gonna go out here and 
bomb none of them's home. (No) That's not right. But I 
am going to do everything in my power to take away all the 
power, political power, legal power that they possess any-
where I live. We are going to compete against them. 
When we blacks learn to support and respect each other, 
then and not until then, will white folks respect us. 
(Applause) 
"Now, you know I trust white folks and I mean every word 
.l. - -
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I say. But it comes a time when we got to make up in our 
mind individually, are we going to make those persons worth-
while. We done talked and raised all kind of sand all day 
here, now, what is really going to prove it, are we going to 
live up to what we have said? (Applause) Now if there is 
. any one of us breaks what we agreed upon, you are just as 
guilty as that little trigger-happy, blood-thirsty rascal. (Tell 
'em about it.) 
"I go all over this country, and I ought not to tell you white 
folks this, and I tell other white folks that some day we are 
going to get together in Mississippi, black and white, and 
work out our problems. And we are ready to start when-
ever you are. If you are ready to start, we are. We ain't 
going to let you push us, not one inch. (That's right.) If 
you come on beating us, we are going to fight back. (Right) 
We got our understanding. We are all God's children. The 
same man that brought you all here brought us. You could 
have been black just like we are. We could have been white 
and baldheaded just like you are. (Laughter) (Inaudible) 
We are going to work hard at this, Dan. We are going to be 
organized this time. We ain't going to be bought off and 
talked off. We are going to elect the county sheriff here this 
next time that don't need the highway patrol. Now, you 
see, Dan had a good chance to set himself up right, but he 
goofed it. He goofed. (Yeah) He blew it. (Laughter) 
Don't forget that, heah. (Right) It brings back memories 
like you know you remember things we do. 
"Now, if you don't think it is necessary, we don't have to go 
back to the church. If you want to go back there, we can. I 
want you to make sure here that we are going to leave this 
town to our white brothers and we ain't coming back no more 
until all our requests have been met. Is that the common 
consent of all you here? (Applause) (Let's go back to the 
church.) All right. Are we willing to make sure that every-
one of us will be sure that none of the rest of our black broth-
' _ I- - -
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ers violate our ... (Yea) We are all saying it now. Let's 
not say it now so much on my part. You know, I'm just sort 
of leading, you know, how these lawyers are, leading our 
folks on to say what has to be said. And that's the case. 
Let's make us a white town. We would like for you to start 
it. Be courteous now. Don't mistreat nobody. Tell them, 
in a nice forceful way, the curfew is going to be on until they 
do what we ask them." 
... -
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J USTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
June 7, 1982 
Re: 81-202 - NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co. 
Dear Lewis: 
Many thanks for your letter providing me with your 
preliminary reaction to my opinion. The circulation 
that we made earlier today includes changes that were 
drafted before receiving your letter. 
I think the new footnote 49 on pages 28-29 may 
help a little with the third problem you raise. In 
addition, I plan to add the following to that footnote 
to address that problem: "Nor are we presented with a 
boycott designed to secure aims that are themselves 
prohibited by a valid state law. See Hughes v. 
Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460." 
With respect to your concern about Hydrolevel, I 
had intended to make it clear that the NAACP could be 
held liable for acts of agents committed within their 
apparent authority as well as within their actual 
authority. Thus, at the bottom of page 43 we state 
that the NAACP may be held responsible "for the acts of 
its agents throughout the country that are undertaken 
within the scope of their actual or apparent 
authority." Furthermore, on page 44 we point out that 
no "NAACP member had either actual or apparent 
authority to commit acts of violence or to threaten 
violent conduct." 
I think you probably are correct that the 
exoneration of Evers should also free the NAACP of 
liability, but it seemed to me that there is sufficient 
danger that some other NAACP member at a much lower 
level may be found guilty of violence that it is 
appropriate to make it clear that the mere fact that 
such a person may have attended a number of NAACP 
,II'-- - • -2-
meetings would not be enough to hold the national 
organization responsible. My reasoning is not that the 
doctrine of apparent authority is wholly inapplicable 
to the NAACP but rather that such a person surely 
cannot necessarily be thought to have apparent 
authority to engage in such conduct on behalf of the 
NAACP. In response to your helpful suggestion, I plan 
to make some changes to that portion of the opinion. I 
have enclosed those pages with the changes marked. 
Finally, with respect to your first point, I think 
you are correct in suggesting that we should again 
emphasize the fact that persons who actually were 
guilty of violence may be held liable on remand. I 
begin the last paragraph of the opinion with the 
sentence: "The taint of violence colored the conduct 
of some of the petitioners." I will add the following: 
"They, of course, may be held liable for the 
consequences of their violent deeds." 
If you do not feel that the changes that I plan to 
make are sufficient, or if you have additional 
concerns, please let me know. I really want to make an 
effort to achieve the maximum consensus possible and, 
entirely apart from that objective, particularly value 
your appraisal of the opinion because it is to a 
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ings are not sufficient to establish that Evers had a duty to 
"repudiate" the acts of violence that occurred. 73 The findings 
are constitutionally inadequate to support the damage judg-
ment against him. 
The liability of the NAACP derived solely from the liability 
of Charles Evers. 74 The chancellor found: 
"The national NAACP was well-advised of Evers' ac-
tions, and it had the option of repudiating his acts or rati-
fying them. It never repudiated those acts, and there-
fore, it is deemed by this Court to have affirmed them." 
App. to Pet. for Cert. 42b-43b. 
Of course, to the extent that Charles Evers' acts are insuffi-
cient to impose liability upon him, they may not be used t~ ~ . 
impose liability on his principal. Tl:IQ jYdg+l:J,QBt awardg 2?n e d_,/l.£seJ ,~ 
3~&inst the NMGP ffl!lY Rat stafta, koWQ¥or, ~r aR. altorna ~., 'Jul'J,r)i,Ve1-_, ~ 
t;ive aml ffl8Pe ftlHd~mentsl PeasoR. J~~ ~f- ~ 
The associational rights of the NAACP and its members PA-)re-f' ~~ 74t:Jf-
have been recognized repeatedly by this Court. 75 The . _ ~ f. 
NAACP-like any other organization-of course may be held si?h,,.L t-n. ~ ~ • 
responsible for the acts of its agents throughout the country 
that are undertaken within the scope of their actual or appar-
ent authority. 761 Moreover, the NAACP may be found liable 
but there is no suggestion that anything improper occurred on those 
occasions. 
73 See n. 69, supra. 
" Indeed it is noteworthy that Aaron Henry-who was president of the 
Mississippi State Conference of the NAACP, president of the Coahoma 
County Branch of the NAACP, and a member of the Board of Directors of 
the national NAACP-was the only defendant dismissed by the chancellor 
on the merits. 
75 Cf. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449; Bates v. 
City of Little Rock, 361 U. S. 516; Louisiana ex rel. Gremillion v. 
NAACP, 366 U. S. 293; NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415; Gibson v. Flor-
ida Legislative Comm. , 372 U. S. 539; NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Flow-
ers, 377 U. S. 288. 
76 There is no question that Charles Evers-as its only paid represent-
er. AmUdA, ~c-,~ 
of Mec~,ad' . 
6,,,~ee-t...S l hie... v. 
~levd 6}/·, 
- l) . ..S. - · 
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for other conduct of which it had knowledge and specifically 
ratified. }>J:either t\'B0 0f 0¥ideftee. he'i¥e. et. is 13FeseBt iR 
II"-~
~~ ThePe is Ha 0viseneel that Charles Evers or any other 
~ 
NAACP member had either actual or apparent authority to 
commit acts of violence or to threaten violent conduct. The 
,.\ 0Rly evidence in the record suggests the contrary. Aaron 
Henry, president of the Mississippi State Branch of the 
NAACP and a member of the Board of Directors of the na-
tional organization, testified that the statements attributed 
to Evers were directly contrary to NAACP policy. R. 
4930. 78 Similarly, there is no evidence that the NAACP rati-
fied-or even had specific knowledge of- any of the acts of 
atb7e in Mississippi- was an a ent of the NAACP. 
77 The chancellor~ that the NAACP had posted bond and provided 
legal representation for arrested boycott violators. Since the NAACP 
regularly provides such assistance to indigent black persons throughout 
the country, this finding is iff0lo¥1mt'.' Counsel for respondents does not 
contend otherwise. 
-
78 In a footnote to his discussion of the NAACP's liability, the chancellor 
wrote: 
"Aaron E . Henry, a prominant black leader in the State of Mississippi, 
who was president of the Mississippi State Conference of the NAACP, 
president of the Coahoma County Branch of the NAACP, and a member of 
the Board of Directors of the national NAACP, testified that the NAACP 
'absolutely did not approve of the way the boycott was being conducted in 
Port Gibson.' There is also evidence in the record tending to show that 
Evers was called to account by the national NAACP because of the manner 
in which the boycott was conducted. However, the NAACP took no ac-
tion whatever to curb Evers' activities in this connection." App. to Pet. 
for Cert.42b n. 9. 
Henry's testimony concerning Evers' having been "called to account by the 
National NAACP" concerned Evers' failure to make proper reports and 
Henry's understanding that there was a personality clash between Evers 
and an executive of the NAACP. R. 4905, 4907. We have found no evi-
dence in the record that any representative of the national NAACP was 
advised of any facts concerning the manner in which the Port Gibson boy-
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violence or threats of discipline associated with the boycott. 
Henry testified that the NAACP never authorized, and 
never considered taking, any official action with respect to 
the boycott. R. 4896. The NAACP supplied no financial 
aid to the boycott. R. 4940. The chancellor made no find-




To impose liability without @1riee0oe ef a:1:1thef'ii;3e.fa0R. or .a, ' 
,oiili,aiioR would impermissib, burden the rights of political tl,. uAAGI" ""- ~--
association that are protected by the First Amendment. As &:-f/!vt.. ae,~ dl.-
Justice Douglas noted in NAACP v. Overstreet, 384 U. S. (2. 
118, dissenting from a dismissal of a writ of certiorari found 1/~?--:~ 
to have been improvidently granted: M--~~J tht. ~ 
"To equate the liability of the national organization ~ 
with that of the Branch in the absence of any proof that 
the national authorized or ratified the misconduct in 
question could ultimately destroy it. The rights of po-
litical association are fragile enough without adding the 
additional threat of destruction by lawsuit. We have 
not been slow to recognize that the protection of the 
First Amendment bars subtle as well as obvious devices 
by which political association might be stifled. See 
Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U. S. 516, 523. Thus we have 
held that forced disclosure of one's political associations 
is, at least in the absence of a compelling state interest, 
inconsistent with the First Amendment's guaranty of 
associational privacy. E.g., DeGregory v. N ew Hamp-
shire, 338 U. S. 825; Gibson v. Florida Legislative 
Comm ., 372 U. S. 539, 543-546; Shelton v. Tucker, 364 
U. S. 479; N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama, 357 U. S. 449, 
462-463. Recognizing that guilt by association is a phi-
losophy alien to the traditions of a ·free society (see 
Schware v. Board of Bar E xaminers, 353 U. S. 232, 
245-246) and the First Amendment itself, we have held 
that civil or criminal disabilities may not be imposed on 
) 
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81-202 NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Company 
Dear John: 
Over the weekend I read with care your second 
draft. It is a_,_ strong opinion, and meets some of the 
concerns I have expressed. 
I am entirely comfortable with most of what you 
have written and the holding. I continue, however, to have 
reservations about some of the language that seems 
unnecessarily broad. 
Perhaps some of my concern derives from the 
increasingly violent age in which we are living. Legitimate 
First Amendment rights must be safeguarded without 
encouraging incitement to violence. Pages 34-42 of your 
opinion come rather close, it seems to me, to making it 
extremely difficult to hold anyone responsible for the 
consequences of incitement to force or violence. You rely, 
of course, on language from prior opinions - written in 
varying circumstances. It may not be of universal 
application. 
I agree with your holding as to Evers because 
"the acts of violence identified in 1966 occurred weeks or 
months after {Evers'] April 1, 1966 speech1 fand] the 
Chancellor made no finding of any violence after the 
challenged 1969 speech". p. 42. This, therefore, is an 
easy case, and a good deal of the very broad language in the 
opinion seems unnecessary. 
If there had been violence within a reasonable 
time span of Evers' "break your neck" speech, combined with 
the continuous but less physical forms of intimidation that 
prevailed, I would think the question of causation would be 
a serious one. Could you not say this? Reliance on the 
phrase "incite [to] imminent lawless action" can be viewed 
as meaning action within hours or even less. Causation 
should depend on the facts and circumstances, and they can 
vary widely. In this case the total circumstances (weekly 
rallies, Black Hats, "guards", intimidation threats, some 
carried out, etc.) well could have led to violence some time 
- -
2. 
after Evers' incitement. It is a credit to the petitioners 
that they did not. 
I am troubled also by your saying that Evers did 
not "authorize", "ratify" or "directly threaten" acts of 
violence (p. 42). If this excused actual incitement, it 
would be virtually impossible to hold one responsible for 
action or speech that caused lawless conduct. Such a person 
rarely would be stupid enough to "authorize" or "ratify 11 
such actlon. At another point, I read the draft as drawing 
a distinction between "inspired" and "authorized". (p. 40) 
Again, specific authorization, direction or approval of 
tortious activity - as these terms normally are used - would 
not be necessary in my opinion. Inspiration and incitement, 
especially where mobs are concerned, can accomplish fully as 
much to _encourage lawless conduct as unlikely specific 
authorization of the conduct. 
The discussion with respect to "damages" also seems 
unnecessarily restrictive. Relying on Noto and Healy -
cases that are not entirely apposite - your opinion may be 
r.ead as saying that there must be "clear. proof that a 
defendant specifically intended ••• resort to violence". 
Both Noto and Healy involved organizations. Here the NAACP 
certainly does not intend violence, but its members should 
be held responsible under tort law principles for violence 
regardless of NAACP intent. I also view this case 
differently from Gibbs as Congress has legislated 
extensively with respect to labor law. I agree, of course, 
that membership in a group alone is not sufficient but I 
also wonder if it is sufficiently clear that your 
requirement of "strict proof" (p. 33) is limited to a claim 
based on association alone. As a practical matter, it will 
be near to impossible to prove damages in a case like this 
where no one can be entirely sure as to what damage was 
caused by what specific action. 
Finally, I remain unpersuaded that Evers lacked 
apparent authority from the NAACP. I agree that there was 
no actual authority beyond directing and encouraging the 
boycott. But the very fact that Evers had this authority 
would certainly lead the blacks in question to believe he 
was acting on behalf of the respected l'-lAACP organization. 
In a sense, I welcome what seems to me to be a retreat from 
Hydrolevel - a case with which I wholly disagree. But I 
must say that Evers' apparent authority seems as evident as 
that of the Association members (not officials, as was 
Evers) who perpetrated the fraud in Hydrolevel. I also 
continue to think, John, in view of the remoteness of the 
violence to Evers' most provocative incitement, that it is 
• - -
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unnecessary to get into the agency question. As you argue, 
NAACP will be exonerated when we clear Evers. (p. 43). 
In view of the foregoing, I hope you will consider 
qualifying some of the rather. broad language. If not, I am 
inclined to join only Parts I, IIA, IV, and the judgment. 
F.ven with respect to IV, I would appreciate your 
making a couple of minor changes. Perhaps you would be 
willing to change the third sentence of Part IV to read as 
follows: 
''And yet one of the foundations of our 
society is the right of individuals to 
combine with other persons in pursuit of a 
common goal by lawful means.• (additions 
underscored) 
And on page 47, it seems to me that the first two full 
sentences on the page need some qualification. Some 
picketing can be the basis for a damage award. And, in the 
next sentence, the word "agreement" to use violence again is 
used. As I have indicated, I think incitement is more 
appropriate where violence occurs within a reasonable time. 
Proof of an agreement, certainly when dealing with large 
numbers of people, normally will be impossible. 
I appreciate that you have had to write what 
probably is the most difficult case of this Term, and 
therefore apologize for causing you even to read this long 
letter. Perhaps I am unduly pessimistic, but it does seem 
to me that world order is showing signs of unraveling. The 
difference between the essentially peaceful picketing 
involved in this case and mindless mobs in the street will 
not always be easy to define. The language of some of the 
First Amendment cases you cite, decided in a different era, 
may be relied upon to justify even serious threats to the 




There ls no occasion for you to respond to this 
If you make changes, I will see them in your next 
I can then decide whether to join your entire 




- -.:§u:pumt <qottrl of tlrt ~ro ~tatr.s-
'Jiru.frington, ~- cq. 20~)1.~ 
CH AM BERS O F 
JUSTICE BY R ON R. WHITE June 16, 1982 
81-202 - NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co. 
Dear John, 
Join me, please. 
Sincerely yours, 
Justice Stevens 
Copies to the Conference 
cprn 
-
;;.,,~ jo1@ 381{§~ 
- The Chief Justice ' I 
Justice Brennan "J 
Justice White r , 
Justice Marshall 
(~~ Justice Blackmun L.J,tt'Suce Powell 
~~~/4,~ 
(J IAn:Uf ~ ~1-~ 
Justice Rehnquist "--
Justice O'Connor 
From: Justice Stevens 
Circulated: ------~· ~~ 
~-4~. Recirculated: JUN 1 8 '82 ii.I 
3rd DRAFT 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 81-202 
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT 
OF COLORED PEOPLE, ET AL, PETITIONERS v. 
CLAIBORNE HARDWARE COMPANY ET AL. 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT 
OF MISSISSIPPI 
[June-, 1982] 
JUSTICE STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The term "concerted action" encompasses unlawful con-
spiracies and constitutionally protected assemblies. The 
"looseness and pliability" of legal doctrine applicable to con-
certed action led Justice Jackson to note that certain joint ac-
tivities have a "chameleon-like" character. 1 The boycott of 
white merchants in Claiborne County, Mississippi, that gave 
rise to this litigation had such a character; it included ele-
ments of criminality and elements of majesty. Evidence 
that fear of reprisals caused some black citizens to withhold 
their patronage from respondents' businesses convinced the 
Supreme Court of Mississippi that the entire boycott was un-
lawful and that each of the 92 petitioners was liable for all of 
its economic consequences. Evidence that persuasive rheto-
ric, determination to remedy past injustices, and a host of 
voluntary decisions by free citizens were the critical factors 
in the boycott's success presents us with the question 
whether the State Court's judgment is consistent with the 
Constitution of the United States. 
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I 
In March 1966, black citizens of Port Gibson, Mississippi, 
and other areas of Claiborne County presented white elected 
officials with a list of particularized demands for racial equal-
ity and integration. 2 The complainants did not receive a sat-
isfactory response and, at a local NAACP meeting at the 
First Baptist Church, several hundred black persons voted to 
place a boycott on white merchants in the area. On October 
31, 1969, several of the merchants filed suit in state court to 
recover losses caused by the boycott and to enjoin future boy-
cott activity. We recount first the course of that litigation 
and then consider in more detail the events that gave rise to 
the merchants' claim for damages. 
A 
The complaint was filed in the Chancery Court of Hinds 
County by 17 white merchants. 3 The merchants named two 
corporations and 146 individuals as defendants: the National 
Association for the Advancement of Colored People 
(NAACP), a New York membership corporation; Mississippi 
Action for Progress (MAP), a Mississippi corporation that im-
plemented the federal "Head Start" program; Aaron Henry, 
the President of the Mississippi Branch of the NAACP; 
' Port Gibson is the county seat and largest municipality in Claiborne 
County. 
3 The affected businesses represented by the merchants included four 
grocery stores, two hardware stores, a pharmacy, two general variety 
stores, a laundry, a liquor store, two car dealers, two auto parts stores, 
and a gas station. Many of the owners of these boycotted stores were 
civic leaders in Port Gibson and Claiborne County. Respondents Allen 
and Al Batten were aldermen in Port Gibson, R. 15111; Robert Vaughan, 
part owner and operator of one of the boycotted stores , represented 
Claiborne County in the Mississippi House of Representatives , R. 15160; 
respondents Abraham and Hay had served on the school board, R. 14906, 
14678; respondent Hudson served on the Claiborne County Democratic 
Committee, R. 840. 
- -
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Charles Evers, the Field Secretary of the NAACP in Missis-
sippi; and 144 other individuals who had participated in the 
boycott. 4 The complaint sought injunctive relief and an at-
tachment of property, as well as damages. Although it al-
leged that the plaintiffs were suffering irreparable injury 
from an ongoing conspiracy, no preliminary relief was 
sought. 
Trial was begun before a chancellor in equity on June 11, 
1973.5 The court heard the testimony of 144 witnesses dur-
ing an eight-month trial. In August 1976, the chancellor is-
sued an opinion and decree finding that "an overwhelming 
preponderance of the evidence" established the joint and sev-
eral liability of 130 of the defendants on three separate con-
'The complaint also named 52 banks as "attachment defendants." The 
banks answered that the NAACP had $16,800 on deposit in Mississippi. 
5 As a result of the plaintiffs' prayer for an attachment in equity, juris-
diction existed in chancery court. The trial judge ruled: "It was incum-
bent upon this court to hear the case in full once jurisdiction was assumed. 
To have heard the portions of this matter sounding in equity, only, and to 
have transferred the questions of tort liability and damages to the circuit 
court would have been contrary to the maxim 'equity delights to do com-
plete justice, and not by halves.'" App. to Pet. for Cert. 56b. The defen-
dants thus were denied a jury trial on the liability issues. Although the 
court recognized that it had power to empanel a jury, it declined to exer-
cise its discretion to do so. Ibid. The Mississippi non-resident attach-
ment statute that provided the basis for equitable jurisdiction has since 
been declared unconstitutional by both federal district courts in Missis-
sippi. MP/ Inc. v. McCullough, 463 F. Supp. 887 (ND Miss. 1978); Mis-
sissippi Chem. Corp. v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 444 F. Supp. 925 (SD 
Miss. 1977). 
Commencement of trial was delayed by collateral proceedings in federal 
court. See Henry v. First National Bank of Clarksdale, 50 F.R.D. 251 
(ND Miss. 1970), reversed, 444 F. 2d 1300 (CA5 1971), cert. denied, 405 
U. S. 1019. The District Court entered a preliminary injunction restrain-
ing the state proceedings on the theory that the merchants sought to in-
fringe the defendants' First Amendment rights. The Court of Appeals re-
versed, holding that the mere commencement of a private tort suit did not 
itself involve "state action" for purposes of 28 U. S. C. § 1343(3). 
- -
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spiracy theories. 6 First, the court held that the defendants 
were liable for the tort of malicious interference with the 
plaintiffs' businesses, which did not necessarily require the 
presence of a conspiracy. 7 Second, the chancellor found a vi-
6 App. to Pet. for Cert. 2g. Of the original 148 named defendants, 16 
were dismissed by stipulation of counsel (12 had died , two were minors, 
one was non compos mentis, and one--the Reverend Dominic Cangemi-
was dismissed by agreement without explanation). One defendant was 
dismissed because he had been misidentified in the complaint. The chan-
cellor dismissed one defendant-state NAACP leader Aaron Henry-be-
cause "the complainants failed to meet the burden of proof as to [his] 
wrongdoing." Id., at 28b. Thus, except for the defendants dismissed by 
stipulation, the plaintiffs prevailed on the merits in the trial court against 
all but one of the defendants. 
' Although the bulk of the court's discussion of the defendants' common 
law tort liability focused on the presence of a civil conspiracy, the chancel-
lor did not appear to hold that a concerted refusal to deal- without more--
was actionable under the common Jaw of Mississippi. The court appar-
ently based its first theory of liability on the ground that the "malicious 
interference by the defendants with the businesses of the complainants as 
shown by the evidence in this case is tortious per se, and this would be true 
even without the element of conspiracy." Id., at 42b. (footnote omitted). 
In Mississippi, "[e]ither an individual or a corporation, whether acting in 
conjunction with others, or not," may be liable in an action for "malicious 
interference with a trade or calling." Memphis Laundry-Cleaners v. 
Lindsey, 192 Miss. 224, 239 (1941). The chancellor in this case stated that 
the necessary element of malice is established by proof of "the intentional 
performance of an act harmful to another without just or lawful cause or 
excuse." App. to Pet. for Cert. 42b, n. 8. 
The repeated references to the presence of a conspiracy might be ex-
plained by the court's finding that each of the defendants-with the excep-
tion of Aaron Henry- was jointly and severally liable for the plaintiffs' 
losses. As noted, an element of the plaintiffs' common law action was the 
defendants' intentional performance of an "unprivileged" act harmful to an-
other. The chancellor stated that the evidence clearly established that 
"certain defendants" had committed "overt acts which were injurious to 
the trade and business of complainants. " Id. , at 39b. The court contin-
ued: "Where two or more persons conspire together, the conspiracy makes 
the wrongful act of each person the joint acts of them all," id., at 41b; "[i]t 
follows that each act done in pursuance of the conspiracy by one of the sev-
- -
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olation of a state statutory prohibition against secondary boy-
cotts, on the theory that the defendants' primary dispute was 
with the governing authorities of Port Gibson and Claiborne 
County and not with the white merchants at whom the boy-
cott was directed. 8 Third, the court found a violation of Mis-
sissippi's antitrust statute, on the ground that the boycott 
had diverted black patronage from the white merchants to 
black merchants and to other merchants located out of 
Claiborne County and thus had unreasonably limited compe-
tition between black and white merchants that had tradition-
ally existed. 9 The chancellor specifically rejected the defen-
dants' claim that their conduct was protected by the First 
Amendment. 10 
era! conspirators is, in contemplation of the law, an act for which each is 
jointly and severally liable." Ibid. Thus, the presence of a conspiracy 
rendered all of the "conspirators" liable for the wrongful acts of any mem-
ber of that conspiracy. 
8 See Miss. Code Ann. § 97-23-85. The chancellor found: "The testi-
mony in the case at bar clearly shows that the principal objective of the 
boycott was to force the white merchants of Port Gibson and Claiborne 
County to bring pressure upon governing authorities to grant defendants' 
demands or, in the alternative, to suffer economic ruin." App. to Pet. for 
Cert. 51b. As noted, however, many of the merchants themselves were 
civic leaders. See n. 3, supr a. 
9 See Miss. Code Ann. § 75--21-9. The court made clear that under this 
theory intentional participation in the concerted action rendered each de-
fendant directly liable for all resulting damages. "As a legal principle, it is 
sufficient to show that the concert of action on the part of the defendants 
was deliberately invited, and that the defendants gave their adherence to 
the scheme and participated in it." App. to Pet. for Cert. 54b. The same 
was true of the court's secondary boycott theory; "since an illegal boycott is 
an invasion of a property right, the members of the boycotting combination 
are liable for the resulting damages." Id. , at 53b. 
10 In its discussion of the secondary boycott statute, the court rejected an 
argument that the statute was unconstitutional under the First and Four-
teenth Amendments. Noting as a "basic premise" that "secondary boy-
cotts are unlawful under both United States and Mississippi law," the court 
stated that "conduct and communication which are illegal are not protected 
- -
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Five of the merchants offered no evidence of business 
losses. The chancellor found that the remaining 12 had suf-
fered lost business earnings and lost good will during a seven-
year period from 1966 to 1972 amounting to $944,699. That 
amount, plus statutory antitrust penalties of $6,000 and a 
$300,000 award of attorney's fees, produced a final judgment 
of $1,250,699, plus interest from the date of judgment and 
costs. As noted, the chancellor found all but 18 of the origi-
nal 148 defendants jointly and severally liable for the entire 
judgment. The court justified imposing full liability on the 
national organization of the NAACP on the ground that it 
had failed to "repudiate" the actions of Charles Evers, its 
Field Secretary in Mississippi. 
In addition to imposing damage liability, the chancellor en-
tered a broad permanent injunction. He permanently en-
joined petitioners from stationing "store watchers" at the re-
spondents' business premises; from "persuading" any person 
to withhold his patronage from respondents; from "using de-
meaning and obsence language to or about any person" be-
cause that person continued to patronize the respondents; 
from "picketing or patroling'' the premises of any of the re-
spondents; and from using violence against any person or in-
flicting damage to any real or personal property. 11 
by the constitutional provisions relating to freedom of speech." Id. , at 
46b. In imposing liability under the state restraint of trade statute, the 
chancellor added: "After a careful consideration of the constitutional claims 
of defendants, the Court finds that none of the acts or conduct of defen-
dants was shielded or protected by the Constitution of the United States or 
the Constitution of the State of Mississippi." Id., at 56b. Finally, in as-
sessing damages, the court stated: "Defendants base their defense on the 
concept that the right to boycott and inflict losses on complainants was a 
legally protected right afforded them under the laws and Constitution of 
the United States. This Court has hereinbefore found that the conduct of 
the defendants was unlawful and unprotected. " Id., at 62b. 
11 Id. , at 19g. Following the entry of judgment, the defendants moved 
for relief from Mississippi's 125 percent supersedeas bonding requirement. 
Although the Mississippi Supreme Court denied the motion, a federal court 
- -
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In December 1980, the Mississippi Supreme Court re-
versed significant portions of the trial court's judgment. It 
held that the secondary boycott statute was inapplicable be-
cause it had not been enacted until "the boycott had been in 
operation for upward of two years." 12 The court declined to 
rely on the restraint of trade statute, noting that the "United 
States Supreme Court has seen fit to hold boycotts to achieve 
political ends are not a violation of the Sherman Act, 15 
U. S. C. § 1 (1970), after which our statute is patterned." 13 
Thus, the court rejected two theories of liability that were 
consistent with a totally voluntary and nonviolent withhold-
ing of patronage from the white merchants. 
The Mississippi Supreme Court upheld the imposition of li-
ability, however, on the basis of the chancellor's common law 
tort theory. After reviewing the chancellor's recitation of 
the facts, the court quoted the following finding made by the 
trial court: 
"In carrying out the agreement and design, certain of 
the defendants, acting for all others, engaged in acts of 
physical force and violence against the persons and prop-
erty of certain customers and prospective customers. 
Intimidation, threats, social ostracism, vilification, and 
traduction were some of the devices used by the defen-
dants to achieve the desired results. Most effective, 
also, was the stationing of guards ('enforcers,' 'deacons,' 
or 'black hats') in the vicinity of white-owned businesses. 
Unquestionably, the evidence shows that the volition of 
many black persons was overcome out of sheer fear, and 
they were forced and compelled against their personal 
wills to withhold their trade and business intercourse 
enjoined execution of the chancery court judgment pending appeal. 
Henry v. First National Bank, 424 F. Supp. 633 (ND Miss. 1976), af-
firmed, 595 F. 2d 291 (CA5 1979), cert. denied, 444 U. S. 1074. 
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from the complainants." App. to Pet. for Cert. 39b 
(quoted id., at 20a). 
On the basis of this finding, the court concluded that the en-
tire boycott was unlawful. "If any of these factors-force, 
violence, or threats-is present, then the boycott is illegal re-
gardless of whether it is primary, secondary, economical, po-
litical, social or other." 14 In a brief passage, the court re-
jected petitioners' reliance on the First Amendment: 
"The agreed use of illegal force, violence, and threats 
against the peace to achieve a goal makes the present 
state of facts a conspiracy. We know of no instance, and 
our attention has been drawn to no decision, wherein it 
has been adjudicated that free speech guaranteed by the 
First Amendment includes in its protection the right to 
commit crime." Id., at 23a. 
The theory of the Mississippi Supreme Court, then, was that 
petitioners had agreed to use force, violence, and "threats" to 
effectuate the boycott. 15 To the trial court, such a finding 
had not been necessary. 16 
Although the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed the 
chancellor's basic finding of liability, the court held that re-
'" Id. , at 23a. 
15 The court did not specifically identify the evidence linking any of the 
defendants to such an agreement. 
16 As noted, liability under the secondary boycott and restraint of trade 
statutes could be found on the basis of an entirely voluntary and nonviolent 
agreement to withhold patronage. See n. 9, supra. It is not clear 
whether-in its imposition of tort liability-the trial court rested on a the-
ory similar to that ultimately advanced by the Mississippi Supreme Court. 
In finding an unlawful civil conspiracy-which rendered each conspirator 
liable for the actions of others, see n. 7, supr~the chancellor arguably 
believed that it was necessary to connect all defendants to an agreement to 
use force or violence to effectuate the conspiracy. See id., at 40b-41b. 
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spondents "did not establish their case" with respect to 38 of 
the defendants. 17 The court found that MAP was a victim, 
rather than a willing participant, in the conspiracy and dis-
missed- without further explanation- 37 individual defen-
dants for lack of proof. Finally, the court ruled that certain 
damages had been improperly awarded and that other dam-
ages had been inadequately proved. The court remanded for 
further proceedings on the computation of damages. 18 
We granted a petition for certiorari. -- U. S. --. At 
oral argument, a question arose concerning the factual basis 
for the judgment of the Mississippi Supreme Court. As 
noted, that court affirmed petitioners' liability for damages 
on the ground that each of the petitioners had agreed to effec-
tuate the boycott through force, violence, and threats. Such 
a finding was not necessary to the trial court's imposition of 
liabilty and neither state court had identified the evidence ac-
tually linking the petitioners to such an agreement. In re-
sponse to a request from this Court, respondents filed a sup-
plemental brief "specifying the acts committed by each of the 
petitioners giving rise to liability for damages." Respond-
ents' Supplemental Brief 1. That brief helpfully places the 
petitioners in different categories; we accept respondents' 
framework for analysis and identify these classes as a preface 
to our review of the relevant incidents that occurred during 
the seven-year period for which damages were assessed. 19 
First, respondents contend that liability is justified by evi-
" Id., at 26a. 
18 Concerning the permanent injunction entered by the chancellor, the 
court stated: "Although the granting of injunction has been assigned as 
error, the error has not been argued, and NAACP, et al. say, at the conclu-
sion of their brief ' . .. the injunctive aspects of the case are now moot. 
Id., at 5a. Despite this finding, the court did not vacate the 
injunction. 
19 Respondents acknowledge that "[t]he basis on which the Mississippi 
Supreme Court held that petitioners were liable for damages was 'the 
agreed use of illegal force , violence and threats.'" Respondents' Supple-
mental Brief 1- 2. 
' _.,,. - -
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dence of participation in the "management" of the boycott. 20 
Respondents identify two groups of persons who may be 
found liable as "managers": 79 individuals who regularly at-
tended Tuesday night meetings of the NAACP at the First 
Baptist Church; and 11 persons who took "leadership roles" 
at those meetings. 21 
Second, respondents contend that liability is justified by 
evidence that an individual acted as a boycott "enforcer." 22 
In this category, respondents identify 22 persons as members 
of the "Black Hats"-a special group organized during the 
boycott-and 19 individuals who were simply "store 
watchers." 
Third, respondents argue that those petitioners "who 
themselves engaged in violent acts or who threatened vio-
lence have provided the best possible evidence that they 
wanted the boycott to succeed by coercion whenever it could 
not succeed by persuasion." Id., at 10. They identify 16 in-
dividuals for whom there is direct evidence of participation in 
20 Respondents argue that anyone "who participates in the 
decisionmaking functions of an enterprise, with full knowledge of the tac-
tics by which the enterprise is being conducted, manifests his assent to 
those tactics ... . " Id., at 2. Respondents thus would impose liability for 
the managers' failure to act; respondents argue that, despite evidence that 
boycott "enforcers" caused fear of injury to persons and property, "they 
were not taken from their posts and replaced by a system of voluntary 
compliance; there is no evidence that any of the petitioners ever admon-
ished them for their enforcement methods; the successful system of para-
military enforcers on the streets and 'rhetorical' threats of violence by boy-
cott leaders was left in place for the duration." Id. , at 5. 
21 These groups are not meant to be exclusive. 
22 "Once the pattern had been established-warnings to prospective cus-
tomers, destruction of goods purchased at boycotted stores, public displays 
of weapons and military discipline, denunciation of names gathered by the 
store-watchers, and subsequent violence against the persons and property 
of boycott breakers-store-watching in Port Gibson became the sort of ac-
tivity from which a court could reasonably infer an intention to frighten 
people away from the stores. " Id., at 8. 
-- -
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what respondents characterize as violent acts or threats of 
violence. 
Fourth, respondents contend that Charles Evers may be 
held liable because he "threatened violence on a number of 
occasions against boycott breakers." Id., at 13. Like the 
chancellor, respondents would impose liability on the national 
NAACP because Evers "was acting in his capacity as Field 
Secretary of the NAACP when he committed these tortious 
and constitutionally unprotected acts." Ibid. 
Finally, respondents state that they are "unable to deter-
mine on what record evidence the state courts relied in find-
ing liability on the part of seven of the petitioners." Id., at 
16. With these allegations of wrongdoing in mind, we turn 
to consider the factual events that gave rise to this 
controversy. 
B 
The chancellor held petitioners liable for all of respondents' 
lost earnings during a seven year period from 1966 to Decem-
ber 31, 1972. We first review chronologically the principal 
events that occurred during that period, describe some fea-
tures of the boycott that are not in dispute , and then identify 
the most significant evidence of violent activity. 
In late 1965 or early 1966, Charles Evers , the Field Secre-
tary of the NAACP, helped organize the Claiborne County 
Branch of the NAACP. The pastor of the First Baptist 
Church, James Dorsey, was elected president of the Branch; 
regular meetings were conducted each Tuesday evening at 
the Church. At about the same time, a group of black citi-
zens formed a Human Relations Committee and presented a 
petition for redress of grievances to civic and business lead-
ers of the white community. In response , a biracial commit-
tee-including five of the petitioners and several of the re-
spondents-was organized and held a series of unproductive 
meetings. 
The black members of the committee then prepared a fur-
- -
81-202-OPINION 
12 NAACP v. CLAIBORNE HARDWARE CO. 
ther petition entitled "Demands for Racial Justice." This pe-
tition was presented for approval at the local NAACP meet-
ing conducted on the first Tuesday evening in March. As 
described by the chancellor, "the approximately 500 people 
present voted their approval unanimously." 23 On March 
14, 1966, the petition was presented to public officials of Port 
Gibson and Claiborne County. 
The petition included 19 specific demands. It called for 
the desegregation of all public schools and public facilities, 
the hiring of black policemen, public improvements in black 
residential areas, selection of blacks for jury duty, integra-
tion of bus stations so that blacks could use all facilities, and 
an end to verbal abuse by law enforcement officers. It 
stated that "Negroes are not to be addressed by terms as 
'boy,' 'girl,' 'shine,' 'uncle,' or any other offensive term, but as 
'Mr.,' 'Mrs.,' or Miss,' as is the case with other citizens." 24 
As described by the chancellor, the purpose of the demands 
"was to gain equal rights and opportunities for Negro citi-
zens." 25 The petition further provided that black leaders 
hoped it would not be necessary to resort to the "selective 
buying campaigns" that had been used in other communi-
ties. 26 On March 23, two demands that had been omitted 
23 App. to Pet. for Cert. at 15b. 
24 Id., at 10b. 
25 Id., at 12b. 
26 The petition stated: 
"We hope it will not be necessary to resort to the kind of peaceful dem-
onstrations and selective buying campaigns which have had to be used in 
other communities. It takes manpower, time and energy which could be 
better directed at solving these problems which exist in Port Gibson and 
Claiborne County by mutual cooperation and efforts at tolerant 
understanding. 
"No one likes to have to resort to picketing and other kinds of dem-
onstration-just as no one likes to be the target of this kind of demonstra-
tion. But this sort of thing is inevitable unless there can be real progress 
toward giving all citizens their equal rights. There seems sometimes to be 
no other alternative. 
• - -
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from the original petition were added, one of which provided: 
"All stores must employ Negro clerks and cashiers." 27 This 
supplemental petition stated that a response was expected by 
April 1. 
A favorable response was not received. On April 1, 1966, 
the Claiborne County NAACP conducted another meeting at 
the First Baptist Church. As described by the chancellor: 
"Several hundred black people attended the meeting, 
and the purpose was to decide what action should be 
taken relative to the twenty-one demands. Speeches 
were made by Evers and others, and a vote was taken. 
It was the unanimous vote of those present, without dis-
sent, to place a boycott on the white merchants of Port 
Gibson and Claiborne County." App. to Pet. for Cert. 
15b. 
The boycott was underway. 28 
In September 1966, Mississippi Action for Progress, Inc. 
(MAP) was organized to develop community action programs 
in 20 counties of Mississippi. One of MAP's programs-
known as Head Start-involved the use of federal funds to 
"Objectives of Negro citizens of Port Gibson and Claiborne County are, 
simply put, to have equality of opportunity, in every aspect of life, and to 
end the white supremacy which has pervaded community life. This im-
plies many long-range objectives such as participation in decision-making 
at every level of community, civic, business and political affairs." Id., at 
9b. 
21 Id., at 13b. 
28 Although Evers' speech on April 1, 1966 was not recorded, the chan-
cellor found: "Evers told his audience that they would be watched and that 
blacks who traded with white merchants would be answerable to him. Ac-
cording to Sheriff Dan McKay, who was present during the speech, Evers 
told the assembled black people that any 'uncle toms' who broke the boy-
cott would 'have their necks broken' by their own people. Evers' remarks 
were directed to all 8,000-plus black residents of Claiborne County, and not 
merely the relatively few members of the Claiborne NAACP." Id., at 
17b-18b (footnote omitted). 
- -
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provide food for young children. Originally, food purchases 
in Claiborne County were made alternately from white-
owned and black-owned stores, but in February 1967 the di-
rectors of MAP authorized their Claiborne County represent-
atives to purchase food only from black-owned stores. Since 
MAP bought substantial quantities of food, the consequences 
of this decision were significant. A large portion of the trial 
was devoted to the question whether MAP participated in 
the boycott voluntarily and- under the chancellor's theories 
of liability- could be held liable for the resulting damages. 
The chancellor found MAP a willing participant, noting that 
"during the course of the trial, the only Head Start cooks 
called to the witness stand testified that they refused to go 
into white-owned stores to purchase groceries for the chil-
dren in the program for the reason that they were in favor of 
the boycott and wanted to honor it." 29 
Several events occurred during the boycott that had a 
strong effect on boycott activity. On February 1, 1967, Port 
Gibson employed its first black policeman. During that 
month, the boycott was lifted on a number of merchants. On 
April 4, 1968, Dr. Martin Luther King was assassinated in 
Memphis. The chancellor found that this tragic event had a 
depressing effect on the black community and, as a result, 
the boycott "tightened." 30 
29 Id. , at 22b (emphasis in original). The chancellor also noted that 
MAP's Board of Directors "did not seek help from local law-enforcement 
officers, nor did they complain to United States authorities for protection 
of their cooks from possible reprisals arising from trade with the white 
merchants"; and that "MAP employees in Claiborne County continued to 
take an active part in the NAACP activities and to support the boycott by 
picketing and marching." Id., at 23b. The Mississippi Supreme Court 
rejected the chancellor's findings and concluded that MAP was not a willing 
participant in the boycott, thus absolving it from liability. 
&> Id., at 25b. One of the respondents awarded the most in damages, Bar-
bara Ellis-a partner in Ellis Variety Store-testified that the store was 
boycotted from April 1, 1966 until January 27, 1967. On the latter date, 
,l - -
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One event that occurred during the boycott is of particular 
significance. On April 18, 1969, a young black man named 
Roosevelt Jackson was shot and killed during an encounter 
with two Port Gibson police officers. 31 Large crowds imme-
diately gathered, first at the hospital and later at the church. 
Tension in the community neared a breaking point. The 
local police requested reinforcements from the State High-
way Patrol and sporadic acts of violence ensued. The Mayor 
and Board of Aldermen placed a dawn to dusk curfew into 
effect. 
On April 19, Charles Evers spoke to a group assembled at 
the First Baptist Church and led a march to the courthouse 
where he demanded the discharge of the entire Port Gibson 
Police Force. When this demand was refused, the boycott 
was reimposed on all white merchants. One of Evers' 
speeches on this date was recorded by the police. In that 
speech-significant portions of which are reproduced in an 
appendix to this opinion-Evers stated that boycott violators 
would be "disciplined" by their own people and warned that 
the sheriff could not sleep with boycott violators at night. 
On April 20, Aaron Henry came to Port Gibson, spoke to a 
large gathering, urged moderation, and joined local leaders in 
a protest march and a telegram sent to the Attorney General 
of the United States. On April 21, Evers gave another 
speech to several hundred people, in which he again called for 
a discharge of the police force and for a total boycott of all 
white-owned businesses in Claiborne County. Although this 
speech was not recorded, the chancellor found that Evers 
the store agreed-apparently at the urging of a biracial committee-to hire 
a black cashier. R. 1183. The boycott was reimposed on April 17, 1968, 
after the death of Martin Luther King, but again was lifted on May 1, 1968. 
R. 1184. The boycott finally was reimposed on April 19, 1969, the day fol-
lowing the shooting of Roosevelt Jackson. Ibid. 
3
' The officers had gone to Jackson's home to arrest him. A scuffle en-
sued and Jackson was shot by a white officer allegedly while being held by 
a black officer. 
J - -
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stated: "If we catch any of you going in any of them racist 
stores, we're gonna break your damn neck." 32 
As noted, this lawsuit was filed in October 1969. No sig-
nificant events concerning the boycott occurred after that 
time. The chancellor identified no incident of violence that 
occurred after the suit was brought. He did identify, how-
ever, several significant incidents of boycott-related violence 
that occurred some years earlier. 
Before describing that evidence, it is appropriate to note 
that certain practices generally used to encourage support for 
the boycott were uniformly peaceful and orderly. The few 
marches associated with the boycott were carefully con-
trolled by black leaders. Pickets used to advertise the boy-
cott were often small children. The police made no arrests-
and no complaints are recorded-in connection with the pick-
eting and occasional demonstrations supporting the boycott. 
Such activity was fairly irregular, occurred primarily on 
weekends, and apparently was largely discontinued around 
the time the lawsuit was filed. 33 
One form of "discipline" of black persons who violated the 
boycott appears to have been employed with some regularity. 
Individuals stood outside of boycotted stores and identified 
those who traded with the merchants. Some of these indi-
~ Id., at 27b. 
3.1 R. 1146. The sheriff of Claiborne County testified: "There were pick-
ets off and on from April, 1966 to 1970." R. 1060. When asked to de-
scribe "how they conducted themselves , what they did, what they went 
about doing," he stated: "Most of them carried or either had signs on their 
shoulders and they walked up and down the streets in front of the stores. 
They wouldn't always picket the same stores at the same time. At differ-
ent times they might picket M&M then they would move up and picket 
Claiborne Hardware down Market Street to other businesses. Most of the 
time it was teenagers and at the last it was little bitty fellows, as young as 
about six years old. That was '69 and '70." Ibid. The sheriff also testi-
fied that the boycott was "tight" in April of 1966, April of 1968, and April of 
1969. R. 1152. 
- -
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viduals were members of a group known as the "Black Hats" 
or the "Deacons." 34 The names of persons who violated the 
boycott were read at meetings of the Claiborne County 
NAACP and published in a mimeographed paper entitled the 
"Black Times." As stated by the chancellor, those persons 
"were branded as traitors to the black cause, called demean-
ing names, and socially ostracized for merely trading with 
whites." 35 
The chancellor also concluded that a quite different form of 
discipline had been used against certain violators of the boy-
cott. He specifically identified ten incidents that "strik-
ingly" revealed the "atmosphere of fear that prevailed among 
blacks from 1966 until 1970." 36 The testimony concerning 
four incidents convincingly demonstrates that they occurred 
because the victims were ignoring the boycott. In two 
cases, shots were fired at a house; in a third, a brick was 
thrown through a windshield; in the fourth, a flower garden 
was damaged. None of these four victims, however, ceased 
trading with white merchants. 37 
31 Evidence concerning the aims and practices of the "Black Hats" is 
contradictory. Respondents describe them as a "paramilitary organiza-
tion." Petitioner Elmo Scott, a member of the group, testified concerning 
instructions that were given to him: "It was given to the Deacons to give 
respect to the people that was on the street and, regardless of what they 
say back to you, for you not to use bad language to them or not to curse 
them or no kind of way, just talk to them in the right manner of way." R. 
2985. It is undisputed that the "Black Hats" were formed during the boy-
cott, that members of the organization engaged in "store watching" and 
other "enforcement" activities , and that some individuals who belonged to 
the group committed acts of violence. 
as App. to Pet. for Cert. 19b. 
36 Id., at 35b. 
37 On August 22, 1966, birdshot was fired into the home of James 
Gilmore, a black man who ignored the boycott. He immediately grabbed a 
shotgun, leapt into his car, pursued the vehicle from which he believed the 
shots had come, forced it to the side of the road, and apprehended three 
young black men who were active supporters of the boycott. They were 
- -
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The evidence concerning four other incidents is less clear, 
but again it indicates that an unlawful form of discipline was 
applied to certain boycott violators. In April 1966, a black 
couple named Cox asked for a police escort to go into a white-
owned dry cleaner and, a week later, shots were fired into 
their home. In another incident, an NAACP member took a 
bottle of whiskey from a black man who had purchased it in a 
white-owned store. The third incident involved a fight be-
tween a commercial fisherman who did not observe the boy-
cott and four men who "grabbed me and beat me up and took 
a gun off me." 38 In a fourth incident, described only in hear-
say testimony, a group of young blacks apparently pulled 
down the overalls of an elderly brick mason known as 
"Preacher White" and spanked him for not observing the 
boycott. 39 
indicted, tried, and convicted, but the convictions were set aside on appeal. 
Whitney v. State, 205 So. 2d 284 (Miss. 1967). Gilmore continued to pa-
tronize white merchants after the incident. 
In June 1966, while Murriel Cullens was having a beer in Wolfs Store, a 
brick was thrown through the windshield of his parked car. He had been 
patronizing white merchants and continued to do so thereafter. R. 14049. 
In November 1966, shotgun pellets were fired into the wall of his mother's 
home. She had received a number of threatening telephone calls criticiz-
ing her for patronizing white stores. She continued to do so after the 
indicent. R. 14003. At trial, Laura Cullens testified, in response to a 
question whether she had been scared: "No indeed. I haven't had a bone 
in me scared in my life from nobody. And I have always told them, they 
say, 'You're just an uncle tom.' And I say, 'Well, uncle tom can be blue, 
black, green or purple or white. If I feel I am in the right, I stand in that 
right and nobody tells me what to do."' R. 14017. 
James Bailey, who was a teenager at the time of the incident, testified 
that he had noticed that an elderly black lady named Willie Butler traded 
with a white merchant and had groceries delivered to her home. He testi-
fied that he destroyed flowers in her garden to punish her for violating the 
boycott. R. 3656. He stated that he acted on his own initiative and that 
Mrs. Butler continued to trade with the merchant. R. 3660, 3741. 
38 R. 13868. One of his assailants testified that the incident resulted 
from an automobile accident, rather than the boycott. R. 3656. 
39 "Preacher White" had died by the time of trial. No witness admitted 
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Two other incidents discussed by the chancellor are of less 
certain significance. Jasper Coleman testified that he par-
ticipated in an all-night poker game at a friend's house on 
Christmas Eve 1966. The following morning he discovered 
that all four tires of his pick-up truck had been slashed with a 
knife. Coleman testified that he did not participate in the 
boycott but was never threatened for refusing to do so. R. 
13791. Finally, Willie Myles testified that he and his wife 
received a threatening phone call and that a boy on a barge 
told him that he would be whipped for buying his gas at the 
wrong place. 
Five of these incidents occurred in 1966. The other five 
are not dated. The chancellor thus did not find that any act 
of violence occurred after 1966. ~0 In particular, he made no 
reference to any act of violence or threat of violence-with 
the exception, of course, of Charles Evers' speeches-after 
the shootings of Martin Luther King in 1968 or Roosevelt 
Jackson in 1969. The chancellor did not find that any of the 
incidents of violence was discussed at the Tuesday evening 
being present at what respondents' counsel characterized as "the spanking 
of Preacher White." R. 3696. The Port Gibson Chief of Police testified, 
however, that White had come in and complained that a group of young 
blacks had pulled his overalls down and whipped him. R. 2176. In de-
scribing this incident, the chancellor stated that Preacher White "was 
stripped of his clothing and whipped by a group of young blacks because he 
refused to honor the boycott. " App. to Pet. for Cert. 37b. 
4-0 In describing the "atmosphere of fear" existing during the boycott, the 
chancellor emphasized the participation of petitioner Rudy Shields. He 
stated: 
"Defendant Rudolph J. (Rudy) Shields, formerly of Chicago, was the prin-
cipal figure in several altercations. He boasted that he was 'the most 
jailed person in the Claiborne County boycott.' This man was the ac-
knowledged leader of the 'Deacons. ' " Id. , at 35b. 
See also Respondents' Supplemental Brief 10-13. The record indicates 
that Shields was in Port Gibson for approximately eight months during 
1966. R. 4993. 
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meetings of the NAACP. 41 
II 
This Court's jurisdiction to review the judgment of the 
Mississippi Supreme Court is, of course, limited to the fed-
eral questions necessarily decided by that court. 42 We con-
sider first whether petitioners' activities are protected in any 
respect by the Federal Constitution and, if they are, what ef-
fect such protection has on a lawsuit of this nature. 
A 
The boycott of white merchants at issue in this case took 
many forms. The boycott was launched at a meeting of a 
local branch of the NAACP attended by several hundred per-
sons. Its acknowledged purpose was to secure compliance 
by both civic and business leaders with a lenghty list of de-
mands for equality and racial justice. The boycott was sup-
ported by speeches and nonviolent picketing. Participants 
repeatedly encouraged others to join in its cause. 
Each of these elements of the boycott is a form of speech or 
conduct that is ordinarily entitled to protection under the 
First and Fourteenth Amendments. 43 The black citizens 
" The chancellor did find-and apparently believed this fact to be signifi-
cant-that the NAACP provided attorneys to black persons arrested in 
connection with acts arising from the boycott. App. to Pet. for Cert. 38b. 
The NAACP provided legal representation to the three black persons ar-
rested in August 1966 following the Gilmore shooting. 
•
2 Although the Mississippi Supreme Court remanded for a recomputa-
tion of damages, its judgment is final for purposes of our jurisdiction. See 
Cox Broadcasting v. Cohn, 420 U. S. 469, 480. 
43 "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, 
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of 
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assembly, 
and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." U. S. 
Const., Arndt. I. First Amendment freedoms are protected by the Four-
teenth Amendment from invasion by the States. Edwards v. South Caro-
lina, 372 U. S. 229, 235. 
- -
81-202-OPINION 
NAACP v. CLAIBORNE HARDWARE CO. 21 
named as defendants in this action banded together and col-
lectively expressed their dissatisfaction with a social struc-
ture that had denied them rights to equal treatment and re- · 
spect. As we so recently acknowledged in Citizens Against 
Rent Control v. Berkeley, -- U.S.-- , --, "the prac-
tice of persons sharing common views banding together to 
achieve a common end is deeply embedded in the American 
political process." We recognized that "by collective effort 
individuals can make their views known, when, individually, 
their voices would be faint or lost." Ibid. In emphasizing 
"the importance of freedom of association in guaranteeing the 
right of people to make their voices heard on public issues," 
ibid., we noted the words of Justice Harlan, writing for the 
Court in NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U. S. 449, 460: 
"Effective advocacy of both public and private points of 
view, particularly contr9versial ones, is undeniably en-
hanced by group association, as this Court has more than 
once recognized by remarking upon the close nexus be-
tween the freedoms of speech and assembly." 
. ' 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE stated for the Court in Citizens Against 
Rent Control: "There are, of course, some activities, legal if 
engaged in by one, yet illegal if performed in concert with 
others, but political expression is not one of them." --
U.S., at - -. 
The right to associate does not lose all constitutional pro-
tection merely because some members of the group may have 
participated in conduct or advocated doctrine that itself is not 
protected. In De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U. S. 353, the Court 
unanimously held that an individual could not be penalized 
simply for assisting in the conduct of an otherwise lawful 
meeting held under the auspices of the Communist Party, an 
organization that advocated "criminal syndicalism." After 
reviewing the rights of citizens "to meet peaceably for con-
sultation in respect to public affairs and to petition for a re-
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ing for the Court, stated: 
"It follows from these considerations that, consistently 
with the Federal Constitution, peaceable assembly for 
lawful discussion cannot be made a crime. The holding 
of meetings for peaceable political action cannot be pro-
scribed. Those who assist in the conduct of such meet-
ings cannot be branded as criminals on that score. The 
question, if the rights of free speech and peaceable as-
sembly are to be preserved, is not as to the auspices 
under which the meeting is held but as to its purpose; not 
as to the relations of the speakers, but whether their ut-
terances transcend the bounds of the freedom of speech 
which the Constitution protects. If the persons assem-
bling have committed crimes elsewhere, if they have 
formed or are engaged in a conspiracy against the public 
peace and order, they may be prosecuted for their con-
spiracy or other violation of valid laws. But it is a dif-
ferent matter when the State, instead of prosecuting 
them for such offenses, seizes upon mere participation in 
a peaceable assembly and a lawful public discussion as 
the basis for a criminal charge." Id., at 365. 
Of course, the petitioners in this case did more than assem-
ble peaceably and discuss among themselves their grievances 
against governmental and business policy. Other elements 
of the boycott, however, also involved activities ordinarily 
safeguarded by the First Amendment. In Thornhill v. Ala-
bama, 310 U. S. 88, the Court held that peaceful picketing 
was entitled to constitutional protection, even though, in that 
case, the purpose of the picketing "was concededly to advise 
customers and prospective customers of the relationship ex-
isting between the employer and its employees and thereby 
to induce such customers not to patronize the employer." 
Id., at 99. Cf. Chauffeurs Union v. Newell, 356 U. S. 341. 
In Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U. S. 229, we held that a 
peaceful march and demonstration was protected by the 
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rights of free speech, free assembly, and freedom to petition 
for a redress of grievances. 
Speech itself also was used to further the aims of the boy-
cott. Nonparticipants repeatedly were urged to join the 
common cause, both through public address and through per-
sonal solicitation. These elements of the boycott involve 
speech in its most direct form. In addition, names of boycott 
violators were read aloud at meetings at the First Baptist 
Church and published in a local black newspaper. Petition-
ers admittedly sought to persuade others to join the boycott 
through social pressure and the "threat" of social ostracism. 
Speech does not lose its protected character, however, sim-
ply because it may embarrass others or coerce them into ac-
tion. As Justice Rutledge, in describing the protection af-
forded by the First Amendment, explained: 
"It extends to more than abstract discussion, unrelated 
to action. The First Amendment is a charter for gov-
ernment, not for an institution of learning. 'Free trade 
in ideas' means free trade in the opportunity to persuade 
to action, not merely to decribe facts." Thomas v. Col-
lins, 323 U. S. 516, 537. 
In Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U. S. 
415, the Court considered the validity of a prior restraint on 
speech that invaded the "privacy" of the respondent. Peti-
tioner, a racially integrated community organization, charged 
that respondent, a real estate broker, had engaged in tactics 
known as "blockbusting" or "panic peddling." 44 Petitioner 
asked respondent to sign an agreement that he would not so-
licit property in their community. When he refused, peti-
tioner distributed leaflets near respondent's home that were 
44 Specifically, petitioner contended that respondent "aroused the fears 
of the local white residents that Negroes were coming into the area and 
then, exploiting the reactions and emotions so aroused, was able to secure 
listings and sell homes to Negroes. " 402 U. S. , at 416. 
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critical of his business practices. ~5 A state court enjoined pe-
titioner from distributing the leaflets; an appellate court af~ · 
firmed on the ground that the alleged activities were coercive 
and intimidating, rather than informative, and therefore not 
entitled to First Amendment protection. Id., at 418. This 
Court reversed. THE CHIEF JUSTICE explained: 
"This Court has often recognized that the activity of 
peaceful pamphleteering is a form of communication pro-
tected by the First Amendment. E. g., Martin v. City 
of Struthers, 319 U. S. 141 (1943); Schneider v. State, 
308 U. S. 147 (1939); Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U. S. 444 
(1938). In sustaining the injunction, however, the Ap-
pellate Court was apparently of the view that petition-
ers' purpose in distributing their literature was not to in-
form the public, but to 'force' respondent to sign a 
no-solicitation agreement. The claim that the expres-
sions were intended to exercise a coercive impact on re-
spondent does not remove them from the reach of the 
First Amendment. Petitioners plainly intended to in-
fluence respondent's conduct by their activities; this is 
not fundamentally different from the function of a news-
paper. See Schneider v. State, supra; Thornhill v. Ala-
bama, 310 U. S. 88 (1940). Petitioners were engaged 
openly and vigorously in making the public aware of re-
spondent's real estate practices. Those practices were 
offensive to them, as the views and practices of petition-
ers are no doubt offensive to others. But so long as the 
means are peaceful, the communication need not meet 
standards of acceptability." Id., at 419. 
In dissolving the prior restraint, the Court recognized that 
"offensive" and "coercive" speech was nevertheless protected 
45 One of petitioner's officers testified at trial that he had hoped that re-
spondent would be induced to sign the no-solicitation agreement by letting 
"his neighbors know what he was doing to us. " Id ., at 417. 
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by the First Amendment. 46 
In sum, the boycott clearly involved constitutionally pro-
tected activity. The established elements of speech, assem-
bly, association and petition, "though not identical, are insep-
arable." Thomas v. Collins, 323 U. S. 516, 530. Through 
exercise of these First Amendment rights, petitioners sought 
to bring about political, social, and economic change. 
Through speech, assembly, and petition-rather than 
through riot or revolution-petitioners sought to change a so-
cial order that had consistently treated them as second-class 
citizens. 
The presence of protected activity, however, does not end 
the relevant constitutional inquiry. Governmental regula-
tion that has an incidental effect on First Amendment free-
doms may be justified in certain narrowly defined instances. 
See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U. S. 367. 47 A nonviolent 
and totally voluntary boycott may have a disruptive effect on 
local economic conditions. This Court has recognized the 
strong governmental interest in certain forms of economic 
regulation, even though such regulation may have an inci-
dental effect on rights of speech and association. See 
46 See Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 ("The language of the 
political arena, like the language used in labor disputes, see Linn v. United 
Plant Guard Workers of America, 383 U. S. 53, 58 (1966), is often vitu-
perative, abusive, and inexact. ") See also Cohen v. California, 403 U. S. 
15; Farber, Commercial Speech and First Amendment Theory, 74 Nw. U. 
L. Rev. 372 (1979). 
,; "To characterize the quality of the governmental interest which must 
appear, the Court has employed a variety of descriptive terms: compelling; 
substantial; subordinating; paramount; cogent; strong. Whatever impre-
cision inheres in these terms, we think it clear that a government regula-
tion is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of the 
Government; if it furthers an important or substantial governmental inter-
est; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free ex-
pression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment free-
doms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest." 
391 U. S., at 376-377 (footnotes omitted). 
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Giboney v. Empire Storage, 336 U. S. 490; NLRB v. Retail · 
Store Employees Union, 447 U. S. 607. The right of busi-
ness entities to "associate" to suppress competition may be 
curtailed. National Soc. of Professional Engineers v. 
United States, 435 U. S. 679. Unfair trade practices may be 
restricted. Secondary boycotts and picketing by labor 
unions may be prohibited, as part of "Congress' striking of 
the delicate balance between union freedom of expression and 
the ability of neutral employers, employees, and consumers 
to remain free from coerced participation in industrial strife." 
NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union, supra, at 617-618 
(BLACKMUN, J., concurring). See International Longshore-
men's Assoc. v. Allied International, -- U. S. --, --. 
While States have broad power to regulate economic activ-
ity, we do not find a comparable right to prohibit peaceful po-
litical activity such as that found in the boycott in this_ case. 
This Court has recognized that expression on public issues 
"has always rested on the highest rung of the hierarchy of 
First Amendment values." Carey v. Brown, 447 U. S. 455, 
467. "[S]peech concerning public affairs is more than self-
expression; it is the essence of self-government." Garrison 
v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 64, 74-75. There is a "profound na-
tional commitment" to the principle that "debate on public is-
sues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open." New 
York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254, 270. 
In Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Mo-
tor Freight, 365 U. S. 127, the Court considered whether the 
Sherman Act prohibited a publicity campaign waged by rail-
roads against the trucking industry that was designed to fos-
ter the adoption of laws destructive of the trucking business, 
to create an atmosphere of distaste for truckers among the 
general public, and to impair the relationships existing be-
tween truckers and their customers. Noting that the "right 
of petition is one of the freedoms protected by the Bill of 
Rights, and we cannot, of course, lightly impute to Congress 
an intent to invade these freedoms," the Court held that the 
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Sherman Act did not proscribe the publicity campaign. Id., 
at 137-138. The Court stated that it could not see how an 
intent to influence legislation to destroy the truckers as com-
petitors "could transform conduct otherwise lawful into a vi-
olation of the Sherman Act." Id., at 13&-139. Noting that 
the right of the people to petition their representatives in 
government "cannot properly be made to depend on their in-
tent in doing so," the Court held that "at least insofar as the 
railroads' campaign was directed toward obtaining govern-
mental action, its legality was not at all affected by any anti-
competitive purpose it may have had." Id., at 139-140. 
This conclusion was not changed by the fact that the rail-
roads' anticompetitive purpose produced an anticompetitive 
effect; the Court rejected the truckers' Sherman Act claim 
despite the fact that "the truckers sustained some direct in-
jury as an incidental effect of the railroads' campaign to influ-
ence governmental action." Id., at 143. 
It is not disputed that a major purpose of the boycott in 
this case was to influence governmental action. Like the 
railroads in Noerr, the petitioners certainly foresaw-and di-
rectly intended-that the merchants would sustain economic 
injury as a result of their campaign. Unlike the railroads in 
that case, however, the purpose of petitioners' campaign was 
not to destroy legitimate competition. Petitioners sought to 
vindicate rights of equality and of freedom that lie at the 
heart of the Fourteenth Amendment itself. The right of the 
States to regulate economic activity could not justify a com-
plete prohibition against a nonviolent, politically-motivated 
boycott designed to force governmental and economic change 
and to effectuate rights guaranteed by the Constitution it-
self. 48 
.is In NAACP v. A labama, 377 U. S. 288, the Court unanimously re-
jected Alabama's effort to oust the NAACP from that State. The State 
claimed, in part, that the NAACP was " 'engaged in organizing, supporting 
and financing an illegal boycott' " of Montgomery's bus system. Id., at 
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In upholding an injunction against the state supersedeas 
bonding requirement in . this case, Judge Ainsworth of the 
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit cogently stated: 
"At the heart of the Chancery Court's opinion lies the be-
lief that the mere organization of the boycott and every 
activity undertaken in support thereof could be subject 
to judicial prohibition under state law. This view ac-
cords insufficient weight to the First Amendment's pro-
tection of political speech and association. There is no 
suggestion that the NAACP, MAP or the individual de-
fendants were in competition with the white businesses 
or that the boycott arose from parochial economic inter-
ests. On the contrary, the boycott grew out of a racial 
dispute with the white merchants and city government 
of Port Gibson and all of the picketing, speeches, and 
other communication associated with the boycott were 
directed to the elimination of racial discrimination in the 
town. This differentiates this case from a boycott orga-
nized for economic ends, for speech to protest racial dis-
crimination is essential political speech lying at the core 
of the First Amendment." Henry v. First National 
Bank of Clarksdale, 595 F. 2d 291, 303 (1979)(footnote 
omitted). 
We hold that the nonviolent elements of petitioners' activities 
are entitled to the protection of the First Amendment. ~9 
302. Writing for the Court , Justice Harlan described as "doubtful" the 
"assumption that an organized refusal to ride on Montgomery's buses in 
protest against a policy of racial segregation might , without more, in some 
circumstances violate a valid state law." Id., at 307. In Missouri v. 
NOW, 620 F . 2d 1301, 1317 (CA8 1980), cert. denied, 449 U. S. 842, Judge 
Stephenson stated that "the right to petition is of such importance that it is 
not an improper interference [under state tort law] even when exercised by 
way of a boycott. " 
'
9 We need not decide in this case the extent to which a narrowly tailored 
statute designed to prohibit certain forms of anticompetitive conduct or 
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The Mississippi Supreme Court did not sustain the chancel-
lor's imposition of liability on a theory that state law prohib-
. ited a nonviolent, politically-motivated boycott. The fact 
that such activity is constitutionally protected, however, im-
poses a special obligation on this Court to examine critically 
the basis on which liability was imposed. 50 In particular, we 
consider here the effect of our holding that much of petition-
ers' conduct was constitutionally protected on the ability of 
the State to impose liability for elements of the boycott that 
were not so protected. 51 
The First Amendment does not protect violence. "Cer-
tainly violence has no sanctuary in the First Amendment, 
and the use of weapons, gunpowder, and gasoline may not 
constitutionally masquerade under the guise of 'advocacy." ' 
certain types of secondary pressure may restrict protected First Amend-
ment activity. No such statute is involved in this case. Nor are we pre-
sented with a boycott designed to secure aims that are themselves prohib-
ited by a valid state law. See Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U. S. 460. 
50 "This Court's duty is not limited to the elaboration of constitutional 
principles; we must also in proper cases review the evidence to make cer-
tain that those principles have been constitutionally applied. This is such 
a case, particularly since the question is one of alleged trespass across 'the 
line between speech unconditionally guaranteed and speech which may le-
gitimately be regulated.' Speiser v. Randall , 357 U. S. 513, 525. In 
cases where that line must be drawn, the rule is that we 'examine for our-
selves the statements in issue and the circumstances under which they 
were made to see . . . whether they are of a character which the principles 
of the First Amendment, as adopted by the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, protect.' Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U. S. 331, 
335; see also One, Inc. , v. Olesen, 355 U. S. 371; Sunshine Book Co. v. 
Summerfield, 355 U. S. 372. We must 'make an independent examination 
of the whole record,' Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U. S. 229, 235, so as 
to assure ourselves that the judgment does not constitute a forbidden in-
trusion on the field of free expression.'' New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 
376 u. s. 254, 285. 
51 Although this is a civil lawsuit between private parties, the application 
of state rules of law by the Mississippi state courts in a manner alleged to 
restrict First Amendment freedoms constitutes "state action" under the 
Fourteenth Amendment. New York Times v. Sullivan, supra, at 265. 
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Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U. S. 66, 75 (Douglas, J., concur-
ring). Although the extent and significance of the violence 
in this case is vigorously disputed by the parties, there is no 
question that acts of violence occurred. No federal rule of 
law restricts a State from imposing tort liability for business 
losses that are caused by violence and by threats of violence. 
When such conduct occurs in the context of constitutionally 
protected activity, however, "precision of regulation" is de-
manded. NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415, 438. 52 Specifi-
cally, the presence of activity protected by the First Amend-
ment imposes restraints on the grounds that may give rise to ,. 
damage liability and on the persons who may be held account-
able for those damages. 
In United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U. S. 715, the Court 
considered a case in many respects similar to the one before 
us. The case grew out of the rivalry between the United 
Mine Workers (UMW) and the Southern Labor Union (SLU) 
over representation of workers in the southern Appalachian 
coal fields. A coal company laid off 100 miners of UMW's 
Local 5881 when it closed one of its mines. That same year, 
a subsidiary of the coal company hired Gibbs as mine superin-
tendent to attempt to open a new mine on nearby property 
through use of members of the SL U. Gibbs also received a 
contract to haul the mine's coal to the nearest railroad loading 
point. When he attempted to open the mine, however, he 
was met by armed members of Local 5881 who threatened 
Gibbs and beat an SL U organizer. These incidents occurred 
on August 15 and 16. Thereafter, there was no further vio-
lence at the mine site and UMW members maintained a 
peaceful picket line for nine months. No attempts to open 
the mine were made during that period. 
Gibbs lost his job as superintendent and never began per-
formance of the haulage contract. Claiming to have suffered 
losses as a result of the union's concerted plan against him, 
52 See also Carroll v. Pri,ncess Anne, 393 U. S. 175, 184; Keyishian v. 
Board of R egents , 385 U. S. 589, 604. 
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Gibbs filed suit in federal court against the international 
UMW. He alleged an unlawful secondary boycott under the 
federal labor laws and, as a pendent state law claim, "an un-
lawful conspiracy and an unlawful boycott aimed at him ... 
to maliciously, wantonly and willfully interfere with his con-
tract of employment and with his contract of haulage." Id., 
at 720. The federal claim was dismissed on the ground that 
the dispute was "primary" and therefore not cognizable 
under the federal prohibition of secondary labor boycotts. 
Damages were awarded against the UMW, however, on the 
state claim of interference with an employment relationship. 
This Court reversed. The Court found that the pleadings, 
arguments of counsel, and jury instructions had not ade-
quately defined the compass within which damages could be 
awarded under state law. The Court noted that it had "con-
sistently recognized the right of States to deal with violence 
and threats of violence appearing in labor disputes" and had 
sustained "a variety of measures against the contention that 
state law was pre-empted by the passage of federal labor leg-
islation." Id., at 729. To accomodate federal labor policy, 
however, the Court in Gibbs held: "the permissible scope of 
state remedies in this area is strictly confined to the direct 
consequences of such [ violent] conduct, and does not include 
consequences resulting from associated peaceful picketing or 
other union activity." Ibid. The Court noted that in United 
Construction Workers v. Laburnum Construction Corp., 347 
U. S. 656, damages were restricted to those directly and 
proximately caused by wrongful conduct chargeable to the 
defendants. "'Thus there [ was] nothing in the measure of 
damages to indicate that state power was exerted to compen-
sate for anything more than the direct consequences of the 
violent conduct."' Id., at 730 (quoting San Diego Building 
Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U. S. 236, 248, n. 6). 
The careful limitation on damage liability imposed in Gibbs 
resulted from the need to accomodate state law with federal 
labor policy. That limitation is no less applicable, however, 
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to the important First Amendment interests at issue in this 
case. Petitioners withheld their patronage from the white 
establishment of Claiborne County to challenge a political and 
economic system that had denied them the basic rights of dig-
nity and equality that this country had fought a civil war to 
secure. While the State legitimately may impose damages 
for the consequences of violent conduct, it may not award 
compensation for the consequences of nonviolent, protected 
activity. Only those losses proximately caused by unlawful 
conduct may be recovered. 
The First Amendment similarly restricts the ability of the 
State to impose liability on an individual solely because of his 
association with another. In Scales v. United States, 367 
U. S. 203, 229, the Court noted that a "blanket prohibition of 
association with a group having both legal and illegal aims" 
would present "a real danger that legitimate political expres-
sion or association would be impaired." The Court sug-
gested that to punish association with such a group, there 
must be "clear proof that a defendant 'specifically intend[s] to 
accomplish [the aims of the organization] by resort to vio-
lence."' Ibid. (quoting Noto v. United States, 367 U. S. 290, 
299). 53 Moreover, in Noto v. United States the Court empha-
sized that this intent must be judged "according to the strict-
est law," 54 for "otherwise there is a danger that one in sympa-
thy with the legitimate aims of such an organization, but not 
specifically intending to accomplish them by resort to vio-
lence, might be punished for his adherence to lawful and 
constitionally protected purposes, because of other and un-
protected purposes which he does not necessarily share." 
367 U. S., at 299-300. 
In Healy v. James, 408 U. S. 169, the Court applied these 
principles in a non-criminal context. In that case the Court 
53 See United States v. Robel, 389 U. S. 258; Elfbrandt v. Russell , 384 
U. S. 11; Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U. S. 500. 
54 "Strictissimijuris." 367 U.S., at 299. 
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held that a student group could not be denied recognition at a 
state-supported college merely because of its . affiliation with 
a national organization associated with disruptive and violent 
campus activity. It noted that "the Court has consistently 
disapproved governmental action imposing criminal sanctions 
or denying rights and privileges solely because of a citizen's 
association with an unpopular organization." Id., at 
185-186. The Court stated that "it has been established that 
'guilt by association alone, without [establishing] that an indi-
vidual's association poses the threat feared by the Govern-
ment,' is an impermissible basis upon which to deny First 
Amendment rights." Id., at 186 (quoting United States v. 
Robel, 389 U. S. 258, 265). "The government has the bur-
den of establishing a knowing affiliation with an organization 
possessing unlawful aims and goals, and a specific intent to 
further those illegal aims." I bid. 55 
The principles announced in Scales, Noto, and Healy are 
relevant to this case. Civil liability may not be imposed 
merely because an individual belonged to a group, some 
members of which committed acts of violence. For liability 
to be imposed by reason of association alone, it is necessary 
to establish that the group itself possessed unlawful goals and 
that the individual held a specific intent to further those ille-
gal aims. 56 "In this sensitive field, the State may not employ 
'means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties 
when the end can be more narrowly achieved.' Shelton v. 
55 In Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U. S. 362, the Court vacated an injunction, di-
rected against an entire police department, that had resulted from 20 spe-
cific incidents of police misconduct. The Court held that such collective 
responsibility should be limited to instances in which a concerted design 
existed to accomplish a wrongful objective. Id., at 373-376. 
56 Of course, the question whether an individual may be held liable for ) 
damages merely by reason of his association with others who committed 
unlawful acts is quite different from the question whether an individual 
may be held liable for unlawful conduct that he himself authorized or in-
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Tucker, 364 U. S. 479, 488 (1960)." Carroll v. Princess 
Anne, 393 U. S. 175, 184. 
III 
The chancellor awarded respondents damages for all busi-
ness losses that were sustained during a seven year period 
beginning in 1966 and ending December 31, 1972. 57 With the 
exception of Aaron Henry, all defendants were held jointly 
and severally liable for these losses. The chancellor's find-
ings were consistent with his view that voluntary participa-
tion in the boycott was a sufficient basis on which to impose 
liability. The Mississippi Supreme Court properly rejected 
that theory; it nevertheless held that petitioners were liable 
for all damages "resulting from the boycott." 58 In light of 
the principles set forth above, it is evident that such a dam-
age award may not be sustained in this case. 
The opinion of the Mississippi Supreme Court itself demon-
strates that all business losses were not proximately caused 
by the violence and threats of violence found to be present. 
The court stated that "coercion, intimidation, and threats" 
formed "part of the boycott activity" and "contributed to its 
almost complete success." 59 The court broadly asserted-
without differentiation-that "intimidation, threats, social 
ostracism, vilification, and traduction" were devices used by 
57 It is noteworthy that the portion of the chancellor's opinion discussing 
damages begins by referring expressly to the two theories of liability that 
the Mississippi Supreme Court rejected: 
"The complainants proved, in this record, that they suffered injury to 
their respective businesses as the direct and proximate result of the unlaw-
ful secondary boycott and the defendants' actions in restraining trade, all of 
which was accomplished by defendants through a conspiracy." App. to 
Pet. for Cert. 57b. 
In a footnote, the chancellor added that "any kind of boycott is unlawful if 
executed with force or violence or threats." Id., at 57b, n. 21. 
58 Id. , at 35a. 
59 Id., at 24a (emphasis added). 
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the defendants to effectuate the boycott. 60 The court re-
peated the chancellor's finding that "the volition of many 
black persons was overcome out of sheer fear." 61 These find-
ings are inconsistent with the court's imposition of all dam-
ages "resulting from the boycott." To the extent that the 
court's judgment rests on the ground that "many" black citi-
zens were "intimidated" by "threats" of "social ostracism, 
vilification, and traduction," it is flatly inconsistent with the 
First Amendment. The ambiguous findings of the Missis-
sippi Supreme Court are inadequate to assure the "precision 
of regulation" demanded by that constitutional provision. 
The record in this case demonstrates that all of respond-
ents' losses were not proximately caused by violence or 
threats of violence. As respondents themselves stated at 
page 12 of their brief in the Mississippi Supreme Court: 
"Most of the witnesses testified that they voluntarily 
went along with the NAACP and their fellow black citi-
zens in honoring and observing the boycott because they 
wanted the boycott." 
This assessment is amply supported by the record. 62 It is in-
60 Id., at 20a (quoting id. , at 39b). 
61 Ibid. (emphasis added). 
62 The testimony of Julia Johnson-although itself only a small portion of 
a massive record-perhaps best illustrates this point: 
Q. "How did you observe the boycott? 
A. "I just stayed out of the stores, because I had my own personal rea-
sons to stay out of the stores. There were some things I really wanted, 
and the things I wanted were the right to vote, the right to have a title--
Mrs. or Mr. or whatever I am, and not uncle or aunt, boy or girl. So that's 
what I wanted. And if I wanted a job-a qualified job, I wanted to have 
the opportunity to be hired. Not because I'm black or white, but just 
hired. 
Q. "And this was your reason for observing the boycott? 
A. "Yes, it was. 
Q. "And you were in favor of the boycott? 
A. "Yes, I was in favor of the boycott. 
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deed inconceivable that a boycott launched by the unanimous 
vote of several hundred persons succeeded solely through 
fear and intimidation. Moreover, the fact that the boycott 
"intensified" following the shootings of Martin Luther King 
and Roosevelt Jackson demonstrates that factors other than 
force and violence (by the petitioners) figured prominently in 
the boycott's success. The chancellor made no finding that 
any act of violence occurred after 1966. While the timing of 
the acts of violence was not important to the chancellor's im-
position of liability, it is a critical factor under the narrower 
rationale of the Mississippi Supreme Court. That court has 
completely failed to demonstrate that business losses suf-
fered in 1972-three years after this lawsuit was filed-were 
proximately caused by the isolated acts of violence found in 
1966. 63 It is impossible to conclude that state power has not 
been exerted to compensate respondents for the direct conse-
quences of nonviolent, constitutionally protected activity. 
This case is not like Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. 
Meadowmoor Dairies, 312 U. S. 287, in which the Court held 
that the presence of violence justified an injunction against 
both violent and nonviolent activity. 64 The violent conduct 
Q. "And it wasn't because somebody threatened you? 
A. "No, it wasn't because nobody threatened me. 
Q. "You weren't afraid? 
A. "Was I afraid? 
Q. "Yes. 
A. "No, I was not afraid." R. 15476. 
It is clear . that losses were sustained because persons like Julia Johnson 
''wanted justice and equal opportunity." R. 6864 (testimony of Margaret 
Liggins). See R. 6737, 12419, 13543-13544. 
63 It is also noteworthy that virtually every victim of the acts of violence 
found by the chancellor testified that he or she continued to patronize the 
white merchants. See supa, at 17-18. 
64 In Mine Workers v. Gibbs, supra, the Court stated that if "special 
facts" such as those presented in M eadowmoor "appeared in an action for 
damages after picketing marred by violence had occurred," they might 
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present in that case was pervasive. 65 The Court in 
M eadowmoor stated that "utterance in a context of violence 
can lose its significance as an appeal to reason and become 
part of an instrument of force." Id., at 293. The Court em-
phasized, however: 
"Still it is of prime importance that no constitutional 
freedom, least of all the guarantees of the Bill of Rights, 
be defeated by insubstantial findings of fact screening re-
ality. That is why this Court has the ultimate power to 
search the records in the state courts where a claim of 
constitutionality is effectively made. And so the right 
of free speech cannot be denied by drawing from a trivial 
rough incident or a moment of animal exuberance the 
conclusion that otherwise peaceful picketing has the 
taint of force." Ibid. 
Such "insubstantial findings" were not present m 
M eadowmoor. But in this case, the Mississippi Supreme 
Court has relied on isolated acts of violence during a limited 
period to uphold respondents' recovery of all business losses 
sustained over a seven-year span. No losses are attributed 
"support the conclusion that all damages resulting from the picketing were 
proximately caused by its violent component or by the fear which that vio-
lence engendered. " 383 U. S. , at 731-732. 
66 As described by the Court: "Witnesses testified to more than fifty in-
stances of windowsmashing; explosive bombs caused substantial injury to 
the plants of Meadowmoor and another dairy using the vendor system and 
to five stores; stench bombs were dropped in five stores; three trucks of 
vendors were wrecked, seriously injuring one driver, and another was 
driven into a river; a store was set on fire and in large measure ruined; two 
trucks of vendors were burned; a storekeeper and a truck driver were se-
verely beaten; workers at a diary which, like Meadowmoor, used the ven-
dor system were held with guns and severely beaten about the head while 
being told 'to join the union'; carloads of men followed vendors' trucks, 
threatening the drivers, and in one instance shot at the truck and driver." 
312 U. S., at 291-292. 
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to the voluntary participation of individuals determined to se-
cure "justice and equal opportunity." 66 The court's judg-
ment "screens reality" and cannot stand. 67 
Respondents' supplemental brief also demonstrates that on 
the present record no judgment may be sustained against 
most of the petitioners. Regular attendance and participa- } 
tion at the Tuesday meetings of the Claiborne County Branch 
of the NAACP is an insufficient predicate on which to impose 
liability. The chancellor's findings do not suggest that any 
illegal conduct was authorized, ratified, or even discussed at 
any of the meetings. The sheriff testified that he was kept 
informed of what transpired at the meetings; he made no ref-
erence to any discussion of unlawful activity. 68 To impose li- I m~ 
ability for presence at weekly meetings of the NAACP 
would- ironically-not even constitute "guilt by association," 
since there is no evidence that the association possessed un-
lawful aims. Rather, liability could only be imposed on a 
66 See n. 62, supra. 
fi1 For the same reasons, the permanent injunction entered by the chan-
cellor must be dissolved. Since the boycott apparently has ended, the 
Mississippi Supreme Court may wish to vacate the entire injunction on the 
ground that it is no longer necessary; alternatively, the injunction must be 
modified to restrain only unlawful conduct, and only the persons responsi-
ble for conduct of that character. 
68 See R. 1172. The strongest evidence of wrongdoing at the meetings 
was presented by petitioner Marjorie Brandon, who served at times as the 
local NAACP secretary. She testified that "in the meetings there were 
statements saying you would be dealt with" if found trading in boycotted 
stores. R. 5637. She stated that she understood "dealt with" to mean 
"they would take care of you, do something to you, if you were caught go-
ing in." Ibid. Her testimony does not disclose who made the statements, 
how often they were made, or that they were in any way endorsed by oth-
ers at the meetings. A massive damage judgment may not be sustained 
on the basis of this testimony; the fact that certain anonymous persons 
made such statements at some point during a seven-year period is insuffi-
cient to establish that the association itself possessed unlawful aims or that 
any petitioner specifically intended to further an unlawful goal. 
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"guilt for association" theory. Neither is permissible under 
the First Amendment. 69 
Respondents also argue that liability may be imposed on 
individuals who were either "store watchers" or members of 
the "Black Hats." There is nothing unlawful in standing out-
side of a store and recording names. Similarly, there is 
nothing unlawful in wearing black hats, although such ap-
parel may cause apprehension in others. As established 
above, mere association with either group--absent a specific 
intent to further an unlawful aim embraced by that group--is 
an insufficient predicate for liability. At the same time, the 
evidence does support the conclusion that some members of 
each of these groups engaged in violence or threats of vio-
lence. Unquestionably, these individuals may be held re-
sponsible for the injuries that they caused; a judgment tai-
lored to the consequences of their unlawful conduct may be 
sustained. 
Respondents have sought separately to justify the judg-
ment entered against Charles Evers and the national 
NAACP. As set forth by the chancellor, Evers was spe-
cially connected with the boycott in four respects. First, 
Evers signed the March 23 supplemental demand letter and 
unquestionably played the primary leadership role in the 
organization of the boycott. Second, Evers participated in 
69 A legal duty to "repudiate"-to disassociate oneself from the acts of 
another-cannot arfae unless, absent the repudiation, an individual could 
be found liable for those acts. As our decisions in Scales , Noto, and Healy 
make clear, see supra, at 33, civil liability may not be imposed merely be-
cause an individual belonged to a group, some members of which commit-
ted acts of violence. The chancellor in this case made no finding that the 
individuals who committed those acts of violence were "agents" or "ser-
vants" of those who attended the NAACP meetings; certainly such a rela-
tionship cannot be found simply because both shared certain goals. Cf. 
General Building Constractors Assn. v. Pennsylvania, -- U. S. --, 
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negotiations with MAP and successfully convinced MAP to 
abandon its practice of purchasing food alternately from 
white-owned and black-owned stores. Third, he apparently 
presided at the April 1, 1966 meeting at which the vote to be-
gin the boycott was taken; he delivered a speech to the large 
audience that was gathered on that occasion. See n. 28, 
supra. Fourth, Evers delivered the speeches on April 19 
and 21, 1969, which we have discussed previously. See 
supra, at 15; appendix. 
For the reasons set forth above, liability may not be im-
posed on Evers for his presence at NAACP meetings or his 
active participation in the boycott itself. To the extent that 
Evers caused respondents to suffer business losses through 
his organization of the boycott, his emotional and persuasive 
appeals for unity in the joint effort, or his "threats" of vilifica-
tion or social ostracism, Evers' conduct is constitutionally 
protected and beyond the reach of a damage award. Re-
spondents point to Evers' speeches, however, as justification 
for the chancellor's damage award. Since respondents 
would impose liability on the basis of a public address-which 
predominantly contained highly charged political rhetoric ly-
ing at the core of the First Amendment-we approach this 
suggested basis of liability with extreme care. 
There are three separate theories that might justify hold-
ing Evers liable for the unlawful conduct of others. First, a 
finding that he authorized, directed or ratified specific tor-
tious activity would justify holding him responsible for the 
consequences of that activity. Second, a finding that his 
public speeches were likely to incite lawless action Could jus-
tify holding him liable for unlawful conduct that in fact fol-
lowed within a reasonable period. Third, the speeches 
might be taken as evidence that Evers gave other specific in-
structions to carry out violent acts or threats. 
While many of the comments in Evers' speeches might 
have contemplated "discipline" in the permissible form of so-
cial ostracism, it cannot be denied that references to the pos-
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sibility that necks would be broken and to the fact that the 
chief of police could not sleep with boycott violators at night 
implicitly conveyed a sterner message. In the passionate at-
mosphere in which the speeches were delivered, they might 
have been understood as inviting an unlawful form of disci-
pline or, at least, as intending to create a fear of violence 
whether or not improper discipline was specifically intended. 
It is clear that "fighting words"-those that provoke imme-
diate violence-are not protected by the First Amendment. 
Chaplinsky v. New Hamshire, 315 U. S. 568, 572. Simi-
larly, words that create an immediate panic are not entitled 
to constitutional protection. Schenck v. United States, 249 
U. S. 47. 70 This Court has made clear, however, that mere 
advocacy of the use of force or violence does not remove 
speech from the protection of the First Amendment. In 
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U. S. 444, we reversed the convic-
tion of a Ku Klux Klan leader for threatening "revengeance" 
if the "suppression" of the white race continued; we relied on 
"the principle that the constitutional guarantees of free 
speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid or pro-
scribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except 
where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing im-
minent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such 
action." Id., at 447. See Noto v. United States, 367 U. S. 
299, 297-298 ("the mere abstract teaching ... of the moral 
propriety or even moral necessity for a resort to force and vi-
olence, is not the same as preparing a group for violent action 
and steeling it to such action.") See also Whitney v. Califor-
nia, 274 U. S. 357, 372 (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
The emotionally charged rhetoric of Charles Evers' 
speeches did not transcend the bounds of protected speech 
set forth in Brandenburg. The lengthy addresses generally 
contained an impassioned plea for black citizens to unify, to 
70 "The most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man 
in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic." 249 U. S., at 52. 
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support and respect each other, and to realize the political 
and economic power available to them. In the course of 
those pleas, strong language was used. If that language had 
been followed by acts of violence, a substantial question 
would be presented whether Evers could be held liable for 
the consequences of that unlawful conduct. In this case, 
however-with the possible exception of the Cox incident--
the acts of violence identified in 1966 occurred weeks or 
months after the April 1, 1966 speech; the chancellor made no 
finding of any violence after the challenged 1969 speech. 
Strong and effective extemporaneous rhetoric cannot be 
nicely channeled in purely dulcet phrases. An advocate I 
must be free to stimulate his audience with spontaneous and 
emotional appeals for unity and action in a common cause. 
When such appeals do not incite lawless action, they must be 
regarded as protected speech. To rule otherwise would ig-
nore the "profound national commitment" that "debate on 
public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open." 
New York Times v. Sullivan, supra, 376 U. S., at 270. 71 
For these reasons, we conclude that Evers' addresses did 
not exceed the bounds of protected speech. If there were 
other evidence of his authorization of wrongful conduct, the 
references to discipline in the speeches could be used to 
corroborate that evidence. But any such theory fails for the 
71 In Watts v. United States, 394 U. S. 705, the petitioner was convicted 
of willfully making a threat to take the life of the President. During a pub-
lic rally at the Washington Monument, petitioner stated in a small discus-
sion group: 
"They always holler at us to get an education. And now I have already 
received my draft classification as 1-A and I have got to report for my 
physical this Monday morning. I am not going. If they ever make me 
carry a rifle the first man I want to get in my sights is L.B.J." Id. , at 706 
This Court summarily reversed. The Court agreed with the petitioner 
that the statement, taken in context, was "a kind of very crude offensive 
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simple reason that there is no evidence--apart from the 
speeches themselves-that Evers authorized, ratified, or di-
rectly threatened acts of violence. 12 The Chancellor's find-
ings are not sufficient to establish that Evers had a duty to 
"repudiate" the acts of violence that occurred. 73 The findings 
are constitutionally inadequate to support the damage judg-
ment against him. 
The liability of the NAACP derived solely from the liability 
of Charles Evers. 74 The chancellor found: 
"The national NAACP was well-advised of Evers' ac-
tions, and it had the option of repudiating his acts or rati-
fying them. It never repudiated those acts, and there-
fore, it is deemed by this Court to have affirmed them." 
App. to Pet. for Cert. 42b-43b. 
Of course, to the extent that Charles Evers' acts are insuffi-
cient to impose liability upon him, they may not be used to 
impose liability on his principal. On the present record, l 
however, the judgment against the NAACP could not stand 
in any event. 
The associational rights of the NAACP and its members 
have been recognized repeatedly by this Court. 75 The 
12 There is evidence that Evers occasionally served as a "store watcher," 
but there is no suggestion that anything improper occurred on those 
occasions. 
73 See n. 69, supra. 
74 Indeed it is noteworthy that Aaron Henry-who was president of the 
Mississippi State Conference of the NAACP, president of the Coahoma 
County Branch of the NAACP, and a member of the Board of Directors of 
the national NAACP-was the only defendant dismissed by the chancellor 
on the merits. 
75 Cf. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U. S. 449; Bates v. 
City of Little Rock, 361 U. S. 516; Louisiana ex rel. Gremillion v. 
NAACP, 366 U. S. 293; NAACP v. Button , 371 U. S. 415; Gibson v. Flor-
ida Legislative Comm., 372 U. S. 539; NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Flow-
ers , 377 U. S. 288. 
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NAACP-like any other organization-of course may be held 
responsible for the acts of its agents throughout the country 
that are undertaken within the scope of their actual or appar-
ent authority. 76 Cf. American Society of Mechanical Engi- ·, 
neers, Inc. v. Hydrolevel, -- U. S. --. Moreover, the 
NAACP may be found liable for other conduct of which it had ~ _-;-t-; rr/lMl--elX 
knowledge and specifically ratified. I 7WV'- r · 
The chancellor made no finding that Charles Evers or any I ~
other NAACP member had either actual or apparent author-
ity to commit acts of violence or to threaten violent conduct. 
The evidence in the record suggests the contrary. Aaron 
Henry, president of the Mississippi State Branch of the 
NAACP and a member of the Board of Directors of the na-
tional organization, testified that the statements attributed 
to Evers were directly contrary to NAACP policy. R. 
4930. 77 Similarly, there is no evidence that the NAACP rati-
76 There is no question that Charles Evers--as its only paid represent-
ative in Mississippi-was an agent of the NAACP. 
77 In a footnote to his discussion of the NAACP's liability, the chancellor 
wrote: 
"Aaron E. Henry, a prominant black leader in the State of Mississippi, 
who was president of the Mississippi State Conference of the NAACP, 
president of the Coahoma County Branch of the NAACP, and a member of 
the Board of Directors of the national NAACP, testified that the NAACP 
'absolutely did not approve of the way the boycott was being conducted in 
Port Gibson. ' There is also evidence in the record tending to show that 
Evers was called to account by the national NAACP because of the manner 
in which the boycott was conducted. However , the NAACP took no ac-
tion whatever to curb Evers' activities in this co·nnection." App. to Pet. 
for Cert.42b n. 9. 
Henry's testimony concerning Evers' having been "called to account by the 
National NAACP" concerned Evers' failure to make proper reports and 
Henry's understanding that there was a personality clash between Evers 
and an executive of the NAACP. R. 4905, 4907. We have found no evi-
dence in the record that any representative of the national NAACP was 
advised of any facts concerning the manner in which the Port Gibson boy-
cott was conducted. 
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fled-or even had specific knowledge of-any of the acts of 
violence or threats of discipline associated with the boycott. 
Henry testified that the NAACP never authorized, and 
never considered taking, any official action with respect to 
the boycott. R. 4896. The NAACP supplied no financial 
aid to the boycott. R. 4940. The chancellor made no find-
ing that the national organization was involved in any way in 
the boycott. 78 
To impose liability without a finding that the NAACP au-
thorized-either actually or apparently-or ratified unlawful 
conduct would impermissibly burden the rights of political as-
sociation that are protected by the First Amendment. As 
Justice Douglas noted in NAACP v. Overstreet, 384 U. S. 
118, dissenting from a dismissal of a writ of certiorari found 
to have been improvidently granted: 
"To equate the liability of the national organization 
with that of the Branch in the absence of any proof that 
the national authorized or ratified the misconduct in 
question could ultimately destroy it. The rights of po-
litical association are fragile enough without adding the 
additional threat of destruction by lawsuit. We have 
not been slow to recognize that the protection of the 
First Amendment bars subtle as well as obvious devices 
by which political association might be stifled. See 
Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U. S. 516, 523. Thus we have 
held that forced disclosure of one's political associations 
is, at least in the absence of a compelling state interest, 
inconsistent with the First Amendment's guaranty of 
associational privacy. E.g. , DeGregory v. New Hamp-
78 The chancellor did find that the NAACP had posted bond and provided 
legal representation for arrested boycott violators. Since the NAACP 
regularly provides such assistance to indigent black persons throughout 
the country, this finding cannot support a determination that the national / 
organization was aware of, and ratified, unauthorized violent conduct. 
Counsel for respondents does not contend otherwise. 
- -
81-202-OPINION 
46 NAACP v. CLAIBORNE HARDWARE CO. 
shire, 338 U. S. 825; Gibson v. Florida Legislative 
Comm., 372 U. S. 539, 54~546; Shelton v. Tucker, 364 
U. S. 479; N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama, 357 U. S. 449, 
462-463. Recognizing that guilt by association is a phi-
losophy alien to the traditions of a free society (see 
Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U. S. 232, 
245-246) and the First Amendment itself, we have held 
that civil or criminal disabilities may not be imposed on 
one who joins an organization which has among its pur-
poses the violent overthrow of the Government, unless 
the individual joins knowing of the organization's illegal 
purposes (Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U. S. 183) and with 
the specific intention to further those purposes. See 
Eljbrandt v. Russell, ante, p. 11; Aptheker v. Secretary 
of State, 378 U. S. 500." Id., at 122. 
The chancellor's findings are not adequate to support the 
judgment against the NAACP. 
IV 
In litigation of this kind the stakes are high. Concerted 
action is a powerful weapon. History teaches that special 
dangers are associated with conspiratorial activity. 79 And 
yet one of the foundations of our society rest on the right of I 
individuals to combine with other persons in pursuit of a com-
19 In discussing the doctrine of criminal conspiracy, Justice Jackson 
noted: 
"The crime comes down to us wrapped in vague but unpleasant connota-
tions. It sounds historical undertones of treachery, secret plotting and vi-
olence on a scale that menaces social stability and the security of the state 
itself. 'Privy conspiracy' ranks with sedition and rebellion in the Litany's 
prayer for deliverance. Conspiratorial movements do indeed lie back of 
the political assassination, the coup d'etat, the putsch, the revolution, and 
seizures of power in modern times, as they have in all history. " 
Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U. S. 440, 448 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
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mon goal by lawful means. 80 
At times the difference between lawful and unlawful collec-
tive action may be identified easily by reference to its pur-
pose. In this case, however, petitioners' ultimate objectives 
were unquestionably legitimate. The charge of illegality-
like the claim of constitutional protection-derives from the 
means employed by the participants to achieve those goals. 
The use of speeches, marches, and threats of social ostracism I 07Y'~ 
cannot provide the basis for a damage award. But violent J 
conduct is beyond the pale of constitutional protection. 
The taint of violence colored the conduct of some of the pe-
titioners. They, of course, may be held liable for the conse- J 
quence of their violent deeds. The burden of demonstrating 
that it colored the entire collective effort, however, is not sat-
isfied by evidence that violence occurred or even that vio-
lence contributed to the success of the boycott. A massive 
and prolonged effort to change the social, political, and eco-
nomic structure of a local environment cannot be character-
ized as a violent conspiracy simply by reference to the 
ephemeral consequences of relatively few violent acts. Such 
a characterization must be supported by findings that ade-
quately disclose the evidentiary basis for concluding that spe-
cific parties agreed to use unlawful means, that carefully 
identify the impact of such unlawful conduct, and that recog-
nize the importance of avoiding the imposition of punishment 
for constitutionally protected activity. The burden of dem-
onstrating that fear rather than protected conduct was the 
dominant force in the movement is heavy. A court must be 
wary of a claim that the true color of a forest is better re-
80 "The most natural privilege of man, next to the right of acting for him-
self, is that of combining his exertions with those of his fellow creatures 
and in acting in common with them. The right of association therefore ap-
pears to me almost as inalienable in its nature as the right of personal lib-
erty. No legislator can attack it without impairing the foundations of soci-
ety." de Tocqueville, Democracy in America 203 (Bradley ed. 1954). 
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vealed by reptiles hidden in the weeds than by the foliage of 
countless free-standing trees. The findings of the chancel-
lor, framed largely in the light of two legal theories rejected 
by the Mississippi Supreme Court, are constitutionally insuf-
ficient to support the judgment that all petitioners are liable 
for all losses resulting from the boycott. 
The judgment is reversed. The case is remanded for fur-
ther proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
JUSTICE MARSHALL took no part in the consideration or 
consideration of this case. 
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APPENDIX 
Portions of speech delivered by Charles Evers 
on April 19, 1969 (R. 1091-1130): 
"Thank you very much. We want our white friends here 
to know what we tell them happens to be so. Thank you for 
having the courage to walk down those streets with us. We 
thank you for letting our white brothers know that Port Gib-
son ain't none of their town. (Amen) (Applause) That 
Port Gibson is all of our town. (Applause) That black folks, 
red folks, Chinese and Japanese alike (Yeah) (That's 
right.), that we are going to have our share. (Yeah, we are.) 
"We are going to beat you because we know you can't trick 
us no more. (yea) You are not going to be able to fool us by 
getting somebody to give us a drink of whiskey no more. 
(Applause) You ain't gonna be able to fool us by somebody 
giving us a few dollars no more. (Applause) We are gonna 
take your money and drink with you and then we're gonna 
(Applause) vote against you. Then we are going to elect a 
sheriff in this county and a sheriff that is responsible, that 
won't have to run and grab the telephone and call up the 
blood-thirsty highway patrol when he gets ready (Yeah) to 
come in and beat innocent folks down to the ground for no 
cause. (That's right) (Applause) (Boo) We are going to 
elect a sheriff that can call his deputies and represent black 
leaders in the community and stop whatever problem there 
is. (Yeah) (That's right.) 
"Then we are going to do more than that. The white mer-
chants of this town are so wrapped up in the power structure 
here, since you love your Police Department so well, since 
you support them so well (Yeah), we are going to let them 
buy your dirty clothes and your filthy, rotten groceries. 
"Oh, no, white folks, we ain't going to shoot you with no 
bullet. (That's right.) We are going to shoot you with our 
ballots and with our bucks. (Yea) (That's right.) We are 
going to take away from you the thing that you have had over 
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us all these years. (Yeah) Political power and economic 
power. While you kill our brothers and our sisters and rape 
our wives and our friends. (Yeah) You're guilty. You're 
guilty because you don't care a thing about anybody. (Yes.) 
And when you go and let a big, black burly nigger like you 
get on the police force (Yea) go down and grab another black 
brother's arm and hold it while a white racist stole him from 
us, and he's a liar if he says he didn't hold him. 
"We mean what we are saying. We are not playing. 
(Right) We better not even think one of us is black. You 
better not even be caught near one of these stores. 
(Applause) 
"We don't want you caught in Piggly-Wiggly. You re-
member how he grinned at us four year's ago? (Yeah) You 
know how when he took office he grinned at us? (Yeah) He 
ain't hired nobody yet. (That's right) (No) And you know 
old Jitney Jungle down there with those funny letters down 
on the end? (That's right) (Applause) He haven't hired 
nobody in there yet. (No) Do you know poor ole M & Mor 
whatever it stands for, mud and mush, I guess. (Applause) 
They're out here on the highway and they haven't hired none 
of us yet. 
"Do you know Ellis who had a part-time boy all his life? 
He ain't hired nobody, is he, yet? (No) Then we got ole 
Stampley, and ninety-nine and three-fourths of his sales are 
black folks business. He got the nerve to tell me he ain't 
gonna put no nigger ringing his cash register. I got news for 
you, Brother Stampley. You can ring it your damn self. 
(Extra loud applause.) I want some of you fat cats after this 
meeting who wants three of our young boys who ain't a'scar'd 
of white folks (Applause) (Me) and we want you that's willing 
to follow the rules now to go down by Brother Stampley's and 
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"Then we are going to tell all the young men that drive 
Piggly-Wiggly trucks now (Yeah) (Be careful, Son.) because 
the soul brothers and the spirit is watching you. (Extra loud 
applause.) 
"All right, Brother Wolf, you're next. (Applause) We 
got a couple of 'em to come down by Brother Wolfs. We 
mean business, white folks. We ain't gonna shoot you all, 
we are going to hit you where it hurts most. (In the pocket-
book) (Applause) In the pocketbook and in the ballot box. 
(Applause) We may as well tell our friends at Alcorn to stay 
away from up here. (Yea) Now, you say, 'What's wrong 
with you niggers?' I'll tell you what is wrong with us nig-
gers; We are tired of you white folks, you racists and you big-
ots mistreating us. (Yeah) We are tired of paying you to 
deny us the right to even exist. (Tell 'em about it.) And we 
ain't coming back, white folks. (We ain't.) 
"You all put a curfew on us at eight o'clock tonight. We 
are going to do you better than that. We are going to leave 
at one-thirty. (Loud applause) We are going to leave at 
one-thirty and we ain't coming back, white folks. 
"We are going to have Brother McCay; we are going to 
have our newly elected mayor who we elected, we are going 
to have him around here, too. Come on back, my dear 
friend[, he say.] 'Naw, brother, we ain't coming.' 'Have 
you got rid of all those bigots you got on your police force?' 
'No.' 'Have you hired Negroes in all them stores?' 'No.' 
'Well, we ain't coming back.' (Right) That's all we gonna 
do. You know, what they don't realize is that you put on 
this curfew, that is all we needed. Let me just give them 
some instructions. We are going to buy gas only from the 
Negro-owned service stations. We agreed on it, remember? 
Now, don't back upon your agreement. (Yea) I don't care 
how many Negroes working on it, that's too bad. We are 
going only to Negro-owned service stations. And we are go-
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ing only-the only time you will see us around on this street, 
now listen good, you are going to Lee's Grocery and other 
stores on this end. Is that clear? (Yeah) (Applause) 
"We don't want to go to none of them drugstores. They 
get us confused. Now, who am I going to get my medicine 
from? Let us know in time and we will be glad to furnish a 
car free to carry you anywhere you have to go to get a pre-
scription filled. You can't beat this. (No) It won't cost 
you a dime. You go to any of the local black businessmen 
and tell them you have got to go to Vicksburg to get your 
stuff. And then if they don't carry you, let us know. We'll 
take care of them later. (Applause) Now, you know, we 
have got a little song that says, 'This is your thing, do what 
you want to do. ' (Applause) This is our thing, let's do what 
we want to do with it. Let's make sure now-if you be dis-
obedient now you are going to be in trouble. Remember 
that, now, listen. Listen good. They are going to start say-
ing 'You know what, Evers is down there with his goon 
squad, .. .' Now, we know Claiborne County,- 'with his 
goon squad harassing poor ole niggers. ' 
"Well, good white folks you have been harassing us all our 
lives. (Applause) And if we decided to harass you that's 
our business. (That's right) They are our children and we 
are going to discipline them the way we want to. Now, be 
sure you get all this right on all these tape recorders. What-
ever I say on this trip I will say it in Jackson. (Amen) 
(Glory) And I will say it in Washington and New York. 
White folks ain't gonna never control us no more. (Ap-
plause) 
"Now, my dear friends, the white folks have got the mes-
sage. I hope you have got the message and tell every one of 
our black brothers until all these people are gone, you voted 
on this in the church, don't let me down, and don't let your-
self down. We agreed in the church that we would vacate 
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this town until they have met those requests, the white folks 
don't demand nothing out of us. All right, white folks, we 
are just saying until you decide when you want to do these 
little things we beg of you, we are not coming back. (No 
way) 
"None of us better not be caught up here. (Yea) I don't 
care how old you are, I don't care how sick you are, I don't 
care how crazy you are, you better not be caught on these 
streets shopping in these stores until these demands are met. 
(Applause) 
"Now, let's get together. Are you for this or against it? 
(Applause) (For it.) Remember you voted this. We in-
tend to enforce it. You needn't go calling the chief of police, 
he can't help you none. You needn't go calling the sheriff, he 
can't help you none. (That's right.) He ain't going to offer 
to sleep with none of us men, I can tell you that. (Applause) 
Let's don't break our little rules that you agreed upon here. 
"Let's go to the funeral of our young son whenever the fu-
neral is. I don't want you to come with hate because that is 
not going to solve our problems. (No hate.) We don't want 
you to hate the white folks here in Port Gibson. That is not 
going to solve it. If you hate what they have done, I hate to 
get personal, I hate what they did so much to Medgar, (I 
know.) I ain't going to ever stop hating them for that. But I 
am going to chase them in the way what I know is right and 
just. I am not going to lay out in the bushes and shoot no 
white folks. That's wrong. I am not gonna go out here and 
bomb none of them's home. (No) That's not right. But I 
am going to do everything in my power to take away all the 
power, political power, legal power that they possess any-
where I live. We are going to compete against them. 
When we blacks learn to support and respect each other, 
then and not until then, will white folks respect us. 
(Applause) 
"Now, you know I trust white folks and I mean every word 
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I say. But it comes a time when we got to make up in our 
mind individually, are we going to make those persons worth-
while. We done talked and raised all kind of sand all day 
here, now, what is really going to prove it, are we going to 
live up to what we have said? (Applause) Now if there is 
any one of us breaks what we agreed upon, you are just as 
guilty as that little trigger-happy, blood-thirsty rascal. (Tell 
'em about it.) 
"I go all over this country, and I ought not to tell you white 
folks this, and I tell other white folks that some day we are 
going to get together in Mississippi, black and white, and 
work out our problems. And we are ready to start when-
ever you are. If you are ready to start, we are. We ain't 
going to let you push us , not one inch. (That's right.) If 
you come on beating us , we are going to fight back. (Right) 
We got our understanding. We are all God's children. The 
same man that brought you all here brought us . You could 
have been black just like we are. We could have been white 
and baldheaded just like you are. (Laughter) (Inaudible) 
We are going to work hard at this , Dan. We are going to be 
organized this time. We ain't going to be bought off and 
talked off. We are going to elect the county sheriff here this 
next time that don't need the highway patrol. Now, you 
see, Dan had a good chance to set himself up right, but he 
goofed it. He goofed. (Yeah) He blew it. (Laughter) 
Don't forget that, heah. (Right) It brings back memories 
like you know you remember things we do. 
"Now, if you don't think it is necessary, we don't have to go 
back to the church. If you want to go back there, we can. I 
want you to make sure here that we are going to leave this 
town to our white brothers and we ain't coming back no more 
until all our requests have been met. Is that the common 
consent of all you here? (Applause) (Let's go back to the 
church. ) All right. Are we willing to make sure that every-
one of us will be sure that none of the rest of our black broth-
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ers violate our ... (Yea) We are all saying it now. Let's 
not say it now so much on my part. You know, I'm just sort 
of leading, you know, how these lawyers are, leading our 
folks on to say what has to be said. And that's the case. 
Let's make us a white town. We would like for you to start 
it. Be courteous now. Don't mistreat nobody. Tell them, 
in a nice forceful way, the curfew is going to be on until they 
do what we ask them." 
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